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Decision-making is the most critical role that company directors have to play in the 
life of a company that they are appointed to manage. South African law (in s66 of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008, the Act) has now followed the global trend of recognising that 
directors have original authority or mandate to manage or direct company affairs or business.  
A director is accorded (by law) powers to exercise to enable him or her to fulfil the functions 
of that office. Decision-making, which is not an easy task, is critical to enterprise efficiency 
and advancement of the national economy. Directors have to make business decisions, at 
times under imperfect circumstances and while confronting tensions inherent in the corporate 
form. Not least of these tensions is the pressure to balance the profit maximisation drive from 
shareholders and accountability for how the directors exercise the powers at their disposal. 
Despite pressures involved in decision-making, the law requires that directors should exercise 
their powers in the best interests of the corporation. Thus the Act has attempted to put 
mechanisms in place to ensure that directors‘ freedom to manage corporations has to be 
necessarily constrained and balanced by the need for them to be accountable. 
 The thesis focuses on the duty of care, skill and diligence on one hand (standard of 
conduct), and the business judgment rule (BJR- standard of review) on the other. These are 
two mechanisms put in place by the Act to ensure a balance between directors‘ freedom to 
manage and accountability. The thesis seeks to answer the key question whether the Act has 
made standards of care, skill and diligence clearer, more accessible and enforceable than 
before in light of the Act‘s adoption of BJR. The thesis analyses the duty of care, skill under 
s76(3)(c) and BJR under s76(4) in light of the context of law reform (that is the purposes of 
law reform) and international experiences. In this thesis, an appraisal of the positives brought 
about by the codification of the duty of care and the adoption of BJR into statute for the first 
time in SA is given. It is argued that while some purposes of law reform have been achieved, 
the Act has not achieved the purpose of clarity of standards. For example, the analysis reveals 
unfortunate omissions and worrying ambiguities in the formulation of standards of care, skill 
and diligence in s76(3)(c). While giving in-depth analysis of the scope and policy rationale of 
BJR under the Act, the thesis further notes that the characterisation of BJR in s76(4)(a) as a 
standard of conduct as opposed to standard of review is problematic. It has also been argued 
that the BJR is not properly aligned to international standards. Clear amendments to the Act 
have been suggested to improve clarity of standards and the law in s76(3)(c) and s76(4)(a). 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO STUDY 
 
1. 1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY  
Decision-making in companies, which implicates the duty to exercise reasonable care, 
skill and diligence and the business judgment rule (hereafter BJR), has come under an 
increasing national and global spotlight in recent years. This is attributed to the recent global 
financial crisis and the evolving international best practices in corporate governance.
1
 The 
credit crunch, which is widely accepted as having been the sine quo none of the global 
financial crisis, was a result of a sustained period of careless and inappropriate lending in the 
USA banking sector.
2
  The crisis caused major corporate collapses in different parts of the 
world.
3
 It has been remarked that the global financial crisis was a corporate governance 
crisis.
4
 Consequently many countries, including South Africa were spurred to begin to 
critically consider the effectiveness of directors‘ standards of conduct especially during 
decision-making – when business judgments are made. Closer attention was given to 
investigating whether directors managed companies with the standard of care, skill and 




South Africa has now followed the example of nations such as Australia, the United 
Kingdom (the UK) and the United States of America (the USA) in effecting major corporate 
law reforms. The earlier King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (Institute of 
Directors in South Africa, 1994) (King I) and King Report on Corporate Governance for 
                                                                
1
  See  A Reisberg ‗Corporate Law in the UK after Recent Reforms: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly‘ (2010) 
316  Current Legal Problems  Vol 63 pp315-374;   J Cassidy ‗Models for Reform: The Directors‘ Duty of 
Care in a Modern Commercial World‘(2009) 3 Stell LR 373-406; M Bekink ‗An Historical Overview of the 
Director‘s Duty of Care and Skill: From the Nineteenth Century to the Companies Bill 2007‖ (2008) 20 SA 
Merc LJ 95-116; N Bouwman ―Modification of the Director‘s duty of care and skill‖ (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 
509-534. See also an article by a corporate lawyer in Germany T Zwinge entitled ‗Have Directors Duties Of 
Care And Skill Become More Stringent? What Has Driven This Development? Is this development 
beneficial- An analysis of the Duty of Care in the UK in Comparison to German Duty of Care, copy which is 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1591590 accessed on 10 November 2012. 
2
  McCarthy, C.2009. The global financial and economic crisis and its impact on Sub-Saharan economies.  
tralac Trade Brief 1, available at  
http://www.tralac.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/TB012009GlobalCrisis20090401Fin.pdf . 
Accessed on 22 November 2012.  
3
  The spate of the world-wide high profile corporate collapses includes Enron, Global Crossing, Xerox and 
WorldCom in the USA. Australia witnessed collapses of the Bond Corporation group of companies in the 
1980s and the HIH group in the 2000s, while Parmalat collapsed in Italy. Masterbond, Saambou Bank and 
Fidentia were failed businesses in South Africa in the recent past. Bekink (2008) SA Merc LJ 95.  
4
  See the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (The Institute of Directors in Southern 
Africa), September 2009 (King III). See ―Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis‖ on p8 of the report. 
5
  Cassidy (2009) Stell LR 373. 
2 
 
South Africa, 2002 (King II) and international experiences with respect to corporate law 
reforms gave South Africa the much needed impetus to revise its corporate laws. The 
publication of a policy paper entitled South African Company Law for the 21
st
 Century: 
Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform (hereafter the DTI Policy Document 2004) ignited the 
process of the ―overall review of company law‖ in South Africa.
6
 The result of this corporate 
law review process is a new Companies Act 71 of 2008
7
 (hereafter, the Act) which came to 
replace the old Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
The Act has interesting features and innovations which include the partial codification 
of directors‘ duties (including the duty of care, skill and diligence) and the inclusion of a 
USA-style BJR.
8
 The Act is in addition to a plethora of other commercial pieces of legislation 
recently passed by parliament.
9
 It can be said that the Act has opened the door for accelerated 
modernisation of corporate governance in South Africa.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement and introduction to Research Question  
While the provisions of the Act certainly bring something new to South African 
company law, it is doubtful if the Act has fully met expectations and some of its own stated 
goals. Of relevance to this thesis is the DTI Policy Document 2004‘s stated goal regarding 
directors‘ duties and standards of conduct. This goal is captured as a desire to provide for ―a 
clear, facilitating, predictable and consistently enforced law‖ which provides a ―protective 
and fertile ground for economic activity‖.
10
 It appears that the objective here was to present 
clear, ascertainable, unambiguous and easily enforceable directors‘ common law duties under 
s 76(3)(a)-(c) of the Act ( a statutory statement of directors‘ duties). The sub-goal of partial as 
opposed to total codification was to avoid stunting growth of the common law fiduciary 
duties and the duty of care, skill and diligence. This would allow for continued incremental 
development of the common law directors‘ duties through application by courts of law to 
different arising situations.
11
 It has been correctly stated that directors‘ common law duties 
                                                                
6
 GN 1183 in GG 2004-06-23.  
7
 GN 421 2009 in GG 32121, April 2009. 
8
 Cassim FHI ―The Challenge of Treasury Shares‖ in Mongalo TH (ed)   Modern Company Law for a 
Competitive South African Economy (Juta   Cape Town 2010) 151-164. 
9
 Examples include the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001, the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004, the 
Auditing Profession Act 26 of 2005, the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 
2008 and the Financial Markets Act 19 0f 2012.  
10 DTI Policy document 2004. 
11
 D Ahern ‗Directors‘ duties, Dry Ink and the Accessibility Agenda‘ (2012) 128 L.Q.R 114-139. Also see 




have ―endured remarkably, subject to incremental refinement by the courts to meet new 
factual scenarios and changing societal expectations‖.
12
  
Whether s 76(3) of the Act can be said to have made the statutory statement of 
directors‘ common law duties ―a clear‖ or ―facilitating‖ law remains debatable due to some 
ambiguous presentation of the provisions in that part of the Act. It is also seriously doubted if 
the law is now readily ascertainable and in particular, if the standards of care, skill and 
diligence have been clarified, going forward.
13
   
At a first reading of s76, the reader gets a sense that the section is drafted 
ambiguously and thus raises a number of questions of clarification. To begin with, it is very 
doubtful if s76 is correctly titled. The heading of the section reads ‗Standards of directors‘ 
conduct‘. While this aptly captures the standards contained in s 76(3) (a) –(c), it is not clear 
why the legislature categorised s76 (4) (a) as a standard of conduct. S 76(4) (a) is a South 
African statutory version of the BJR.
14
  
As aforementioned, another major question which needs to be answered concerns the 
clarity of directors‘ standards of care, skill and diligence. S 76 (3) (c) of the Act does not 
appear to have been presented in a manner that clarifies and improves the relevant standards 
of conduct expected of directors in a modern South Africa.  The intention of the legislature 
with regards to the duty of care, skill and diligence is unclear. In fact, it appears to be difficult 
to reconcile the lofty objectives of law reform plus the purposes of the Act
15
 on one side and 
the now statutory standards of care, skill and diligence on the other side. The exact standards, 
by which the duty was measured at common law, were not clear.
16
 Thus one major law 
reform objective was to develop a ―clear, facilitating, predictable and consistently enforced 
law‖.
17
 In this context, the Act appears to have intended to introduce high standards of 
corporate governance under the Act.
18
 By implication, clarifying and improving standards of 




                                                                
12
 Ahern (2012) L.Q.R 114-115. 
13 See Cassidy (2009) Stell LR 404.  Also see K H Lindsay ―Codification of directors‘ duties- Between the devil 
and the deep blue sea‖, available at http://www.hrfuture.net/governance/codification-of-directors-
duties.php?Itemid=153 (visited on 25 November 2012). 
14
 See part 5.4.1 of Chapter 5 for proper characterisation of the BJR.  
15
 See s7 for purposes of the Act. 
16
 Bekink (2008) SA Merc L.J 95. Part 4.2.1 of Chapter 4 further canvasses this point. 
17
 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Companies Bill, 2007, at p3.  
18
 See s7(b) (iii) of the Act. 
19
 See HS Cilliers, ML Benade, JJ Henning, JJ du Plessis, PA Delport, L de Koker & JT Pretorius Corporate 
Law 3 ed (2000) at 147 
4 
 
Related to the question of clarity highlighted above is the question of exactly what test 
is now applicable to the statutory duty of care, skill and diligence under the Act. From the 
manner that s76 (3) (c) is drafted, it is not crystal clear whether an objective test is intended 
to apply. Is the subsection comparable to the dual objective/subjective standards applicable 
under the current English statutory law?
20
 Was the Act designed to be declaratory of the 
common law without any statutory modification of the duty of care? The judiciary is likely to 
face difficulties in interpreting the purpose of s76 (3)(c) in the absence of any indication 
under s76 as to whether the Act intended to modify common law or not. 
Yet another question which needs to be answered relates to the status of the statutory 
duty of care vis-à-vis the common law.  The inquiry is whether legislative standards of 
conduct should operate in place of, in addition to, or whether they override the common law. 
This could potentially lead to confusion in given scenarios if for example, the content of the 
statutory duty of care is to be found to be more advanced than the common law. The language 
employed in formulating s76 (3)(c) is not crystal clear in these respects. This presents 
difficulties in assessing whether the Act improves the standards of care, skill and diligence, 
and could thus facilitate more effective enforcement.  
Closely related to the grey areas pointed to in the paragraph above is the need to 
establish clarity regarding the exact relationship between s 76(3) (b) – (c) and s 76 (4) (a) of 
the Act. It is widely accepted and recognised that s 76 (4) (a) of the Act is an incorporation of 
the USA-style BJR,
21
 despite the Act not referring to or even defining the concept ‗Business 
Judgment‘.  The first question that needs to be answered is whether the application of the 
BJR will have the effect of limiting the effectiveness and enforcement of the duty of care, 
skill and diligence. This work will investigate whether the BJR may have the opposite effect 
of enhancing the standards of corporate governance in South Africa.  
A double-edged question with regards to adoption of the BJR under the Act relates to 
an inquiry into the scope, content and rationale for BJR in South Africa. With regards to 
scope of application of the BJR under s76 (4) (a), it is not clear whether the BJR has general 
application, whether it applies in certain situations only and does not apply to other situations. 
In the USA where the rule originated in the state of Delaware as state case law, the rule is 
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mostly applicable in take-over defences.
22
 The statutory position in South Africa regarding 
the application of the BJR remains unexplained and therefore unclear.  
In the future interpretation and application of the BJR by the courts, spotlight will 
likely fall on the content of the rule. This thesis seeks to lead a discussion about and proposes 
to proffer suggestions on interpretation and application of the rule. This discussion is in form 
of the question as to why the South African version of the BJR specifically relates to 
subsections 76(3) (b) and (c) only.  Prima facie, the rationale for the exclusion of good faith 
requirements
23
 from the content of the rule is inexplicable. Traditionally, the BJR relates to 
the triads of the fiduciary elements of good faith and loyalty to the company as well as 
process due care in decision-making.
24
   
Another interesting point to note is that while South Africa has incorporated the BJR 
under the Act, the rule is not the subject of a statute in the USA
25
 and remains uncodified to 
this day.
26
 Two USA attempts to codify the rule in a statute failed.
27
 The rule is only the 
subject of a provision in the American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance (the 




1.3 Key Research Question and sub-inquiries 
The central question in this study is whether the Companies Act 2008 has adopted 
clearer, improved and more effective standards of directors‘ conduct in light of s76(3)(c) and 
the adoption of the BJR under the Act. Put differently, the question is whether the new Act 
can be said to have made the standards of care, skill and diligence more accessible, clearer, 
ascertainable and more enforceable in light of the incorporation of the BJR than prior to 
2008, in a manner that enhances corporate governance in South Africa.  
Answers to the following sub-enquiries will provide building blocks towards finding 
answers to the central research question: 
1. What lacuna (gap in law) did the Act seek to close through the reforms in standards of 
care, skill and diligence and by adopting the BJR? 
                                                                
22
  J Farrar ―Directors‘ duties of care: Issues of Classification, Insolvency and Business Judgment and the 
Dangers of Legal Transplants‖ (2011) 23 SAcLJ 745-761. 
23
 See s76 (3) (a) of the Act. 
24
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25
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26
 D Branson ―The Rule that isn‘t a Rule- The Business Judgment Rule‖ (2002) 36 Val.U.L. Rev 631-654. 
27
 See D Botha & R Jooste ―A critique of the Recommendations in the King Report regarding a Director‘s Duty 
of Care and Skill‖ (1997) SALJ 65-76; and Farrar (2011) SAcLJ 761.  
28
 See Branson (2002) Val.U.L. Rev at 634. 
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2. Are there international best practices relating to reforms of the duty of care, skill and 
diligence and the BJR? Are there any lessons for South Africa? 
3. Does s 76 (3) (c) introduce a purely objective test, a dual objective/subjective test or 
an even lower test for the duty of care and skill? How appropriate is this test for 
improving clarity and enforcement of the standards in light of adoption of the BJR? 
4. What is the content, rationale and scope of application of the BJR under the Act?  
5. Does s 76(4) (a) have the effect of limiting the application of s 76(3) (c) and 
weakening the standards or could it have the opposite effect? Could the BJR have the 
effect of blurring the fiduciary duty and the duty of care? 
6. Has the Act put in place mechanisms to ensure more effective interpretation, 
application and enforcement of the standards of care, skill and diligence than before? 
 
1.4 Brief literature review, justification of Study & gaps in knowledge  
The purpose of this section is to give a brief literature review on the opinions of major 
writers on the main questions relating to the directors‘ duty of care, skill, diligence and the 
BJR in South Africa in light of the new Act. The methodology in this part is to briefly state 
the views expressed by the leading writers, showing points of convergence and divergence. 
Any gaps in the existing body of knowledge and questions which still need further inquiry or 
alternative view- points will be identified. These will serve as justification for this Study.  
The duty of care is vital to the development of corporate law in South Africa.  It has 
been correctly submitted that ‗the duty of care and skill is of paramount importance as it 
applies to all decisions directors make or should make were they to exercise their powers to 
the benefit of the company and its shareholders‘.
29
 It is of great significance to the 
development of jurisprudence that at a time when there is a new law on directors‘ duties in 
South Africa, a PhD Study is devoted to a critical analysis of the standards of care, skill, 
diligence and the BJR under the Act. Other writers have certainly expressed views on the 
state of the law prior to the Act, while a few have attempted a review of the law after the 
enactment of the Act. It is argued in this part that there are still gaps in the law – making it 
necessary to further inquire into the state of directors‘ standards of care, skill, diligence and 
the BJR post the Act. 
The conceptual framework (Chapter 2) attempts to deal with the themes on 
foundational principles underpinning decision-making by directors (that is duty of care and 
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the BJR). This includes definitions of key terms and concepts to be covered in this Study. 
Views have been expressed on these issues by South African and international writers. For 







that directors‘ duties fall under corporate governance. It is further agreed that contemporary 
principles of corporate governance have played a key role in informing the need for and 
shaping the content of modern day standards expected of company directors. The 
aforementioned South African authors are also in agreement as to the role of the King 
Reports in fostering the highest standards of corporate governance in South Africa.
33
 
Bouwman in particular demonstrates the importance of the King Reports in contributing to 
development of jurisprudence in the country on key issues such as directors‘ standards of 
care, skill and diligence.
34
 The author further points out how the King II report in particular 
dealt with the contentious question on whether at law the role of the non-executive and 
executive directors should be distinguished. Bouwman remarks that though a distinction is 
drawn between the executive and non-executive directors of the company, both are bound by 
the duty of care and skill. The author does not clarify as to whether there is a differentiation 
of the standards expected of these two types of directors.
35
 These are two issues which are not 
yet trite law in South Africa even post the new Act. 
It is accepted by leading authors that the paramount duty of company directors in 
South African law is loyalty to the company by observing utmost good faith towards the 
company and to act in the best interests of the company. While discharging this 
responsibility, a company director is expected to, without fail, act with the necessary care, 
skill and with due diligence.
36
 That makes the duty of care critical and even central to the 
proper and lawful discharge of directorial responsibilities.  
With respect to whether South African law insists that there should not be a blurring 
of the distinction between the fiduciary duty and the duty of care, there appears to be both 
points of convergence and divergence among authors. For the reason that the BJR by its 
nature and origin potentially muddles the distinction between the two duties, its adoption 
under s 76(4) (a) has revived this debate. It was clearly trite before the new Act that in South 
Africa, a common law duty of care, skill and diligence is separate and distinct from a 
                                                                
30
 I Esser & P Delport ―The Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence: The King Report and the 2008 Companies Act‖  
(2011) 74 THRHR 449-455. 
31
 Bekink (2008) SA Merc LJ 95-116. 
32
 Bouwman (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 509-534. 
33
 See Esser & Delport (2011) THRHR 449. 
34




 See Bekink (2008) SA Merc LJ 100.  
8 
 
fiduciary duty. Those who wish to maintain the distinction between the composite duty of 
care and the fiduciary duties have already criticised the Act for having blurred the celebrated 
distinction between fiduciary duties and the duties of care, diligence and skill.
37
 This gives 
rise to the debate as to whether it is still necessary and possible to maintain the distinction 
between these two common law duties in light of the inclusion of the BJR under the Act.  
 In South Africa, strong views have been expressed as to why  the fiduciary duty and 
the duty of care are different and should remain distinct.
38
  Equally strong counter arguments 
as to why the distinction between the two duties could be considered superfluous  given 
possible overlaps between the two duties have been proffered. Bouwman strongly believes 
that the fiduciary duties and the duty of care should never be confused in South African law 
in the same manner they were ―forced together under the heading ‗fiduciary duties‘ ‖ in the 
USA.
39
 Bouwman further argues, without giving clear reasons, that if the duties are not kept 
distinct, confusion will be created in their application, and this may lead to directors‘ being 
able to escape liability for the breach of their duties.
40
 Jones agrees with Bouwman that 
adoption of the BJR by the new Act threatens to distort the celebrated distinction of these two 
common law duties and is undesirable.
41
 McLennan has a different opinion to that of 
Bouwman or Jones. He observes that there is no ―sharply delineated borderline between the 
fiduciary duty and the duty of care and skill‖, and even adds that ―situations may arise where 
the two [duties] overlap‖.
42
 The BJR, in this construction is viewed as providing such a 
perfect situation for potentially blurring the distinction between the duties.
43
 Therefore the 
question as to whether there is scope for conflation of the fiduciary duty and the duty of care 
under the Act needs to be investigated and debated in the light of the statutory adoption of the 
                                                                
37
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BJR in South Africa. It is however, my preliminary view that unlike the situation in the state 
of Delaware in the USA, s76 of the Act cannot be read to have opened the door for conflation 
of duties in the context s76 (4) and review of director‘s decision-making. 
On standards of care, skill and diligence, most authors writing prior to the passing of 
the Act, agreed that the common law provided low and inadequate standards of care and skill, 
which was  the result of an inheritance from English case law. Bouwman correctly states that 
English courts initially followed a lenient approach in holding directors accountable for 
breach of their duty of care and skill.
44
 It is agreed by most writers that through passage of 
time, the test for breach of the duty developed beyond the entirely subjective test, to an 
objective/subjective test. This was especially the case with the passing of s 214(4) of the UK 
Insolvency Act 1986.
45
 Esser & Delport
46
 note that the main limitation of the dual 
objective/subjective test applied at common law by English courts was that with respect to 
care, the minimum standard was always the lower of the two. McLennan submits that the UK 
position compared well with the position under South African common law and that thes 
214(4) test correctly reflects our common law position.
47
 It is important to point out that there 
is also general agreement that the test for skill under common law has always been low and 
subjective. This is the legacy of Re City Equittable Fire Insurance Co Ltd
48
 and In Re 
Brazillian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd
49
  which cases have been said to have allowed 
for lax standards of skill among company directors. This led Finch to argue that the common 
law operates to give directors a remarkable freedom to run companies incompetently.
50
 Finch 
focused on effective enforcement of the duty of care and skill, and was concerned that only 
gross negligence as opposed to mere negligence was punishable.  
Views have been expressed regarding the adequacy, clarity and effectiveness of the 
standards of care, skill and diligence under the Act. Even prior to the Act, authors agreed that 
the standards by which the required degree of care and skill are measured were not clear.
51
 
This is the anomaly which the DTI Policy document 2004 sought to correct. Post-mortem 
reviews have attempted to establish the exact standards introduced into South African 
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company law by the new Act. To what extent the policy goal of presenting clear and easily 
enforceable standards has been achieved by the new Act remains highly debatable. There are 
points of convergence and divergence in this regard. Du Plessis
52
 who served as a member of 
the International Reference Group in the drafting of the Act indirectly admits that the framing 
of s 76(3)(c) could be problematic. Du Plessis seems to tacitly admit that the phrase ―having 
the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director‖ in s 76(3)(c)(ii) could have the 
effect of lowering the standards of ―skill‖ expected of South African company directors.
53
 
The author however defends the appropriateness of this subsection. He argues that this is 
necessary to avoid a situation where, if standards are pegged too high, it may act as a barrier 
to competent people accepting directorships of companies. Some authors counter argue that 
despite such fears as expressed by du Plessis, in South Africa and elsewhere, there has not 
been  a shortage of people who have gone ahead to take up directorships in companies. Botha 
and Jooste
54
 argue that fears such as expressed by du Plessis are based on misunderstanding 
of the law, which led others to advocate for a lightening of the duty of care and skill, and the 
introduction of the BJR as a safe harbour for directors. 
Cassidy opines that there are problems of clarity in section 76(3)(c), due to serious 
omissions which creates ambiguity in the provisions and that there are challenges of 
divergence of standards of care and skill at common law and now in the statutory law.
55
 I 
share these views.  Cassim et al,
56
 while noting that the new Act has introduced innovation, 
that the goal of making duties accessible might have been achieved and that it has modified 
the common law, is not convinced that the Act has made the law clearer and ascertainable. 
Cassim et al bemoan the ―uneasy and uncertain combination of statutory law and still 
evolving judicial precedent‖.
57
  Bouwman appears satisfied with the choice of partial 
codification as opposed to total codification. She argues that it allows courts to ―reach for 
answers in the treasure chests of the common law where the statute cannot provide us with 
guidance or an answer in a set of complicated factual circumstances‖.
58
 The only question 
that remains to be answered according to Bouwman with regards the duty of care, skill and 
                                                                
52
 JJ Du Plessis ― A comparative analysis of directors‘ duty of care, skill and South Africa and Australia‖ (2010) 
1 Acta Juridica 263-289. 
53
 Ibid at 287. 
54
 Botha & Jooste (1997) SALJ  65-76. 
55
 Cassidy (2009) STELL LR at 376-386. 
56
 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law  
57
 Ibid at 508. 
58
 Bouwman (2009) SA MercLJ 533. 
11 
 
diligence is whether the statutorily codified duties and the common law will co-exist and 
function successfully.
59
 This is one of the questions that this study also seeks answers to. 
There are certainly gaps in law which necessitate further inquiry into the exact 
statutory standards of care, skill and diligence introduced into South Africa by the Act. For 
example, it is unclear whether s 76(3)(c)(ii) has the effect of undermining the objectivity of 
standards of care under s 76(3)(c)(i) in any way or whether the subjectivity in s 76(3)(c)(ii) 
only affects the test for the ―skill‖ component of the duty. The author is unaware of any 
recent work which has adequately dealt with such questions. The question regarding the exact 
relationship between the statutory duty of care, skill and diligence in        s 76(3)(c) and the 
BJR under s 76(4)(a) also still needs to be answered.  
Yet another gap in the existing body of knowledge requiring attention of research is 
the question of ensuring the effectiveness of the standards of care, skill and diligence through 
enforcement. It is not enough to say that standards of care and skill must be improved. Once 
such high standards of corporate governance have been established, they will need to be 
enforced. This implicates matters of liability for breach of the statutory and common law 
duties of care, skill and diligence, and an exploration of enforcement mechanisms established 
by the Act. This is partly the focus of Chapter 6 of this Study.  
It remains unclear as to whether South African law accepts that there should be a 
differentiation at some point in the standards of care and skill expected of executive full-time 
and non-executive directors. This question has to be asked given the confusion brought into 
our common law by the seeming conflicting views by courts in two very important cases. In 
Fisheries Development Corporation of  SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd
60
 the court 
expressed a view that because a director‘s duty inter alia depends on the nature of  the 
particular obligations assumed or assigned to the director, there is a difference between the 
so-called executive director and a non-executive director. In Howard v Herrigel NNO
61
 the 
Appellate Division regarded it as being unhelpful or even misleading to classify company 
directors as executive or non-executive for purposes of ascertaining their duties to the 
company. The Court in the latter case remarked that the rules are the same for all directors. 
Interestingly even this Court acknowledged that all relevant factors need to be taken into 
account, including whether the director is engaged full-time or part-time in the affairs of the 
company..   




 Fisheries Development Corporation of  SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd (supra) 
61
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The reading of the two cases referred to above can lead to a prima facie conclusion 
that there should be a minimum irreducible standard of conduct which is not the same as a 
uniform standard. Such a standard takes into account the peculiarities of the directorship held. 
The significance of the research in this regard is that it will propose how the law can bring 
clarity to these important questions which have occupied academic debates and remain 
unresolved at this stage. This work intends to build upon the foundation of knowledge 
already available and to make a significant contribution to the body of existing knowledge as 
proposed herein. 
 Drawing upon the experiences of countries such as Australia
62
 and the UK, the South 
African academic articles were fiercely critical of the introduction of a USA-style BJR.
63
 
Prior to the adoption of the Act, most academic commentators concurred that the USA-
originated the BJR was unnecessary and unsuited to the peculiarities of the Roman-Dutch 
legal system in South Africa, which system also boasts a heavy English law influence in its 
company laws.
64
 As a consequence of the distinction between a fiduciary duty and the duty of 
care, the basis for founding liability for breach of each of the duties is different. There were 
perhaps genuinely mistaken fears that the BJR, viewed as a ―legal transplant‖ from 
America,
65
 posed risks of incompatibility with South African law. Unlike South African 
law‘s mixed legal system, USA law has a pure common law foundation.
66
 Now and contrary 
to views and suggestions from prominent South African academic writers, a statutory version 
of the rule has become part of the Act.
67
  
Writers like McLennan, Jones and co-authors Botha and Jooste argued prior to the 
adoption of the BJR under the Act that the rule was unsuited to South Africa. Yet little has 
been done to investigate how this rule evolved in the USA, how and why it‘s original purpose 
and application may be unsuited to South Africa. Farrar has criticised countries such as 
Australia and South Africa who have to date statutorily adopted the BJR. Farrar criticises 
these countries‘ failure to do enough research on the operation of the rule in the US in order 
to gauge if the application of the rule into local conditions should not be tampered with to suit 
the peculiar conditions in the importing jurisdiction.
68
 Little has also been written about the 
alternative incremental development of the rule, something akin to how the common law 
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duties developed in South Africa before partial codification under the Act.  There is need to 
investigate how the rule could be better utilised in South Africa to enhance the standards of 
corporate governance without unnecessarily ―stifling innovation and venturesome business 
activity‖ in companies.
69
 Potential to strike such a balance exists if courts adopt a purposive 
approach to the interpretation of s 76(3) and s 76(4)(a) when applying these provisions to a 




1.5 Purpose of the Study 
The following are the goals which the study sets out and hopes to achieve: 
(i) To identify the gaps which the new Act was expected to fill with respect to the duty of 
care, skill and diligence in South Africa, and to further identify the lacuna which it 
was proposed that BJR comes to close. 
(ii) To establish if the partial codification of directors‘ common law duties under the Act  
has achieved the legislature‘s stated goals of providing clarity with regards to 
standards of care, skill and diligence now contained in section 76(3)(c) of the Act.   
(iii)To critically analyse the provisions of sections 76(3) (c) of the Act in the light of 
international best practices with regards to the standards of care, skill and diligence. 
To further propose ways in which standards can be further clarified, and to investigate 
ways of improving enforcement of the standards. 
(iv) To provide a critical analysis of the adoption of the BJR under section 76(4) (a) of the 
Act in light of experiences from legal systems such as Australia, the UK and the USA.  
(v) To inquire into and establish the nature of the relationship between sections 76(3)(b) 
and (c) and section 76(4)(a). In other words, the aim is to find out if the incorporation 
of the BJR under the Act has the effect of limiting the application of the duty of care 
or whether it rather enhances corporate governance by promoting high standards of 
conduct.    
1.6 Scope and delimitation of Study 
This study focuses on directors‘ standards of care, skill, diligence and the BJR under 
section 76 of the Act. Any other common law and statutory duties of directors which have no 
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bearing on these selected standards of directors‘ conduct fall outside the scope of this study. 
Such duties are only referred to where relevant for purposes of this study. The purpose of the 
thesis is to evaluate the position of the standards of care, skill and diligence post the 
Companies Act 2008, as well as the implications of the inclusion of the BJR. This may 
involve a cursory reference to the common law relating to the selected standards, but the 
intention is not to provide a detailed study of the history of common law directors‘ duties. 
Cursory reference will be made to the partially codified directors‘ duties implicated in this 
study. It is nonetheless not the aim of this study to give a detailed discussion of the merits and 
demerits of codification of directors‘ duties under the Act.   
It was initially considered to look at directors‘ duty of care in specific contexts such 
as during take-overs and the standards of care expected of company directors when the 
company is in the zone of insolvency and a possible duty to care for the environment. 
However, it has since been considered prudent to exclude these matters from the thesis as 
there is little room to adequately deal with them. This thesis will suggest these matters as 
fertile ground for future or further research by would-be researchers.  
 
1.7 Methodology 
This study adopts a methodology of analysing relevant South African legal principles 
contained in the primary and secondary sources of law applicable to the scope of study. 
Comparative studies with international best practice nations will also be done, and nations 
will be selected for their comparative values. The Constitution of South Africa 1996 provides 
legitimacy to the use of comparative materials in this Study. Section 39 (1) (b) –(c) 
encourages the use of public international law and foreign law which deal with comparable 
provisions to the Act to serve as tools of interpretation.
71
 This approach promotes 
harmonisation of public international law with South African domestic law as will be further 
clarified in Chapter 6, especially part 6.3.  
England (UK) has been selected for the reasons that South African company law has 
inherited English principles relating to directors‘ duties. The UK recently revised its 
corporate laws and enacted the Companies Act 2006. Interestingly, the UK resisted the 
temptation to adopt a USA-style BJR whereas South Africa elected to. Australia has been 
selected for two main reasons. Firstly, Australia has revised its corporate laws resulting in the 
Corporations Act 2001, and is believed to have influenced South Africa‘s codification of 
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directors‘ duties as well as the adoption of the BJR. Secondly, Australia has already had its 
standards of care, skill and diligence tested in recent cases.
72
 South Africa can derive lessons 
from this experience. The USA‘s comparative value stems from the fact that the US is 
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CHAPTER 2: DIRECTORS’ STANDARDS OF CONDUCT & THE 




The purpose of this Chapter is to lay down the foundational principles relating to 
company directors‘ composite duty of care
73
 and the BJR. The Act places a premium on 
promotion of high standards of corporate governance ‗given the significant role of enterprises 
within the social and economic life of the nation‘
74
 of South Africa. Directors inevitably have 
to make key or strategic decisions when directing the business or affairs of the company.
75
 
Such decisions affect both the company and the many stakeholders associated with the 
enterprise. Thus, decision-making is undoubtedly central to the role fulfilled by the board in 
the governance of corporations.  In order to make real the Act‘s vision of high corporate 
governance standards, decision-making has to be punctuated by appropriate care, 
meticulousness or attention to detail and competence. A corporate decision made by the 
board may have disastrous results despite the board‘s good intentions or the integrity of the 
decision-making process. In such a case, the BJR now applies under the Act to protect honest 
directors against liability where due care process was followed. Central to this study is an 
inquiry into the effectiveness of standards of care, skill and diligence of directors established 
by the Act in light of the inclusion of the BJR provisions.
76
  
The chapter begins by defining key concepts relevant to the study such as corporate 
governance, the BJR and company director inter alia..  Thereafter, the chapter will consider 
the regulation of corporate governance in South Africa. The interaction between standards of 
care, skill, diligence and the BJR under the Act is a governance issue and the discussion of 
the central question in the study has to be located within proper context.  It is also considered 
vital in this chapter to clarify the nature of the relationship between the company and a 
director in light of relevant theories on the nature of the company as espoused in literature. 
As part of the nature of the director-company relationship, Chapter 2 will also briefly 
                                                                
73
 The term ‗duty of care‘ is normally used as a composite term for the full spectrum of the duty, that is, the duty 
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examine the legal status of a company in South Africa. The chapter will also briefly look at 
the relationship between the duty of care and the BJR, before the conclusion to the chapter.   
 
2.2 Definitions and introduction of key concepts 
2.2.1 Corporate Governance  
The importance of corporate governance to this Study is to be seen in the fact that the 
central focus implicates the standards of corporate governance in South Africa in light of 
relevant provisions of the Act. The recent global financial crisis has been credited for being 
one of the catalysts in the incremental development of the concept.
77
 Throughout the world, 
there is an acknowledgement of the critical role of corporations in the global market 
economy.
78
 As has been correctly acknowledged, corporations are responsible for the control 
and management of a sizeable quantity of the world‘s wealth and other resources.
79
  It is little 
wonder there is heightened attention on development of the concept of corporate governance 
following recent global corporate failures.
80
 In South Africa, the importance of corporate 
governance has been underscored by the judiciary. The court in Minister of Water Affairs and 
Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining made an important observation. It remarked that the 
practice of sound corporate governance is essential for the well-being of companies.
81
 
Integrity of the leadership role of directors in companies in the decision-making process has 
been held to be a critical principle underpinning corporate governance in South Africa.
82
 
Thus corporate governance provides a conceptual framework for directors‘ standards of care, 
skill and diligence and the BJR (decision-making aspects). 
2.2.1.1 Meanings of corporate governance 
There is a multiplicity of opinions regarding what constitutes corporate governance. 
This could be attributed to the fact that corporate governance is complex.  Some 
commentators even claim that it is undefinable,
83
 and that there are no hard and fast rules that 
constitute corporate governance.
84
 The concept involves an intersection of often competing 
multi-stakeholder interests, and thus by its very nature, is laden with tensions. Not least of 
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such difficult-to-resolve tensions is the directors‘ task to balance the profit-making objective 
of corporations, need for accountability and the interests of the wider community.
85
 Different 
people attach different meanings to corporate governance. This has led to the concept 
becoming so malleable and elastic to the extent of falling prey to the idiosyncrasies of the 
person defining it. While there may not be a universally agreed upon definition of corporate 
governance, there are shared fundamentals regarding how directors are expected to carry out 
their responsibilities in a company. This will be illustrated through the few definitions to be 
considered below and a contribution to the meaning of corporate governance to be proffered 
by this study. 
A definition of corporate governance by Bob Tricker
86
 demonstrates the different 
viewpoints within the concept. Tricker defines the concept as falling under the following 
perspectives; an operational perspective,
87
 a relationship perspective,
88
 a stakeholder 
perspective,
89
 a financial economics perspective
90
 and a societal perspective.
91
 Each 
perspective focusses on the matter of major concern to the person defining corporate 
governance as a concept and shows an understandable level of bias. The examples of 
attempts at defining the concept show both strengths and limitations of each perspective, and 
reveal a possible incremental development of the concept from the 1990s till the present day. 
The most popular definition of corporate governance during the 1990s is the 
perspective adopted by the UK‘s Cardbury Report
92
 as well as the King II Report. This 
perspective views corporate governance as ―the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled‖.
93
 The definition focusses on governance structures, processes and practice. 
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Similarly, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereafter OECD) 
defines corporate governance as being ―…about the procedures and processes according to 
which an organisation is directed and controlled‖.
94
 The OECD definition demonstrates a 
consciousness of the broader context in which corporate governance is practised.
95
 These two 
definitions may be classified under an operational perspective. An operational perspective 
views the company board as being primarily responsible for the governance of companies. 
The role of shareholders in this regard being to appoint the board, the auditors and ensuring 
checks and balances in the running of corporations.
96
  
A relationship perspective looks at corporate governance as ―the relationship among 
the shareholders, directors and management of a company, as defined by the corporate 
charter, by-laws, formal policy and the rule of law‖.
97
 As stated above, the list of participants 
in the corporate governance practice under this perspective can also include role players like 
employees, the community and/or the environment. The relationship perspective could be 
seen as supplementing what could be lacking in the operational perspective. For example the 
OECD definition supplements the operational perspective by combining the relationship and 
stakeholders‘ perspectives beautifully. It describes the concept of corporate governance as a 
structure   that ―specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different 
participants in the organisation- such as the board, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders-and lays down the rules and procedures for decision-making‖.
98
  
The different versions of corporate governance definitions suggested by various 
writers above cannot as yet be said to be universally accepted, but they certainly appeal to 
people with a particular focus or bias. In addition, all the different definitions are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive.  
 Recent definitions of corporate governance appear to attempt to combine elements of 
the different perspectives and importantly identify the underlying tensions in corporate law 
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between ownership of the corporation on one hand, and its control on the other hand.
99
 While 
this tension is not new to corporate law, it could have been revived by the recent corporate 
failures witnessed by several developed countries. The first example comes from the post-
mortem analysis of the collapse of HIH Insurance Ltd in Australia. The Report of the HIH 
Royal Commission made a bold attempt at defining corporate governance. It views corporate 
governance as referring ‗generally to the legal and organisational framework within which, 
and the principles and processes by which, corporations are governed‘.
100
 This definition goes 
on to identify the board of directors and management as chief participants in corporate 
governance. The definition indirectly recognises the implication that corporate governance 
has on the ‗ownership and control‘ debate by acknowledging corporate governance‘s ‗impact 
on the relationship between shareholders and the company‘.
101
  While this tension is 
important to corporate law, it is important to note that corporate governance is shifting away 
from its traditional preoccupation with agency conflicts. It now seeks to address fundamental 
issues of business ethics, accountability, transparency and disclosure.
102
  
Corporate governance is therefore evolving into a multi-stakeholder concept. This is 
due to the increasing realisation that corporate behaviour ultimately affects the lives of many 
people. It is for this reason that a narrow approach to the definition of corporate governance 
is not progressive enough to keep up with the pace of growth and development of the concept 
in the 21
st
 century. There are basic relationships and participants in corporate governance. 
These are shareholders, the board of directors and operational management. It is also 
apparent from the diversity of opinions on the meaning of the concept that it is hardly 
possible to come up with a closed list of stakeholders or additional participants, given the 
evolutionary nature of corporate governance. Other stakeholders are gaining in importance in 
the 21
st
 century given their increasing contribution to or impact on the sustainability of the 
business interests of companies. It is true to say that ―properly governed companies with a 
reputation for practising good corporate governance are more likely to attract better calibre 
employees‖.
103
 Apart from employees, the environment is fast growing into a major 
stakeholder as a result of the challenges of climate change.. Such important social 
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considerations are the main focus of the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) movement 
which has sought to use corporate governance principles as a vehicle for incorporating social 
and environmental concerns into the decision-making processes of companies. This is seen as 
benefiting not only financial investors, but also employees, consumers and communities.
104
  
A new definition is added as promised earlier on in this chapter. In addition to other 
definitions, corporate governance has to do with a quest to achieve a balance within the key 
leadership relationships in the life and business of the corporation. In this regard, the 
shareholders provide capital for business, appoint or remove the company board of directors 
where necessary, make decisions affecting the company, and make the board accountable for 
its oversight on the management of company business.  This provides checks and balances to 
the directors‘ duties of managing company resources as good stewards. The board provides 
oversight and supervision to the management of a company by appointing executive 
management. Senior Management/Executives do the actual management of the company 
including setting policies for proper functioning of the company, for the approval of the 
board.   
2.2.2 Company Director 
The Act defines a ‗director‘ to mean: 
a member of the board of a company, as contemplated in section 66, or an alternate 
director of a company and includes any person occupying the position of a director or 
alternate director, by whatever name designated.
105
 
As is evident from this definition provided in s1 of the Act , a ‗director‘ is defined in such 
broad and to some extent unclear terms. It appears that this definition was carefully designed 
to ensure that it is expansive and more inclusive than it was intended to be exhaustive. It 
sounds more like a description of a director rather than a definition of the term. The Act also 
merely defines ‗board‘ to mean ‗the board of directors of a company‘.
106
 It could as well be 
that the legislature assumed that the term director has become so commonplace that everyone 
should know what it means. Directors could be defined as persons appointed or elected 
according to law, and are authorised to manage and direct the affairs of a corporation or 
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  By defining directors in singular terms the crafters of the Act probably sought to 
ensure that individuals tasked with the responsibility of managing the affairs of a company 
are held accountable in terms of their conduct when fulfilling directorial functions. In making 
the definition of directors expansive, it appears that the legislature intended to cover many 
situations which could be classified as directorial roles or functions.   
The wide definition of ‗director‘ in s1 includes some senior company officials other 
than the individuals who are traditionally referred to by that title. A part of the definition 
identifies an official ‗by whatever name designated‘ as a director, even if such an official 
could be called by some other title such as ‗manager‘ for example.
108
 The message from the 
Act‘s definition of a ‗director‘ appears clear. What a person is called in terms of title is now 
not as relevant in determining whether a person is a director. Of greater importance than the 




Also included in the broadened definition of a director in s1 are such individuals who 
are considered to be ‗occupying the position of a director‘ at any relevant times.  The phrase 
‗occupying the position of a director‘ is understood in South African law to denote a person 
who acts in the position of a director, with or without lawful authority.
110
 The phrase 
‗occupying the position of a director‘ could denote a type of a director recognised under 
South African law as a temporary director. Such a director is appointed to serve on a 
temporary basis until the vacancy is filled at a properly constituted meeting of 
shareholders.
111
                                             
In addition to the types of directors clearly identified in section 1 of the Act, there are 
also other types of directors recognised under South African law. In terms of the Act,
112
 the 
MOI may provide for appointment of a person as an ex officio director by virtue of that 
person holding a position elsewhere which qualifies him/her for appointment as an ex officio 
director.
113
 Another type of a director recognised by the Act and who can be appointed in line 
with a provision in the company‘s MOI is an alternate director. An alternate director is 
                                                                
107
 This definition is available at http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/directors , accessed on 19 July 
2013. This is a law dictionary by John Bouvier of the United States of America, published in 1856. 
108
 See s1 of Act. 
109
 See Re Mea Corporation Ltd [2007] BCC 288 para 82, referred to in Cassim et al Contemporary Company 
Law 404. 
110
 See Corporate Affairs Commission v Drysdale (1978) 141 CLR 236 at 242, where the court gave the phrase 
‗occupying the position of a director‘ the same meaning as of a person who acts in the position of a director. 
111
 Appointment is done in terms of ss68 (2) & (3) of the Act.  
112
 See s66 (4) (a) (ii).  
113
 See s66, for definition of an ex officio director. Also see s66 (5) (a) & (b) for the role of this type of director 
and the nature of his/her liabilities.   
23 
 
defined in s 1 of the Act to mean ‗a person elected or appointed to serve, as the occasion 
requires, as a member of the board of a company in substitution for a particular elected or 
appointed director of that company‘.  
114
  
There is a host of other types of directors who might not have been specifically 
defined by the Act, but who are recognised under South African law, as already stated.
115
 
Impliedly and for purposes of the Act, any person who is not formally appointed as a director 
of a company may nonetheless be deemed to be a director if he or she exercises the authority 
of a director, regardless of whether he/she is properly appointed at law.
116
  
In South African law, as elsewhere in developed legal jurisdictions, company 
directors are known to fall into two descriptive categories, namely ‗Executive‘ directors and 
‗Non-Executive‘ directors. Executive directors are the full-time salaried executive/senior 
officers in the employ of the company, who serve the company under a contract of service for 
a specified period. The Executive directors undertake additional or special functions and 
participate in the day-to-day management of the company‘s affairs.
117
  Non-executive 
directors on the other hand, are part-time directors of a company, who are not full-time 
employees and have not undertaken any special functions
118
 in the company by means of 
employment contract. A non-executive director is one who has no other relationship with the 
company outside of his or her directorship to the company.
119
 Thus no relationship or 
circumstances should affect, influence or impair the director‘s independent judgment
120
 - and 
the emphasis appears to be on the ‗independence‘ of the director. The King III Report 
understands ‗independence‘ in this context to mean the absence of undue influence and bias 
that could be affected by the intensity of the relationship between the director and the 
company, rather than any particular fact such as length of service or age.
121
 King III Report 
appears to suggest that an objective assessment should be done to determine whether a 
director is independent or not. Thus a director should not only be independent in fact, but 
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should, in the perception of a reasonably informed outsider, appear to be independent.
122
 The 
common law and now statutory law imposes an obligation on all directors to fulfil their 
fiduciary duties as well as the duty to exercise care, skill and diligence when performing 
company functions. Common law duties, including the standards of care to be analysed in 
Chapter 4, apply equally to directors whether they fit the description ‗executive‘ or ‗non-
executive‘. The distinction between executive and non-executive directors is not relevant to 
the standards of conduct required of a director. Nonetheless, the courts will take into account 
all relevant factors such as the nature of the company‘s business, any particular functions 
assigned by the board to the director whose conduct is being judged and whether the director 
also holds a position under the company.
123
 
While the King Reports
124
 have taken time to draw a distinction between executive 
and non-executive directors, and also while in practice the distinction remains, the Act is 
curiously silent on the issue.
125
 Non-executive directors are expected to bring an independent 
external perspective and to add objective judgment in decision-making within the board. Case 
law buttresses the view that such directors should remain independent in the execution of 
their functions to the extent of disregarding the views and decisions of those who appointed 
or nominated them for appointment.
126
 In fact, in the collective functioning of the board, all 
directors are expected to act in the best interests of the company, in keeping with its separate 
legal personality as will be explained in part 2.4 below.
127
 Therefore the independence of the 
board is a concept which is strongly supported by our courts as noted in the PPWAWU 
National Provident Fund case.
128
 The King III Report advocates for a balance of power in the 
company board, and recommends that the majority of the board members should be non-




   It cannot be gainsaid that every company director should give the company the 
benefit of his independent judgment when deliberating issues of policy or matters affecting 
the company in a board meeting. The Act makes it mandatory for all directors (not only 
certain non-executive directors) to perform their functions ‗in the best interests of the 
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 The exact meaning of the phrase ‗in the best interests of the company‘ may be 
subject to different interpretations. Nonetheless, it can never be interpreted to exclude acting 
in a manner that benefits the company ahead of any other competing interest. As will be 
established in 2.4.3 below, a company is a separate legal entity that needs to be distinguished 
from its shareholders and/or incorporators. The duty in s76(3) (b) needs to be read in 
conjunction with the duty to exercise the degree of care, skill and diligence expected of a 
director in ‗relation to the company‘.
131
 When this is done, it should remove doubt as to 
whether a director is obliged to advance the interests of any other parties to the exclusion of 
or ahead of those of the company.  
Any of the directors on a company board may have their own interests or some form 
of loyalty to some shareholders. Notwithstanding this, in exercising their legal powers and 
executing their functions, such directors should exercise a level of independence that allows 
them to ‗act in the best interests of the company‘. This should hold true regardless whether 
this clashes with their own personal interests or not. That should be the hallmark of the 
concept of ‗independence‘ as far as the role of directors in a company is concerned. It is for 
that reason that in Howard v Herrigel the Court held that ‗…once a person accepts an 
appointment as a director, that person becomes a fiduciary in relation to the company and is 
obliged to display the utmost good faith towards the company and in his dealings on its 
behalf.‘
132
 The courts generally appear not to be in favour of separating or distinguishing 
directors in terms of their expected independent functioning in a company board. To this end 
it was argued in Re Elgindata Ltd that ‗it is unhelpful and even misleading to classify 




A question could be asked regarding why the Act chose not to pronounce on the 
executive-non-executive director distinction. The reason for the Act‘s silence could be in 
keeping with the understanding that all directors are equally bound by their common law and 
now statutory duties. This is what can be discerned from section 76(3) of the Act. The 
codified common law duties apply to all directors without exceptions.
134
 A case could be 
made for the Act to have at least emphasised the issue of independence by clarifying that all 
directors are expected to be independent. The omission to emphasise the requirement that all 
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directors ought to be independent should not be seen to be fatal. Courts can interpret s76(3) to 
imply that all directors are enjoined by law to be independent and to act in the best interests 
of the company.  
2.2.3 The BJR – Meaning 
There is no generally accepted definition of the BJR. Different people and institutions 
define the term differently, depending on their preferred approach to the BJR. The BJR 
originated in the USA and has been evolving to assume new meanings and possibly new 
scope. Establishing a proper understanding of the BJR
135
 is vital for two closely connected 
reasons. The first one is that this study discusses the BJR and its interaction with standards of 
care, skill and diligence under the Act. Secondly, a good understanding of the BJR is 
important because how one views the BJR drives how the rule is interpreted.
136
 More 
importantly, for South Africa, it is vital to establish what must be considered by courts in 
determining the rule‘s application.
137
 During the 1960s, BJR was considered one of the least 
understood concepts in corporate law then.
138
 Post the 2000s, the BJR as a concept or term 
remains poorly understood despite its usage and growing popularity.
139
 The search for proper 
meaning of the rule is on-going. Some theories are emerging to attempt to find an acceptable 
explanation as to why the BJR exists, what its proper relationship with the duty of care is, and 
what its scope of application should be. 
In addition to the approaches to the BJR which will be discussed in Chapter 3, some 
writers have attempted the difficult task of providing its definition or meaning. McMillan in 
his approach to the BJR as immunity defines the term to mean a judicially developed doctrine 
that protects company directors from personal liability for the decisions they make on behalf 
of corporations.
140
  Bainbridge, an advocate for the BJR to be viewed as a judicial ‗abstention 
doctrine‘, acknowledges that the BJR has been evolving over the years. He further comments 





 argues that the BJR, which is often misunderstood, is not 
a rule at all, as it provides no substantive  ‗do‘s‘ and ‗don‘ts‘ for officers or directors of 
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companies. Instead of viewing the BJR as a rule, Branson suggests that it should rather be 
seen as a standard of judicial review entailing only slight review of business decisions. This 
standard of review which becomes a defence if the directors have made a business judgment 
is what is called BJR. To the extent that BJR precludes the judiciary from reviewing the 
substantive merits of the board‘s decisions where directors were not somnambulant on duty, 
the BJR may even be seen as a standard of non-review.
143
  
The understanding of the BJR as a standard of review is shared by Eisenberg,
144
  who 
distinguishes the duty of care as a standard of conduct from the BJR as a standard of review. 
In this understanding, the duty of care specifies how directors should conduct themselves.  
The BJR then sets forth the test courts will use in determining whether the directors‘ conduct 
gives rise to liability or not.
145
  
There is a common thread running through the definitions by various authors 
considered above and the approaches to the BJR which follow below. The first commonality 
is that the BJR involves a standard of review connected to the decisions made by boards of 
directors. The second commonality is the role of the courts in reviewing decisions made in 
the board room. In any case, the BJR was developed by American courts hence it is referred 
to as a common law standard of review.
146
  The BJR was developed with the understanding 
that directors have to make decisions on behalf of corporations, which decisions often entail 
an assumption of risk.
147
 The BJR thus seeks to ensure that decisions made by directors, 
provided they meet a set criterion,
148
 are protected even though, with the benefit of hindsight, 
the directors‘ decisions may prove to be erroneous.  
The problem of separation of ownership and control is well known in corporate 
law.
149
 Directors are employed or engaged to manage the assets of absentee owners. While it 
is debatable whether shareholders are these absentee owners, there is a general agreement that 
shareholders are residual claimants of the assets of the corporation.
150
  The interest of 
shareholders includes that corporate decision-making powers in directors‘ hands must be 
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exercised to maximise shareholder wealth.
151
 There is a general correlation between the 
desired return (maximisation of shareholders‘ wealth) and risk. In order for directors to fulfil 
their role and expectations, there is a need to exercise fiat- a level of freedom to manage 
companies. Fiat, as has been argued by others, entails a risk that directors may be tempted to 
divert company profits from shareholders to themselves.
152
 This creates tension in corporate 
law, between the exercise of power by the board and the need for accountability to 
stakeholders. The BJR is increasingly being seen as a fulcrum used to balance these 
competing concerns.
153
 How courts play a role in striking the much needed balance, is subject 
to different approaches espoused in the common law and in literature. Chapter 3 draws on the 
approaches to and formulations of the BJR under American law as well as US case law 
relating to the BJR in order to aid development of South African jurisprudence. Chapter 5 
substantively discusses the BJR, and provides a critical analysis of the South African version 
of the BJR
154
 in light of international jurisprudence
155




2.2.4 Subjective, objective, dual objective/subjective standards of care & gross 
         negligence 
The terms listed above will be encountered mainly in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, and 
these terms may also be used throughout the Study. It is thus considered vital to provide 
simply a basic meaning of each term in order to provide a good foundation for 
comprehension. The best way to understand the hybrid terms on standards of conduct is to 
begin by giving meanings of the terms ‗subjective‘ and ‗objective‘ standards of conduct.   
A subjective standard is used to evaluate an applicable standard of conduct that is 
dependent upon the individual characteristics, personal abilities, attributes or competences of 
a particular director.  For example in the early nineteenth century cases in England, directors 
were expected to show such care and skill which an ordinary man might be expected to take, 
in the circumstances, on his own behalf. The common law required directors to offer what 
they could offer, given their level of skill and experience.
157
 A subjective standard would be 
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low if the director had little knowledge and experience although for directors with special 
expertise it may be higher than ordinary objective standard.  
In contrast to subjective considerations, an objective standard is a uniformly 
applicable standard to all persons. The standard relating to directors‘ duty of care is given 
meaning by the law of negligence.
158
 A negligent director is liable to the victim in terms of 
the common law remedies deriving from the actio legis Aquilae for patrimonial loss resulting 
from negligence.
159
 The objective standard in this context is not reduced to the level of the 
director‘s actual ability to take are of something, and neither is it ‗limited by a director‘s 
knowledge and experience or ignorance or inaction‘.
160
 Thus, a reasonable person test is 
applied, and such a person is an ideal person – and this is a creation of legal fiction. Conduct 
is ordinarily measured by reference to what the reasonable man of ordinary prudence would 
do in the circumstances of the director who faces allegations of breach of duty of care.
161
 This 
appears to clearly apply to the standard of care, which can be assessed objectively. It is 
considered
162
 difficult or even impossible to have a single objective standard of skill, given 
that there is no requirement that a director should ‗bring any special qualifications to his 
office‘.
163
 In addition it was also held in South African case law that there is no requirement 
that a director should possess ‗special business acumen or expertise, or singular ability or 
intelligence, or even experience in the business of the company‘.
164
 
Dual objective/subjective standard is where a director owes a duty to his company to 
exercise the care, diligence and skill that would be exercised by a reasonable person in the 
same circumstances having both: 
(a) the knowledge and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person in the 
      same position as the director, and 
(b) the director‘s knowledge and experience.
165
 
A dual objective/subjective standard thus requires the conduct of directors to be judged or 
assessed objectively (as far as care is concerned) and subjectively (by reference to directors‘ 
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 The applicable test considers the notional knowledge and experience 
that may reasonably be expected of a person in the same position as the director.
167
      
Gross negligence can be defined to mean a conscious and voluntary disregard of the 
need to use reasonable care, which conduct is likely to cause foreseeable grave injury or harm 
to persons, property, or both.
168
 It is conduct that is extreme when compared with ordinary 
negligence, which is a mere failure to exercise reasonable care.
169
 In S v Dhlamini
170
 gross 
negligence was described as including an attitude or state of mind characterised by ‗an entire 
failure to give consideration to the consequences of one's actions. In other words, it is an 
attitude of reckless disregard of such consequences.
171
 Respected South African author 
Blackman, on the basis of applicable case law, argues that the standard applicable under 
common law is negligence, and not gross negligence.
172
 South Africa appears to have 
inherited this position from English law.
173
 English company law principles have had an 
enduring influence on South African common law in this regard.  
2.3 Corporate governance in South Africa- voluntary compliance framework 
      In South Africa the concept of corporate governance has been given its recognisable 
regulatory form through the publication of the King Reports on corporate governance 
between 1994 and 2009.  As has been justifiably argued, the King Reports have indeed 
institutionalised corporate governance
174
 by setting minimum standards for directors‘ conduct 
when running and controlling companies. The King Reports have attempted to give South 
Africa an accurate statement of the international benchmarks on the new trends, principles 
and best practices in corporate governance.
175
 The reports are the fruit of the hard work of the 
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 The King Committee followed the same format as the one followed by 
the Cadbury Report and subsequent reports in the UK.
177
 It shares the distinction with the UK 
reports of being pioneers in the world in making comprehensive investigations into the state 
of global corporate governance.
178
 The King Reports like the UK reports, became an 
important means of corporate regulation for local companies in South Africa. This was done 
through the Codes of Corporate Practice and Conduct (here after ‗Codes‘ or ‗Code‘ where 
applicable) which accompanied each of the three reports which have been produced by the 
King Committee to date.
179
  
This part considers the impact of the King I Report, the King II Report and King III 
Report on the development of the standards of care, skill, diligence and the statutory adoption 
of the BJR under the Act. The King reports represent a voluntary basis for governance 
compliance by South African corporates, as juxtaposed with a legislated basis for governance 
compliance where there are legal consequences (sanctions) for non-compliance.
180
 It will be 
argued and demonstrated in this part that the pioneering work of the King Committee sowed 
seeds for future legislative development of the standards of care, skill, diligence and the 
incorporation of the BJR under the Act.  
 
2.3.1 King Reports on Corporate Governance 
The King 1 Report, released in 1994 at the dawn of constitutional democracy in South 
Africa, was the first comprehensive report of its kind in the country. It dealt with principles of 
corporate governance relating to directors‘ duties towards the company. The report 
recommended that all companies listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (hereafter 
JSE) should comply with and give due consideration to the application of its accompanying 
Code. The application of the King 1Report and the Code was generally not prescribed by law. 
The King 1 Code, as is the case with the subsequent codes, was a matter of voluntary or self-
regulation by South African companies.
181
  Nonetheless, the enforcement of the Code was as 
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effective as legislative enforcement can be, or even better. This is because enforcement was 
driven by the JSE who made compliance with the Code one of its listing requirements.
182
 
Under the relevant Listing Requirements, a company was and is still expected to explain in its 
annual report how it complied with the Code or how it intended to comply with the Code.
183
  
King I sought to promote the highest standards of corporate governance by firmly 
recommending standards of conduct for company directors of listed companies, banks, and 
certain state-owned enterprises in South Africa. The report emphasised responsible ethical 
directorial conduct, integrity and quality of decision-making by the board in a manner that 
promotes the broader interests of the company. It has further been stated that the challenge 
which confronted drafters of King I was to seek principles striking an appropriate balance 
between directors‘ freedom to manage, accountability, and the interests of stakeholders.
184
 
The report came at a time when there was a shift from a traditional view which held that the 
function of directors is none other than that of profit maximisation for shareholders.
185
 By 
1994, a new thinking in corporate governance was emerging. It focussed not only on the 
interests of shareholders, but the interests of the broader spectrum of stakeholders, if this will 
promote the interests of the company. As such King I sought to promote an integrated 
approach to good governance.
186
 This approach takes into account stakeholders‘ interests and 
encourages the practice of financial, social, and environmental accountability. Consequently 
the report advocated for directors to act with the necessary care and skill in fulfilling their 
responsibilities towards the company and the stakeholders involved. As part of its 
contribution towards development of the duty of care, the King I Report advocated that 
directors should not be held accountable for breaching a duty of care and skill in the event 
that they exercised the BJR.
187
 Whether there was a need to include the BJR in modern South 
African company legislation was hotly debated following this recommendation by the report. 
The two views within this debate are partly covered in Chapter 4. It suffices to only point out 
here that with regard to the BJR and the proposed limitation of the duty of care, critics 
questioned the appropriateness of ‗transplanting‘ a foreign legal concept into the South 
African law.  
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King II Report came about as an update of the King I in March 2002. While the first 
report provided for general corporate governance principles and practices, the King II Report 
extensively covered on specific standards of directorial conduct. Of great relevance to this 
study are the guidelines of the King II Report for directors in performing their duties of care, 
skill and diligence and recommendations regarding the need for the BJR in law. Regarding 
the duty of care, the report encouraged the acquisition of knowledge by directors and an 
understanding of the affairs of the company for which one is a director. Like King I this 
report also made reference to the BJR, which relates to one aspect of the duty of care, that is, 
decision-making. Conceptually, King II saw the board of directors as the focal point of the 
corporate governance system.
188
 Thus the board is ultimately responsible and accountable for 
the performance and affairs of the company.
189
 An interesting feature of this 
conceptualisation is the aspect of delegation of responsibility to perform company tasks as 
well as reliance on others for performance. The report provided that the board cannot 
delegate its ultimate responsibility to monitor performance of operational management and its 
legal duty to provide strategic direction to the company. Where authority was delegated to 
operational management in the course of company business, the board remained ultimately 
answerable for the final results.
190
   
King III Report has now effectively replaced King II and contains updated corporate 
governance principles in line with trends consistent with international best practice 
jurisdictions. This was one of the goals of the DTI policy document for the review of 
corporate law in South Africa, and it is a goal which the King Committee also envisaged for 
King III.
191
 The King III Report and the accompanying Code were released in September 
2009. Publication of the Report became necessary because of the Act which had been in the 
pipeline since about 2004, and also due to the changes in corporate governance at 
international level.
192
 The King III Report is evidently an upgrade from King II in three 
critical ways. Firstly, it develops corporate governance principles covered in the past reports. 
Secondly, the Report provides with clarity, the governance framework upon which King III is 
based and establishes an important connection between King III and the Act.
193
 Thirdly, the 
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Report imports into South Africa new trends in governance and places an emphasis on ethical 
leadership, sustainability of corporations and consideration of the company‘s role as a 
socially responsible corporate citizen. While King III and similar reports before it provides 
for a recommended practice, the Act prescribes standards which are binding on directors.
194
  
  King III has maintained the view expressed under King II and states that the ‗King III 
report was written from the perspective of the board as the focal point of corporate 
governance‘.
195
 By implication, it is the board‘s responsibility to ensure that the company 
applies the King III Report, the accompanying Code and complies with the law. King III is in 
form of a Code of principles and practices, which is a recommendation for a course of 
conduct.  A board must ensure that the company meets the requirements of the JSE by 
accounting for the adherence or non-adherence to the principles and recommendations in the 
Code.
196
 It may be important at this stage to point out that King III operates on an ‗apply or 
explain‘ basis, which is a refinement from the King II‘s ‗comply or explain‘ basis.
197
 South 
Africa has now realised that a ‗comply or explain‘ basis is now outdated as it denotes a 
mindless adherence to the letter of the Code without flexibility and understanding of 
implications for the company and society at large.
198
 In this regard, the King III Report 
accepts that a board of directors may decide that applying the Code may not be ‗in the best 
interests of the company‘, and could therefore decide to apply the Code differently or apply a 
different practice which still meets the requirements of the Code.
199
 
Of particular relevance to this study is the special role that the King III Report sees for 
the common law duty of care in the context of the board‘s decision-making processes. The 
King III Report provides that consistent application of corporate governance practices, 
guidelines and codes by boards will not only raise perceptions of what are regarded as the 
appropriate standards of directors‘ conduct.
200
  The more established the governance practices 
become, the more courts of law will likely regard them as meeting the standard of care.
201
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Hence the King Committee could boldly argue and warn company directors that failure to 
meet recognised standards of governance that are not legislated could result in legal liability 
of boards and directors.
202
  King III  qualifies this point by stating that the report (King III) 
points to ‗those matters that were recommendations in King II, but are now matters of law 
because they are contained in the Act‘.
203
 Lack of due diligence to read and understand the 
recommended course of conduct for directors freely provided for in the Code could also be 
construed as lacking the required standard of care by a company director. 
The King III Report also links the duty of care to some new trends in or principles of 
corporate governance such as Information Technology (hereafter IT) governance
204
 and use 
of Alternative Dispute Resolution (hereafter ADR).
205
 With regard to the required standard of 
skill for directors in relation to IT use, the Report provides that ‗in exercising their duty of 
care (and skill)   directors should ensure that prudent and reasonable steps have been taken in 
regard to IT governance‘.
206
  As far as the exercise of the requisite standards of care and skill 
in enhancing productive relationships beneficial to the interests of the company is concerned, 
the Report sternly recommends that directors should attempt to resolve disputes 
expeditiously, efficiently and effectively.
207
 On applying the required standards of diligence, 
the Report explained that directors are required to adequately acquaint themselves with the 
content of applicable laws, rules, codes and standards generally in order to discharge not only 
their duty of care, skill and diligence, but also their fiduciary duties.
208
  
The King III Report, like the King II, makes reference to the BJR, which relates to the 
decision-making aspect of the duty of care. King III describes the BJR as a ‗statutory 
defence…introduced (by the Act) for the benefit of directors who have allegedly breached 
their duty of care‖.
209
  
The King III Report revolves around three philosophical underpinnings or what the 
report describes as ‗key aspects‘ which have assumed great importance at international level. 
The first of these key aspects of the report is leadership or good governance of companies 
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steeped into the constitutional values given best expression through the concept of Ubuntu.
210
 
The second aspect is sustainability.
211
 The third aspect is corporate citizenship.
212
  
2.4      Nature of the director–company relationship 
In this part, it is considered vital to sketch an understanding of the ever evolving legal 
nature of a company. Closely connected to this is the need to establish an understanding of 
the role and legal responsibilities of a company director in advancing the main business of the 
company. This is in light of a considerably transformed and still evolving company law 
framework globally and more particularly in South Africa.
213
    
2.4.1 Theories on the nature of a company 
The theories on the nature of a company serve the purpose of giving insight into the 
origin and proper purpose of the corporate form. It has been suggested that the theories help 
to shape the corporate governance model which a company adopts, a model which indicates 
in whose best interest directors should manage a company.
214
 In discussing the theories, this 
study intends to show the nexus between the evolving nature of a company and the expected 
standards of directorial conduct during decision-making. Three theories, namely the 
contractual or agency theory, the concession theory and the communitaire theory, are of 
relevance to this study.  
The theories on the nature of a company are considered in search of answers to questions 
such as: What is a company? An understanding of the legal nature of a modern day company 
is important in order to deal with challenges arising from issues of separation of ownership 
and control of companies.  No clear cut answers have been found over decades. An attempt at 
answering this question is vital as the bedrock to understanding the nature of the role and 
standards of conduct expected of directors. A related question which this section may also 
seek answers to is: In whose interests must company directors govern? Should directors 
manage companies in the interests of a collective body of shareholders, the supposed owners 
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of corporations? Or should this be done in the best interests of the company as a separate 
legal entity, different from its incorporators? Yet another related double edged inquiry is: To 
whom is the duty of care, skill and diligence owed by company directors? Tensions in 
corporate law and corporate governance have come about as a result of differences of opinion 
in answering the above questions. Different theories discussed below are an attempt to 
provide insight into the nature of the problem as described above and possible answers to 
such challenges.  
 
2.4.1.1 The Agency/Contractarian theory  
The Contractarian theory has been described as the antithesis of the concession 
theory.
215
 The two theories stand in contradiction to each other regarding their views on the 
nature of a company. The interesting paradox is that the contrasts between the two theories 
vitally help to illustrate the private nature and the public nature of a corporation. Where the 
contractarian theory
216
 views the company as a result of a purely private initiative,
217
 the 
concession theory views a company as a creation of the state.
218
   
The Contractarian theory sees the company as a consequence of private individuals 
exercising their freedom to contract with each other out of their free will.
219
 A clear evidence 
of the impact of the Contractarian theory on the Act is the reference to incorporation of a 
company as a right, as juxtaposed with a privilege bestowed by the state.
220
 S 13 of the Act 
reflects a core essential principle of corporate law reform in South Africa. This principle 
provides that the ‗formation of a company is an action by persons in the exercise of their 
constitutional right to freedom of association,
221
 combined with their common law right to 
freedom of contract‘.
222
  The purpose of corporate law according to the Contractarian theory 
is therefore seen as that of providing an enabling set of rules empowering stakeholders to 
establish contractual relationships.
223
  Thus the ‗nexus of contracts‘
224
 results in a product 
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called a corporation, which is viewed under this theory as a ‗web of contractual 
relationships‘
225
 constantly renegotiated by parties, with each party seeking to maximise its 
own advantages.
226
  The parties to this network of contractual ties in a corporation are 
regarded as stakeholders- members on par with each other, separated only by the nature of 
‗their inputs in exchange for certain rights with respect to output‘.
227
 Under this theoretical 
construction, shareholders are not considered to be owners of the corporation, but ‗merely 
one type of investor among many‘.
228
  While this may give the impression that the agency 
theory downgrades the status of the shareholders, ironically it upholds and affirms the norm 
of shareholder primacy, nonetheless even if this could be achieved somewhat by default.
229
 It 
has been argued that in the final scheme of things, shareholders, given their unique position 
among all stakeholders, become the obvious proxy for societal wealth.
230
 Arguably, this is for 
the reason that shareholders are residual claimants to the assets of the corporation – the type 
of claimants who bear the entire weight of risk in the corporation.
231
 
In addition to the above, the contract theory is anti-regulatory in nature and even goes 
as far as suggesting that participants in the corporate form should have the option to opt out 
of rules should they so wish.
232
 The contractarians‘ stance in this regard stems from the 
conviction that companies are voluntary associations of individuals tied to each other by 
means of freewill-driven contracts. As such they should be allowed to structure their 
relationships freely, without interference from the state.
233
 The state, it is argued, ‗has no 
greater standing to intervene in the corporate affairs than it has in the individual lives of the 
citizens who make up the company‘.
234
 The contractarian theory does not deny the state‘s 
power to make rules. However, the theory understands corporate law‘s role as being to enable 
and empower stakeholders to enter into contractual relationships,
235
 while regulating 
performance of parties in this ‗nexus of contracts‘ context. In this connection of the freedom 
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of stakeholders in this ‗web of contractual relationships‘, the theory regards the shareholders 
as principals, while directors or managers are seen as agents.
236
 As aforementioned, though 
shareholders are accorded what appears like a higher status to other stakeholders, they are not 
regarded as owners. With the understanding that the traditional interests of shareholders is 
profit maximisation, and the unique position which directors occupy in a modern company, 
there are bound to be tensions. If shareholders are not owners of the corporation,
237
 and if it is 
to be accepted that the company has a separate legal personality from its incorporators, will 
the directors act in the best interests of the shareholders, their own interests or will they act in 
the best interests of the company? Where does that leave the shareholders and all those who 
rely on shareholders primacy for benefit? This is the challenge identified by the contract 
theory. In this theory‘s perspective, the director, as an agent, may not necessarily act in the 
best interests of the principal (shareholder). The assumption and apprehension in this theory 
is that if the director chooses to act, he may only do so partially,
238
 say by pursuing interests 
which advance his own ends at shareholders‘ expense. 
 
2.4.1.2 The Concession theory  
In contrast to the contract theory‘s view on the private nature of a corporation as 
given rise to by private individuals‘ initiative, the concession theory emphasises the public 
nature of a company. In this connection, the concession theory views a corporation as a 
creature of statute, owing its existence to an exercise of state power,
239
 and thus owing the 
state something in return for its very existence.240 
The quid pro quo or commensurate return from the corporation as understood by the 
concession theorists would include what has now come to be known as good corporate 
citizenship – typically socially responsible behaviour.
241
 Whereas the contractarian theorists 
believed in freedom of contract, non-interference by the state and adopted a stance against 
over regulation by the state, the concession theory viewed it differently. The concession 
theorist believed that the state even had a right to demand socially responsible behaviour 
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from the corporation for the many benefits bestowed upon a company.
242
 Consequently, the 
concession theorists advocated for double taxation as a means of the state getting some return 
from the privileges enjoyed by companies. In exchange for the ‗privilege‘ involved in 
obtaining a corporate status, there had to be a concession upon which the validity of the 
concession theory rested, that is from the state to the corporation.
243
 For example, the state 
was expected to ensure protection of property rights through enacting relevant legislation and 
also by moulding the company‘s constitution so as to protect the interests of shareholders 
against potential abuse of position by management.
244
   
Much of the basis for the concession theory appears to have fallen by the wayside, 
and has been criticised for being now ‗antiquated and inaccurate‘.
245
 In modern thinking, 
incorporation can no longer be considered a privilege. It is rather seen as a right which a 
company as both a legal person and corporate citizen of a country is capable of enjoying.
246
 
Under the Act, a South African citizen enjoys a right to incorporate a company.
247
  It is 
submitted that apart from progressive concepts such as modern day Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), most of the theoretical bases of the concession theory are now out of 
sync with modern constitutional and statutory developments. 
 
2.4.1.3 The Communitaire theory  
This is the third theory on the nature of the corporation with strong relevance to this 
study and it will be considered briefly here. This theory has interesting similarities and 
differences with the contractual and concession theories. Its distinguishing features are a 
combination of its attempts at balancing interests within the corporation and avoidance of the 
excesses of either of the contractarian or concession theories. The Communitaire theory does 
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The basis of the communitaire theory appears to be the protection and advancement of 
the interests of society or community.
249
 To the communitarian, the objectives of the 
company should be reflective of the interests of society.
250
 Consequently, the company has a 
special place in the community which it serves, and finds justification for its activities only if 
it fulfils societal needs. It is not clear what the exact meaning or implication of this is, and if 
this view does not conflict with the economic dimension of a corporation, which the 
communitarian believes in. It appears that to the communitaire theorist, ‗stakeholders‘ serve 
as proxy for the so called interests of the society.
251
 The communitaire theorist‘s meaning 
attached to the term ‗stakeholder‘ is by no means clear. The weakness or serious omission of 
the theory in this regard is that ‗stakeholders‘ are not clearly defined, making it difficult to 
know with certainty which interests are excluded and which ones are included. The theory 
views stakeholders as requiring protection from potential abuse.
252
 Stakeholder co-operation 
and maintenance of ethical conduct by all stakeholders become necessary to ensure justice 
and fairness to all interests represented in the corporation.
253
 
There are many differences and only a few similarities between the communitaire and 
the contractarian theories. It is important to point out that on some occasions where the two 
theories appear to agree, differences of approach exist. Good examples of this are to be seen 
in either theory‘s take on  the role of contracts in establishing relationships within the 
company and either theory‘s view of the directors‘ relationship with the company.    
In the discussion of the contractarian theory above, it was established that a 
corporation is a product of a ‗web of contractual relationships‘.
254
 Thus, to the contractarians, 
contracts clearly have a role to play in the establishment of a company. The communitarians 
may be prepared to accept the agency theory‘s take that the firm is established by a web of 
interrelated contracts. They however, do not accept the structure of shareholder primacy that 
the contract theorists construct as a result of their theory of the ‗nexus of contracts‘. While 
the communitaire theorists share the contractarians‘ belief in the role of contracts in 
establishing relationships in a corporation, they tend to argue that the ‗web of contracts‘ 
extends beyond explicit or written contracts to include unwritten contracts. This reasoning 
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can be criticised for the reason that implicit contracts are problematic to deal with since they 
are not intended to be enforceable.
255
  
Another point of convergence between the contractarian and the communitaire 
theories relates to their view of the legal nature of the director‘s relationship with the 
company. Either of the theories tends to regard directors as agents of the company. Generally 
the communitarians in their proposals for reform focus on re-characterising directors as 
agents of the entire corporation.
256
 The proposals for reform are geared towards ensuring that 
directors are lobbied to expand their consideration beyond shareholder wealth 
maximisation
257
 to include what is in the best interests of the wider spectrum of stakeholders. 
The major point of variation on this is that the contractarian theory views shareholders as the 
proxy for the wider stakeholders. It believes that the primary role of directors as agents of 
shareholders is profit maximisation for the principals.     
The following are clear differences between the communitaire and the contract 
theories. Where the concession theory views a company as a creature of the state, the 
communitarians regard the company as an instrument available to the state, not necessarily as 
its mere concession.
258
 While communitarians do not reject all the elements of the contractual 
theory, they tend to differ on emphasis and methods of achieving certain goals. For example, 
on the role of corporate law, the communitarians ‗…believe that corporate law must confront 
the harmful effects on non-shareholder constituencies of managerial pursuit of shareholder 
wealth maximisation‘.
259
 In contrast, the contractarians believe that the law should protect 
shareholders against potential abuse by directors in line with shareholder primacy and in 
order to ensure profit maximisation for shareholders.
260
  Another difference is that where 
contractarians emphasise principles of freedom and competition, the communitaire theorists 
advocate for norms of justice, cooperation and responsibility towards societal needs.
261
 
The strengths and flaws of the theories of the nature of the corporation pointed out 
above help put into perspective the development of corporate governance and corporate law 
both at international level and its evolution in South Africa. For example, concession and 
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contract theories help to highlight the public nature as well as the private nature of company 
law respectively, minus the theories‘ excesses of course. The law in South Africa and indeed 
the world over, serves to regulate the conducting of business and various relationships created 
within the life of the corporation as proposed by either the concession or the contractant 
theories. Some of the thrusts of the theories have somehow been subsumed by law-makers 
and regulators. The communitaire theory, and also the other two theories‘ views on the role 
of stakeholders and the debate around which interests of the stakeholders should receive 
primacy, are debates which are still present in South African law.   
The conflicting views represented by the various theories regarding shareholder 
primacy versus a stakeholder inclusive approach are present in the current South African 
corporate law and corporate governance regime.
262
 South Africa is said to have adopted the 
enlightened shareholder value approach under the Act.
263
 However and regardless, there 
appears to be an interesting thrust towards giving consideration to the wider interests of other 
stakeholders in the life of the corporation, other than the interests of shareholders. According 
to the King III Report, while directors are expected to maximise value for shareholders in the 
long term, they need to maintain healthy and productive relationships with stakeholders.
264
  
It is important to point out that whereas the concession and communitaire theories describe 
the state as either playing a concessionary role or the corporation as being an instrument of 




Another double importance of the theories to this study, especially the debate between 
the contractual and communitaire theories, is the theories‘ different approaches towards the 
nature of directors‘ relationship with the corporation. In this regard, the question debated by 
the two theories can be represented by one inquiry: Are company directors agents of 
shareholders, managing partners in the corporation, or is their legal status sui generis? Part 
2.4.3 will attempt to provide answers to this question by referring to the legal position under 
the new and still evolving corporate governance regime in South Africa.  
The theories on nature of companies can be summed up to lead to two common 
models of corporate governance, namely the contractual model and the concession model. 
The first model, the contractual model, as discussed above, is based on the contractarian or 
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agency theory. In dealing with the key question ‗in whose interests should directors manage 
the company‘, the contractual model answers it with a shareholder-centric view. Managing 
the company ‗in the best interests of the company‘ is understood by this model to mean the 
interests of the shareholders collectively. Interests of other groups in the life of a corporation 
such as creditors, employees and the environment for example, are seen as subordinate to 
those of shareholders. The goal of the model is to maximise shareholder wealth, and 
shareholders are seen as the best proxy for societal wealth. In case of a clash of interests, 
primacy must be given to the interests of the shareholders which must as of necessity, trump 
any other competing interests. 
In contrast, the second model, the concessionary model,
266,
 gives primacy to pluralist interests 
as opposed to a shareholder-centric approach. Even where the so called ‗bottom-up‘ variant 
of the concessionary theory accepts that the company must be run in the interests of the 
shareholders, taking into account interests of other interest groups is seen as a necessity. The 
first variant of the ‗bottom-up‘ concessionary theory argues that ignoring stakeholder 
interests will seriously damage shareholder interests, while the second variant holds that 
considering stakeholder interests in decision-making will directly benefit the company 
whether in the short-run or in the long run.
267
 
2.4.2 The legal status of a company in South Africa  
At common law a company is regarded as a legal person that is capable of acquiring 
rights and duties distinct from its incorporators, from the time of and by virtue of its 
incorporation.
268
 There are legal implications or consequences of this separate legal 
personality of a company. It was confirmed in the old South African case of Dadoo v 
Krugersdoorp Municipal Council
269
 that the separate existence of a company is not merely an 
artificial legal technicality, but that it is a matter of substance. One real implication of such a 
legal personality is that company property or assets, profits, debts and liabilities vest in the 
company. They cannot be regarded as the property of shareholders of a company.
270
 
According to the seminal English case Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd,
271
 the motives of 
incorporators in establishing the company are irrelevant when considering the rights and 
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liabilities of a company.
272
 Once a company is deemed to be legally existent following 
incorporation, it should, to the extent that it is applicable, be treated like any other 




Another implication of the legal personality of a company at common law is that 
incorporation of a company entails limited liability of shareholders in some instances.
274
 As a 
general principle, incorporators or shareholders of a company are not liable for the debts of 
the company.
275
  The debts and liabilities of a company should be solely borne by the 
company. Shareholders‘ assets should not be unfairly burdened by the liabilities of the 
company. This is one clear consequence of the ‗separate legal personality‘ concept.
276
 This 
common law general rule is now subsumed by the Act.
277
   
Two other legal consequences of the separate legal personality of a company, in 
summary, are that; firstly, as discerned from case law, there is potential for perpetual 
existence of the company. Thus, the company is not supposed to be affected by changes in 
terms of shareholding membership within the corporation, either as a result of death of a 
shareholder or any form of share transfer.
278
 Lastly, separate legal personality of a company 
implies that only agents or representatives of the company are authorised by law to manage 
the affairs of a company.  In this connection, shareholders do not qualify as agents of a 
company, and lack authority or standing to bind the company in terms of contracts or to 
participate in business transactions affecting the company to the exclusion of duly authorised 
agents. If it is to be accepted that shareholders are residual claimants to corporate assets, then 
this legal consequence of separate legal personality of a company has implications for the 
need to separate ownership and management or control in the corporate form. This also has 
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There are exceptions to the general rule that shareholders and/or directors have 
limited liability for the company‘s debts.  Company legislation may provide that certain 
companies may have a legal personality but that their directors may not enjoy limited 
liability.
280
 The Act provides clear examples and instances of such exceptions. The Act 
appears to suggest that a company‘s Memorandum of Incorporation (hereafter, MOI) may 
provide that directors  of the company for example, may be liable even if the company is a 
limited liability company.
281
   
The clearest exception to the general rule
282
 as referred to above, concerns the legal 
position of personal liability companies as provided for in section 19(3) of the Act. This 
section provides that in a personal liability company, the directors and the past directors of a 
company are jointly and severally liable together with the company for its debts and 
liabilities.
283
..    
With regard to the meaning of the term ‗company‘, the Act defines a company in 
terms of its juristic personality.
284
 This is  for the reason that the very foundation of our 
company law rests on the concept of a company‘s separate legal personality.
285
The Act 
provides a lengthy definition of a ‗company‘ in section 1, which definition takes into account 
the previous legislative positions. The definition of a juristic person in the same section of the 
Act includes a foreign company and interestingly, a trust. Under South African common law, 
a trust is not considered a juristic person.
286
 The inclusion of a trust within the scope of the 
definition of a juristic person has implications for appointment of this body onto the board of 
directors for company groups, as has been the norm under South Africa common law.
287
 
Section 69(7) of the Act will now disqualify trusts from holding a directorship, while other 
commentators believe that the import of the wording of section 87 (1) (a) and (b) mean that 
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trusts may now be appointed as company secretaries.
288
 If this is at all correct, such trusts will 
obviously have to be represented by their employees who satisfy certain requirements set by 
the Act.
289
    
Section 19(1) of the Act confirms the common law position regarding the legal 
consequences of incorporation on the legal personality of a company. In this regard the Act 
provides that from the date of its incorporation, a company -:  
… 
(a) is a juristic person which exists continuously until its name is removed from the 
companies register in accordance with this Act; 
(b) has all of the legal powers and capacity of an individual, except to the extent that 
(i) a juristic person is incapable of exercising any such power, or having any such 
capacity, or 
(ii) the company‘s Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise.290   
 The above definition of a company, particularly s 19(1) (b) of the Act has implications for a 
company operating in South Africa where the Constitution
291
 informs every conduct and legal 
form. S 19(1)(b) (i) appears to affirm the contents of section 8(4) of the Constitution. It 
similarly provides that a juristic person is entitled to the same fundamental rights as natural 
human beings, to the extent that such rights can be exercised by legal persons such as 
companies.
292
 Impliedly, companies are bound by applicable provisions of the Bill of Rights 
such as those contained in section 8.
293
 Equally, a juristic person can now derive the benefits 
and protection of the Bill of Rights, and can invoke its provisions. For example, a company 
may sue for defamation, if its reputation is unfairly affected. This is possible despite the fact 
that a company is regarded as having ‗no feelings to outrage or offend‘.
294
 For the reason that 
a corporation, just like natural persons ‗ has a reputation in respect of business or other 
activities which it is engaged that could be damaged by defamatory statements, it is only 
proper that [such] a corporation should be afforded the usual legal processes for vindicating 
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 However in keeping with the tenor of s8(4) of the Constitution, while 





 cautioned against equating juristic persons with natural persons in 
terms of all fundamental human rights contained in the Bill of Rights. For example, a 
corporation cannot enjoy rights to life and human dignity, and its right to privacy cannot be 
equated with that of a natural person.
298
    
2.4.3 Legal status of company directors: Are directors agents, trustees, managing 
partners or is their status sui generis? 
The precise nature of the legal relationship between a director and a company remains 
debatable without concrete agreement on the matter.
299
 Different analogies have been 
employed to try and explain this relationship. In this regard, directors have been described as 
agents, trustees, employees or even managing partners for varying reasons.
300
 As will be 
argued in this part, each of these descriptions has serious limitations in giving a precise 
understanding of the unique role of directors in corporations.  The situation has been crying 
out for a fresh view on the legal relationship between directors and companies.  
The limitations of the different descriptions of company directors listed above were 
considered in an old English case of Re Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co. Bowen L.J while 
appreciating the use of similes such as agents, servants or managing partners to describe 
directors‘ powers and duties, stated firmly that in his view: 
…directors are not exactly agents, nor exactly servants, perhaps not servants at all, nor 
exactly managing partners if by that is meant that they are nothing more and nothing 
less.
301
   
As explained by Bowen L.J there are very good reasons why directors‘ status can only be 
said to be analogous to that of agents, trustees, managing partners or servants. However, these 
expressions cannot, in their singular forms, exhaustively describe the nature of the powers, 
roles and responsibilities of directors.   
                                                                
295
 See the statement of the Appellate Division in Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 
(A) at 461-462. Words in brackets and italics are my own addition for emphasis. 
296
 For e.g. corporations, including Non-Profit Companies have an equal right and have a remedy of a 
     defamatory action available to them in case of defamatory statements calculated to cause such entities  
     financial prejudice. See Dhlomo v Natal Newspaper (Pty) Ltd (supra) 945.   
297
 In Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd; In re  
     Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) para 19. 
298
  Ibid. 
299
 See Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 412. 
300
 Joash Amupitan ‗Status of a Company Director- An Agent, Trustee or Employee‘ (2000) 4 JPPL 60-70. 
301
 (1882) 23 Ch. D.I.PP. 12 and 13. Also see a South African case Cohen v Segal 1970 (3) 702 (W) for similar 
comments by the court. 
49 
 
Are directors trustees? This question has been debated for centuries, with the early 
development of directors‘ fiduciary duties giving rise to the concept of a director as a trustee. 
The fiduciary duties themselves were largely moulded in the nineteenth century by the Courts 
of Chancery in England by way of analogy with duties applicable to trustees.
302
  The origin of 
the concept of directors as trustees is to be seen in the pre-1884 era of the deed of settlement 
companies whose property is said to have been vested in trustees who were often also 
directors of the companies.
303
  The analogy with trustees, as illustrated in Re City Equitable 
Fire Insurance Co,
304
 came out of the need to impose equitable obligations which had already 
been developed in relation to trustees.  As a result, an understanding was developed that just 
like trustees, directors are fiduciaries who manage assets or property that belongs to another 
person. As such, obligations had to be imposed to protect the interests of the beneficiaries. Re 
City Equitable Fire Insurance Co
305
 confirmed Bowen L.J‘s view in Re Imperial 
Hydropathic Hotel Co
306
 that it will be misleading to equate directors with ordinary trustees.  
Under most common law jurisdictions such as South Africa, it is inappropriate to 
describe directors only as trustees. In South African trust law, a trustee is deemed ‗owner‘ of 
the trust property and trust property is vested in the trustee.
307
 A director on the other hand 
does not own company property; he simply administers the property on behalf of the 
company. It is the company, as a legal person which remains owner of the property and/or 
assets.
308
 Unlike a trustee, a director‘s  role encourages him to display more entrepreneurial 
flair and to accept commercial risks to produce a sufficient return on the capital invested, than 
a trustee is allowed to.
309
 It can be argued that while a director‘s status may be analogous to 
that of a trustee, it is not identical to that of a trustee.
310
 
The status of a director has also been equated to that of an agent for good reasons. 
Indeed the position of a director is analogous to that of an agent. Being a juristic or legal 
person in terms of law,
311
 a company cannot act on its own, and it is necessary that it acts 
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through the agency of natural persons.
312
 S66 of the Act, as aforementioned, requires that the 
business of the company must be managed under the direction of its board of directors. Even 
if this task is to be carried out by other company officers, they do so with delegated authority 
from and/or on behalf the company‘s board. Whether the term agent alone aptly captures the 
unique role of directors in a company is debatable. What is not debatable however is the fact 
that the relationship of a director to the company is analogous to that of an agent and a 
principal. Like an agent, a director acts for the benefit of another party (the company), and 
not for his own benefit.
313
  
In a company set-up, who the principal is, if it is to be accepted that a director is an 
agent, can give rise to controversy. It seems quite inappropriate to assume that in this 
construction, the director can be seen as an agent of a shareholder who then may be viewed as 
a principal. It has been argued that shareholder primacy has been overtaken by legal 
developments internationally, and in a reformed agency theory, the corporation can now be 
considered to be the principal – not the shareholder.
314
 Thus if a director is an agent, then he 
can only be an agent of a company, and not that of a shareholder.
315
 Despite close similarities 
with agents, directors are however not agents. In the context of the director primacy model, 
the status of directors is one of ‗autonomous fiduciaries‘ as opposed to being merely 
agents.
316
 An agent is not accorded original power to manage the assets or property of the 
principal. As alluded to earlier, directors, acting as a collective (the board) have now been 
accorded original power to manage and direct the affairs of companies.
317
 
If directors are not trustees and if they are not agents, can they be regarded as 
managing partners in a company then? Once again, it can be said that the roles of directors 
and managing partners could be analogous, but they are certainly not identical. It has been 
said that an analogy with managing directors has been drawn especially in the case of a 
personal liability company where directors are jointly and severally liable, together with the 
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company for debts and liabilities of the company during their periods of office.
318
 Directors 
have also been likened to managing partners because both types of leaders have a mandate to 
lead and govern. Regardless of whether this mandate comes from enabling legislation or 
constitutive documents of corporations, both directors and managing partners are empowered 
to run business.
319
 The concept of managing partners is more relevant to a situation where the 
managing partner is a senior partner of a business organisation, has part ownership and a 
strong financial interest in the business which he manages on behalf of other partners. This is 
where directors are different from ordinary managing partners. Directors are not per se 
regarded as co-owners of company assets. They do not per se have a financial interest, save 
for situations where a director is also a shareholder in a company.
320
 
As demonstrated above, expressions such as ‗agents‘, ‗trustees‘, ‗managing partners‘ 
or ‗employees‘ used to describe the role of directors fall short in depicting the real extent of 
directors‘ powers and legal responsibilities. While all these analogies help to explain the 
common characteristics of the function and role of company directors, they have serious 
limitations as pointed out above. The limitations in turn only serve as a pointer to the 
uniqueness of the position of directors and their relationship with the company they are 
elected to serve. Some even believe that directors, acting as a collective (the board), have 
now risen to the status of a central organ of a company, with the general meeting of 
shareholders being another organ.
321
 As has been argued by some legal commentators, it 
seems more appropriate to say that the status of company directors is sui generis.
322
 Directors 
occupy a unique position, and no single expression with reference to some other legal 
relationship by way of an analogy can best describe directors‘ relationship to the corporation. 
In South Africa, the Act, unlike its predecessor the Companies Act 61 of 1973 has now given 
directors original power or mandate to manage companies as already highlighted. This further 
strengthens the argument that directors have assumed a status akin to an independent 
managerial organ of the corporation.  
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2.5 Meaning of ‘the best interests of the company’ – Does the Enlightened 
Shareholder Value (ESV) approach provide an answer to the meaning of this 
phrase under the Act? 
Efforts to answer the questions relating to what exactly is meant by the term 
‗company‘ and the phrase ‗the best interests of the company‘ are on-going. At present, the 
efforts to find answers are represented by at least three theories. These three theories include 
the Shareholder value approach, which is based on two premises, namely directors‘ 
obligation to ensure wealth maximisation for shareholders
323
 and the now archaic belief that 
shareholders are sole owners of the corporation.
324
 The other two approaches are the 
Stakeholder/Pluralist and the ESV approaches. These two recently occupied South African 
debates during the company law reform negotiations which culminated with the DTI Policy 
Document 2004.
325
 Some writers appear convinced and even claim that South Africa has 
adopted the ESV approach under the Act.
326
 The term ‗the best interests of the company‘ may 
still require some unpacking through interpretation to give a meaning which reflects and 
represents the developments in law, including the spirit, objects and purposes of the Act.
327
 
This part of the Study will highlight the lack of clarity regarding the exact approach adopted 
by the Act and will point in the direction of what may need to be done to make the position 
clearer.   
The ESV is an approach which is still grounded within the shareholder value 
paradigm, but is considered to eschew a shift from a pure shareholder primacy.
328
 Like its 
predecessor the shareholder value approach, the ESV emphasises economic efficiency and 
maximum returns on shareholder investments.
329
 Simultaneously, the ESV considers some 
stakeholder interests as long as this results in wealth maximisation for shareholders. While 
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ESV maintains the view that directors have to act in the collective best interests of 
shareholders, it now eschews what has been described as an ‗exclusive focus on the short-
term financial bottom line‘ which it seeks to balance with a more inclusive approach that 
values the building of long-term relationships.
330
  This inclusive thrust of the ESV is 
something akin to a similar sounding concept of enlightened value maximisation espoused by 
famous author Professor Michael Jensen.
331
 The ESV approach is more enlightened than the 
shareholder value theory in the sense that directors are encouraged, and one may even argue, 
are now clearly required in other jurisdictions such as the UK
332
 to take into account interests 
other than those of shareholders, in decision-making.
333
  
 Whether the ESV approach in practice results in a paradigm shift that removes it far 
from pure shareholder value remains unclear, and this opens the ESV to criticisms. A critical 
look at the ESV reveals that it may essentially be a glorified or ‗repackaged‘ shareholder 
value approach. This is so for the reason that as has been argued, ESV still requires directors 
to treat shareholders‘ interests as paramount and only considers material interests where this 
advances shareholders‘ interests.
334
 It can be argued that with an ESV approach, the 
traditional understanding that directors‘ acting ‗in the best interests of the company‘ amounts 
mainly to maximisation of wealth for shareholders refuses to go away. This does little to 
solve a long standing tension in corporate law as represented by the question: in whose 
interest do directors manage companies? As already established in 2.4.2, a company as a 
separate legal person owns its assets and is to be seen apart from its shareholders and 
incorporators.  
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At this stage it is important to briefly consider the tenets of the Pluralist approach 
(which is part of the Stakeholder theory) and its relevance to South African modern company 
law. The first pillar is that those who affect or are affected by the company and contribute to 
its success are stakeholders. They deserve to be treated as an end and not as the means to an 
end.
335
 The second pillar is inclusion and broader accountability by directors to these 
stakeholders whose contribution to success of the business enterprise must receive 
recognition.
336
 The third pillar is that, directors thus have a duty to create optimal value for all 
stakeholders in decision-making and make a company a place where not only shareholders 
but stakeholder interests are also maximised.
337
 The Pluralist approach views the best 
interests of the company to mean to balance interests of key stakeholders, not only those of 
shareholders.  
South Africa‘s latest attempt at responding to the question regarding whose interests 
the company should serve is contained in the Act. S76 (3) (b) simply answers the question by 
requiring directors to perform their functions (which include decision-making) ‗in the best 
interests of the company‘.
338
 What is meant by ‗the best interests of the company‘ is not 
exactly defined or given ready meaning under the Act. It has to be emphasised here that our 
law (the Act and common law included as established in 2.4.2) views a company as a 
separate person and its assets are not to be confused with those of shareholders. Yet, there is 
potential for conflict when one considers the common law interpretation of ‗the best interests 
of the company‘ which is not properly aligned to the Act.  The common law would interpret 
the phrase to mean interests of the collective body of shareholders, the present and future.
339
 
This common law interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the understanding that a 
company stands apart from its shareholders.  
The DTI Policy Document 2004 appears to suggest an approach which, though 
difficult to classify, may provide an answer to the proper interpretation of the ‗best interests 
of the company‘ properly aligned to the Act. A close reading of the policy document appears 
to suggest a rejection of the traditional common law understanding of the best interests of the 
company. Thus according to the policy document, if company law is to remain congruent 
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 and consequential legislation, the interests of the shareholders should 
be balanced with those of stakeholders.
341
 The company‘s pursuit of economic objectives 
should thus be constrained by social and environmental imperatives
342
 as demanded by 
relevant constitutional values
343
 and legislative enactments.
344
 The policy document  does not 
seem to be limited to the ESV approach. The policy document does not advocate a 
consideration of stakeholders‘ interests only if this ultimately promotes shareholder interests. 
On the contrary, the policy document provides that an approach properly aligned to a 
constitutional framework demands that stakeholder interests be given independent value.
345
 
The DTI Policy Document 2004 goes even further to provide that directors in certain 




 It is therefore clear from the above paragraphs that the ESV cannot be said to be the 
approach adopted by the Act to provide meaning to what is meant by ‗the best interests of the 
company‘.  As argued above, it can no longer be business as usual and the common law 
interpretation is not properly aligned to the constitutional framework as required by the DTI 
Policy Document 2004. The ‗best interests of the company‘ can no longer be interpreted to 
only mean the collective interests of the present and future shareholders to the exclusion of 
other key stakeholders‘ interests. So how is the tension between an interpretation preferred by 
common law and the policy aligned to the proper policy direction of the Act and new 
company law in South Africa to be resolved? Well, the Act provides a way in which its 
provisions should be interpreted and the position is fully canvassed under Chapter 6, and it is 
not necessary to get into any more detail here.
347
 What suffices for the present purposes is to 
state that if the common law is lagging behind in terms of development, which I am 
convinced that it is the case here, then the Act points towards a possible solution. It (the Act) 
gives courts the mandate to develop the common law when applying it to a given set of facts 
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if this is necessary to provide a remedy to an injured part.
348
 If a court is to give s76 (3) (b) a 
purposive interpretation,
349
 ‗best interests of the company‘ will mean interests of the 
company as a juristic person.
350
 It is then both a right and responsibility of this juristic person, 
acting through its duly authorised agents, the board of directors,
351
 to ensure that it balances 
interests of shareholders and all other key stakeholders.  
An approach that balances interests of shareholders and other key stakeholders is 
neither an ESV approach to corporate governance nor a pure Pluralist approach. As 
demonstrated in the paras above, the ESV is not properly aligned to the policy direction 
preferred by the DTI Policy Document 2004. The Pluralist approach cannot be said to be the 
preferred approach since stakeholders have not received any formal recognition under the 
Act, unlike shareholders who are clearly recognised by the Act.
352
 It cannot be gainsaid 
however that there is indirect recognition of the importance of certain key stakeholders in the 
life of the corporation by the Act.
353
 For example, in terms of derivative action provisions, the 
Act recognises clearly the powers of mainly three categories of stakeholders who can serve a 
demand on the company to commence or continue legal proceedings or to take related steps 
aimed at protecting the interests of the company. These are shareholders, directors/prescribed 
officers and registered trade unions representing employees or any other representative of 
employees. It is also clear from the reading of ss 4 & 22 of the Act that the Act considers the  
protection of creditors as important to sustainability of companies and promotion of 
enterprise efficiency. An approach balancing the ESV and the Pluralist approach can be said 
to be the preferred approach. 
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2.6 The relationship between duty of care and BJR 
What is the duty of care, skill and diligence and why is it important in company or 
corporate law? As already conceptually established in this thesis,
354
 the company as a juristic 
person can only act through the ‗agency‘ of authorised natural persons, that is, its directors 
who should represent it and make important decisions on its behalf.
355
 In discharging their 
responsibilities, directors should observe two categories of common law duties. The first such 
category, the fiduciary duties, can be summed up as the composite duty of loyalty to the 
company. A fiduciary duty imposes on directors what has been described as ‗a largely 
negative obligation to do nothing which conflicts with the company‘s interests‘.
356
 The 
second category,  the composite duty of care, can be described as a duty of directorial 
competence.
357
 It has been correctly stated that the paramount duty of directors, individually 
and collectively, is to exercise their powers bona fide in the best interests of the company.
358
 
Directors‘ main role in a company involves decision-making. This demands leadership 
qualities such as the exercise of necessary or reasonable care, application of relevant skill and 




  Risk taking is inextricably part of business and entrepreneurship.
360
 Thus in their 
decision-making role, directors are expected to take investment risks and even courts of law 
expect them to display ‗entrepreneurial flair‘ in the hope of commensurate rewards for the 
company and its shareholders.
361
. Courts have maintained for a long time that directors are 
not liable for mere errors of business judgment.
362
 As such, it has been observed
363
 that courts 
have been careful to take into account the fact that after the event ‗the knowledge of hindsight 
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can be misleading and give rise to unfair criticism‘.
364
 Courts will avoid second-guessing 
business judgments of directors provided that the decision in question was, under the 
circumstances, sufficiently informed and given the information at directors‘ disposal, it was 
rational and reasonable.
365
 Directors‘ duty of care obligations in the decision-making process 
and the discretion which the law affords them naturally connects the duty of care with the 
BJR. The two are inextricably linked as far as directors‘ decision-making is concerned. The 
BJR will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 of this Study, while Chapter 3 considers 
international best practices as part of a comparative analysis of the Study.  
In brief, the essence of the BJR as captured in English case law is that ‗directors may 
exercise their discretion bona fide in what they consider- not what a court may consider – is 
in the interests of the company‘.
366
 English case law has for a long time maintained the 
understanding that it is not the function of the courts to be the arbiter of commercial 
decisions. That role was seen as belonging to shareholders and directors.
367
 The courts are 
expected to intervene only if the actions of directors indicate lack of good faith, absence of 
due care and or proper diligence in decision-making.
368
 As will be demonstrated in Chapter 5, 
South Africa has adopted the US-style BJR in statute even without incremental development 
of the rule as was the experience in the Australian
369
 legal system where the BJR has now 
been codified in a statute.
370
 The question that remains to be answered is whether the 
adoption of the BJR under the Act without something akin to a ‗test-drive‘ will have positive 
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2.7 CONCLUSION    
This Chapter has laid down the theoretical foundations or a conceptual framework for 
an interrogation of the effectiveness of standards of care, skill, diligence and the BJR under 
the Act. It has been established that these standards are at the heart of the role that directors 
have to fullfill when discharging their legal responsibility of directing the business and affairs 
of a corporation.
371
 Directors have to make business decisions, at times under imperfect 
circumstances and while confronting tensions inherent in the corporate form.
372
 Not least of 
these tensions is the pressure to balance the profit maximisation drive from shareholders and 
accountability for how the directors manage broader stakeholder interests. Implicated in this 
are standards of care, skill and diligence and the duty to act in the best interests of the 
company expected of directors during the decision-making process. When allegations of 
breach of proper conduct are made, the BJR then provides the test a court is to apply when it 
reviews a director‘s conduct.
373
  
Importantly, this Chapter defined key concepts central to this thesis. These key terms 
include subjective standards; objective standards, dual subjective/objective standards, dual 
objective/subjective standards; gross negligence; the complex corporate governance concept; 
the BJR; the terms ‗company‘ and ‗director‘ as defined by the Act and by various theories on 
the nature of a company.
374
        
  A discussion of the standards of care, skill, diligence and the BJR has been properly 
located within the broad concept of corporate governance which has been adequately defined 
and explained. How the company is governed is at the heart of this research because I focus 
here at the director‘s composite duty of care and the BJR (decision-making). The world-wide 
global financial crisis has put the spotlight back on directorial competence and attention to 
the affairs of the company during decision-making processes.
375
 Hence the importance of 
focussing on standards of care, skill and diligence plus the BJR in this thesis. 
The relevant theories on the nature of the company have been explored with the view 
of answering questions regarding the legal status of a company and a director in South Africa 
today. It has been established that a company is a juristic person with a separate legal 
personality in terms of common law
376
 and the Act.
377
 On whether a director is an agent, a 
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trustee, managing partner in a corporation, it has been established that the position of a 
director is unique from all these descriptions associated with it. It can only be sui generis.
378
 
It has also been established that the Act adopts a broader definition of the term ‗director‘ to 
focus more on the exercise of power and the function performed. This is a shift from a 
traditional focus on title and designation of the person of a director. 
Two related key questions needed to be answered through the examination of the 
theories on the nature of a company, the legal status of the company as well as the legal status 
of a company director. The first question is ‗in whose interests should directors manage the 
companies?‘ The second question is ‗to whom are the directors‘ duties owed, especially the 
duty of care?‘ In the light of the conclusion I reached regarding the legal status of both the 
company and the director, the logical corollary is that a reading of the Act and the corporate 
law reform policy objectives
379
 should lead to the conclusion that our law now demands a 
departure from a traditional narrow interpretation of ‗the interests of a company‘.
380
 It was 
demonstrated in this Chapter that the law determines that duties are owed to the company as 
an independent commercial entity and not to individual stakeholders. 
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CHAPTER 3: INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKS & TRENDS IN EVOLUTION 
OF STANDARDS OF CARE, SKILL, DILIGENCE & THE BJR 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
South Africa‘s corporate law reforms
1
 coincided with similar developments elsewhere 
in the world, and benefited immensely from evolving international best practices in corporate 
governance. The DTI Policy Document 2004 spelt out a vision for law reform which resulted 
in the Act. One of the objectives of law reform was to promote the global competitiveness of 
South African companies. One of the ways of achieving this was by ensuring compatibility 
and harmonisation of the new company law with the best practice jurisdictions 
internationally.
2
 In this regard, South Africa has followed a common trend in the 
Commonwealth legal systems towards stating in statute the directors‘ duties which 
incrementally developed through case law.
3
 Two such legal systems, Australia and the United 
Kingdom (hereafter the UK) have probably had the greatest influences on the development of 
modern standards of care, skill and diligence in South Africa. Both Australia
4
 and the UK
5
 
have codified directors‘ common law duties in their revised company laws. 
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the development of the duty of care, skill, 
diligence and the BJR in the countries selected as comparators of choice for this study, being 
Australia, the U K and the USA. The chapter further considers how the evolving standards of 
directors‘ conduct, distilled from a growing body of case law in these countries, have 
influenced South African law reform. Even more importantly, this chapter considers how 
evolving standards from these countries may continue to impact on the future development of 
relevant jurisprudence in South Africa. The chapter will compare and contrast directors‘ 
standards of conduct and review contained in the various pieces of legislation in the selected 
countries on one hand, and the standards now contained in the Act on the other hand. The 
success stories or the challenges of interpreting and enforcing standards in those countries 
will serve as lessons for development of standards in South African law.  
Why is a comparative approach important to this study? It is decidedly relevant to this 
study because the Act and the Constitution encourages such an approach when interpreting its 
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 In s 5(2) the Act states that ―to the extent appropriate, a court interpreting or 
applying this Act may consider foreign company law‖. Each comparator selected adds a 
peculiar dimension to understanding the historical as well as the future development of the 
duty of care, skill, diligence and the BJR in South Africa. As stated earlier, the UK and 
Australia jointly share South Africa‘s experience of codifying directors‘ duty of care. South 
Africa shares a common law heritage with these two Commonwealth legal systems. As such 
an understanding of any developments in English and Australian company laws has been 
correctly said to be of great comparative value to understanding development of the broad 
duty of care in South Africa.
7
  
This chapter begins by briefly tracing the traditional or common law standards of 
care, skill and diligence in the UK, looking at the incremental development of the modern 
standards through case law and s 214(4) of the Insolvency Act of 1986. Comments will be 
made on the current standards under the Companies Act 2006 as comparisons will be drawn 
between the developments in law in the UK and South Africa. The UK set the pace for the 
development of the duty of care among common law jurisdictions. It is therefore proper that 
the comparative analysis should begin with a brief study of developments in the UK. 
Australia will be considered next, as Australian law reforms benefited too from common law 
developments of the duty of care in the UK during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Lessons drawn from the Australian experience of interpreting and enforcing the modern 
standards of care, skill and diligence will assist in proposing the correct future judicial 
approach for South Africa and development of standards. The USA law will be examined to 
give insight into the content of the duty of care, and the historical development of the 
relationship between the duty of care and the BJR.  
3.2 The UK duty of care  
The standards within the duty of care, skill and diligence have been incrementally 
developing (moulded and refined by courts of Chancery) under English law over centuries- 
from the nineteenth century to the present day.  Codification of the duty of care in s 174 of 
the Companies Act 2006 is largely viewed as a transfer of the evolving modern day standards 
of care, skill and diligence from case law to a legislative scheme.
8
 It is debatable under 
English law whether s 174 within the entire scheme of the statutory statement of directors‘ 
                                                                
6
 Part 1.7 of Chapter 1 briefly explains how the Constitution encourages a comparative study.   
7
 Bekink (2008) SA Merc LJ 103. Also see Havenga (2000) SA Merc LJ 25, & Bouwman (2009) SA Merc LJ 
517. 
8
 See Ahern (2012) L.Q.R 114-139. 
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duties under UK law,
9
 has merely restated in statute the position of the standards of the duties 
in case law as they existed prior to the Act. 
The spot-light at the moment falls on the difficulty of interpreting statutory duties 
such as the one in s174. Debates have arisen over which method of interpretation is best 
suited to allow for further growth of the law. The challenge appears to be around 
understanding the exact relationship between a statutory statement of directors‘ duties and the 
pre-existing case law–whether the one overrides the other in interpretation.
10
 For purposes of 
making a case for the best approach in interpreting section 76(3)(c) of the Companies Act 
2008, it will be useful to have regard to the debates and challenges the UK is facing regarding 
interpretation of the standards contained in s174.  
The approach to interpretation of s174 of the Companies Act 2006 has naturally 
generated controversy and debate in the UK as will be revealed below. While that is the case, 
what is not debatable is the fact that the Companies Act 2006 represents a memorial of the 
milestones in the development of the standards in English law. By implication, the standards 
in s 174 can be better understood within the context of the incremental development of the 
duty of care in the UK over the years.  It is vital to briefly consider the common law 
development of the duty of care under English law prior to the Companies Act 2006. 
 3.2.1 From a traditional approach to modern standards of care in the UK 
Standards of care under English law shifted from low and less demanding standards to 
the more stringent modern standards encapsulated in the Companies Act 2006. The law 
relating to the duty of care never remained fossilised at the traditional approach. Different 
scenarios and commercial realities gave rise to refinements of principles through application 
by courts of law.
11
 The traditional approach to the duty of care was that there was little 
demanded of directors, and the directors of the nineteenth century were liable only for gross 
errors of judgment amounting to negligence.
12
 In Re Denham & Co,
13
 the director who had 
neglected his duties for four years, and had been found guilty of negligence by the court of 
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 S171-177 of the Companies Act 2006 is a statutory statement of seven directors‘ common law duties.  
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 Ahern (2012) L.Q.R 116. 
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It can be argued that in the earlier cases of the nineteenth century, the courts adopted a 
lax attitude towards enforcement of the duty of care. This attitude of the courts was informed 
by a belief that if shareholders appointed ‗half-wits‘ or incompetent directors they only had 
themselves to blame. It was believed to be their duty to take remedial action and not the 
courts‘.
15
 In Turquand v Marshall,
16
 the court declared that as long as the directors kept 
within the powers in their deed, however ridiculous their actions might seem, it was the 
misfortune of the company that they had chosen such unwise directors. An equally surprising 
dictum was made in a fairly recent case In re Elgindatahad Ltd,
17
 where the court remarked 
that the shareholders had no right to expect a reasonable standard of general management 
from the company‘s managing director. The court went on to add that it was considered one 




In Re Cardiff Savings Bank: Marquis of Bute’s Case,
19
 the Marquis of Bute, having 
been appointed director at six months of age, only attended one shareholders‘ meeting in 38 
years. Yet despite this clear abdication of duty (at least from a modern perspective), the 
action for breach of his duty of care was unsuccessful.   
In the earlier case of Overend, Gurney & Co v Gibb,
20
 the test developed was that of 
mere ‗ordinary prudence‘, a test which was lower than the prudence expected to be exercised 
by a man when running his own affairs. Under such a low standard, it has been argued, a 
director would be exempted from liability where he was not aware of pertinent facts because 
of his own inattentiveness to company business.
21
   
English courts of the early nineteenth century insisted on gross negligence to found 
liability, and anything short of this would not help litigants in the action for breach of the 
duty as was ruled in Lagunas Nitrate Co v Lagunas Nitrate Syndicate Ltd for example.
22
 
Lindley MR emphatically remarked that directors‘ ‗negligence must be not the omission to 
take all possible care; it must be much more blameable than that; it must be in a business 
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sense culpable or gross‘.
23
 Thus even in a case of serious misconduct on the part of a director, 
the directors could escape liability if their misconduct could not be classified as gross 
negligence. This was the case in Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd.
24
 This 
seemingly lax attitude of the courts during this period towards enforcement of the duty of 
care led other commentators to argue that the common law of the day operated to give 
directors a remarkable freedom to run companies incompetently.
25
 Part of the reason for this 
lenient approach by the courts was due to the nature of business during the period.  There 
were relatively few companies during those days.  Company boards apparently consisted of 
part-time, non-executive directors who were considered mere figureheads,
26
 or well-meaning 
amateurs.
27
 The courts of Chancery probably felt sorry for this ‗species‘ of directors of the 
day who lacked in technical ability and did not possess any  specialist skills. As ‗amateurish‘ 
part-timers, the directors (possibly) could not be expected to consistently attend meetings, to 
participate in company affairs with requisite diligence let alone to exercise a professional 
skill which they possibly lacked.
28
   
 
3.2.1.1 Shift from subjective to dual objective/subjective elements 
From the lax attitude of the courts during the latter years of the nineteenth century,
29
 
the English courts moved from applying purely subjective elements of the duty of care to 
what I would call a dual subjective/objective standard or simply a classic subjective standard 
of the duty of care, skill and diligence.
30
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Re City Equitable Fire Insurance
31
 is considered by many to have provided the 
genesis or roots of the modern law on directors‘ standards of care, skill and diligence.
32
 
While there is a general agreement regarding this point, there are differences on whether the 
test applied by Romer J was a purely subjective one or whether it had dual  
subjective/objective elements. There is a general misunderstanding of the breadth, length and 
depth of the decision in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd. Some believe that Romer 
J‘s decision did little to improve standards of care, skill and diligence in the UK from the 
position left by cases such as Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd.
33
 I submit that 
this is an inadequate comprehension of the depth to which Romer J went in attempting to 
improve standards of care, skill and diligence. There is a good reason why Re City Equitable 
Fire Insurance Co Ltd is regarded as having laid the roots for a modern duty of care, skill and 
diligence. Romer J, in expounding upon a new approach, sought to build upon the 
foundations laid by earlier cases, while giving a robust approach within which the new 
standards should be understood.
34
 A close examination of the judgment reveals elements of 
objectivity in the standards. Romer J proposed a basic standard of reasonable care,
35
 which is 
‗to be measured by the care an ordinary man might be expected to take in his own 
circumstances on his own behalf‘. This is a classical formulation of a reasonable man test, 
considered to approximate an objective test. Admittedly the standard was not objective 
enough for modern day business. 
Critics have paid attention to the propositions put forward by Romer J in Re City 
Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd. The proposition should be understood as a context in which 
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the new proposed standards of care, skill and diligence were to be understood at the time. The 
first proposition
36
 related the subjective elements to the objective standards of a reasonable 
man. The test of reasonable care shown by an ordinary man when running his own affairs is 
tempered by the subjective element of a skill that a director actually possesses. Thus, a 
director was said not to be required to exhibit a greater skill than may reasonably be expected 
from a person of his knowledge or experience.
37
 The only difficulty with Romer J‘s 
formulation of the standards was that it subordinated the objective standard to the level of 
skill or even the idiosyncrasy of a director. By implication, executive directors could be more 
easily liable for breach of duties than non-executive directors.  The second proposition was 
formulated with part-time non-executive directors in mind, given the reality that during those 




It became apparent with the effluxion of time that Romer J‘s propositions made with 
non-executive directors in mind were no longer appropriate for the demands of modern 
business. Society‘s expectations of executive directors have changed, and the tightening of 
standards is required to be in sync with the exigencies of modern day business.
39
 The third 
proposition
40
 related to reliance and delegation, which is most applicable today, given 
modern day demands of business. The Act  has been influenced by developments in English 
case law and has incorporated delegation and reliance into statutory law.
41
  There is a clear 
supervisory and strategic management role to be played by the company board, while the 
executive functions can be left to the executive to fulfil.  In addition to some other aspects of 
the standards of care, skill and diligence which require further tightening, what Romer J also 
failed to emphasise is the role of the board to properly supervise the executive management. 
This became the object of further incremental development of the standards through case law 
wherein s214(4) of the Insolvency Act of 1986 was applied by English courts. 
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While Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd sowed the seeds for a dual 
objective/subjective standard, the decision leaned more towards  a subjective standard, even 
though a basic objective standard of reasonable care could be discerned.
42
 Even though in 
terms of the society‘s expectations of executive directors today, the test applied by Romer J 
may seem to have been somewhat lax, it represented a tightening of the standards in law at 
the time.
43
 Latter cases such as Dorchester Finance Co v Stebbing
44
 built upon this 
foundation.  
3.2.1.2 Dual Objective/Subjective standards and the UK Law Reform 
The case of Dorchester Finance Co v Stebbing
45
 in 1989 appears to me to have been 
the beginning of the modern approach to the duty of care. Forster J recognised the need to 
distinguish a subjective standard which applies to the duty of ‗skill‘ from an objective one 
pitched at a high level which applies to ‗diligence‘. That was the beginning of the dual 
objective/subjective standards of care. Forster J did not only manage to build upon Romer J‘s 
formulations of standards of care, he also succeeded in creating a good problem. The good 
problem is whether it is possible to easily delineate an objective duty of ‗diligence‘ from the 
subjective duty to exercise ‗skill‘ as Forster J attempted to do. 
The English courts through the work of a commercial judge Hoffman J adopted an 
upgrade of standards of care in the cases after 1989. In Norman v Theodore Goddard,
46
 
Hoffman J adopted the view that both elements of the duty of care, namely ‗diligence‘ and 
‗skill‘ are to be assessed objectively.
47
 In pronouncing on the objective standard to be 
expected in the ‗skill‘ to be exercised, the court stated that  ‗a director who undertakes the 
management of the company‘s properties is expected to have reasonable skill in property 
management, but not in offshore tax avoidance‘.
48
 When expounding on the new standards of 
care in law, Hoffman J relied on s 214 (4) of the Insolvency Act 1986. In Hoffman J‘s view, 
this statutory position accurately captured the common law position at the time.
49
  Section 
                                                                
42




 [1989] BCLC 498.  
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the same functions as are carried out by that director in relation to the company, and 
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214(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 applied specifically to wrongful trading,
50
 but Hoffman J 
insisted that the standard of care owed is the same, whether or not a company is trading in the 
zone of insolvency.
51
 Two years later, in Re D’Jan of London Ltd
52
 Hoffman J reaffirmed his 
view that the duty of care owed by a director at common law is accurately stated in section 
214(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986.  
It is clear from the above cases that despite the gains made in the decisions/judgments 
made by Hoffman J, there was some confusion regarding the exact standards of care expected 
of directors. Some critics assumed that a more demanding duty of care was developed by 
Hoffman J in Norman v Theodore Goddard and Re D’Jan of London Ltd. As a consequence 
of this misconstruction, some critics were concerned about the severity of a demanding duty 
of care which could dissuade good people from acting as directors.
53
  The correct 
understanding should be that the court could only have espoused a dual objective/subjective 
standard since s214(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 emphasised a dual objective/subjective, 
and not an objective standard. There was also concern raised regarding whether in principle a 
line should be drawn between the elements of ‗skill‘ and ‗diligence‘ under the duty of care.
54
 
The Law Commission in its final report on law reform identified the issue of the 
clarity of the nature of the standards of care and skill demanded of directors as one of its main 
focuses under ‗Directors‘ Duties- Codification, or Legislative Restatement‘.
55
 Clearly the 
lack of clarity regarding the applicable standards is a matter which occupied law reform, and 
needed to be resolved in the new law (namely the Companies Act 2006). The Law 
Commission considered altering the content of the duty of care to provide clarity on the 
standards of conduct expected of directors.
56
 When recommending that the duty of care 
should be set out in statute like other common law duties, the Law Commission appears to 
have opted to retain the dual objective/subjective test under the common law. Up until the 




 had developed the common law duty of care 
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based on section 214(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986. Therefore a dual objective/subjective 




South Africa has followed developments in English law and adopted corporate law 
principles as they developed in the UK. The DTI Policy Document 2004 even acknowledged 
that company law in South Africa, including the Companies Act 1973 was ―still based on the 
framework and general principles of the English law‖.
60
 This is evident in the leading South 
African case on the duty of care, skill and diligence. As stated earlier, the Fisheries 
Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen & Another case summarised the adoption 
into South African law of milestones in English law developments up to the 1980s.
61
 South 
African authorities agree that English law principles were readily accepted in South African 




When English case law moved to dual objective/subjective standards based on 
s214(4) of the Insolvency Act, South African case law appears to have followed suit. For 
example in Howard v Herrigel & Another NNO,
63
 the court followed the English approach at 
the time, and followed the example and approach in Dorchester Finance Co v Stebbing
64
 
against distinguishing between an executive director and a non-executive director. The court 
was critical of Margo J‘s attempt to distinguish non-executive from executive directors,
65
 and 
ruled that the standards of care owed were the same for all directors.  
3.2.2 Standards of care under s 174 of the Companies Act 2006. 
The UK Companies Act 2006 has codified the duty of care, skill and diligence in line 
with the recommendations of the Law Commission.
66
 The duty to exercise reasonable care, 
skill and diligence in s 174 provides thus: 
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(1) A director of a company must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence 
(2) This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably 
diligent person with- 
(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected 
of a person carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to 
the company, and 
(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has.   
As highlighted earlier, it is evident that the Companies Act 2006 has opted for dual 
objective/subjective standards of care, skill and diligence in s 174(2). The  Law Commission 
decided against adopting purely subjective or purely objective standards.
67
 Either approach 
would have resulted in a single standard set for all directors, something that could have failed 
to take into account the nature of the company, and the specific function performed or power 
exercised by a particular       director.   
  A closer analysis of s 174 above reveals dual objective/subjective standards of care, 
skill and diligence, modelled along s 214(4) of the Insolvency Act of 1986. To borrow from 
the words of Paul L. Davies,
68
 the duty has two limbs. Subsection (2) (a), referred to as Limb 
2 (a), sets a standard which all directors must meet. Unlike the subjective standards applied 
by the courts of Chancery in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the standard under this 
limb is not dependant on the particular director‘s capabilities.
69
 In other words, this is a 
minimum irreducible objective standard which all company directors are reasonably expected 
to meet in the UK.  Limb 2(b) adds a subjective standard which can operate to allow 
reference to be made to the particular characteristics of the directors whose conduct could be 
under scrutiny.
70
 The subjective elements do not operate to lower the minimum objective 
standard. Rather, when one reads into the purpose and nature of the standard as framed under 
s 174, and as recommended by the Law Commission, limb (2)(b) helps to enhance the 
application of the objective standards.
71
 It has been argued that limb (2) (b) may operate to 
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increase the level of care required of the director.
72
 This is achievable through requiring the 
director to utilise such skill as he has for the benefit of the company in addition to the 
minimum objective standard required of all directors. It can be argued that this is the essence 
and effect of limb (2) (b). 
There are some very interesting elements of s 174 which could help the interpretation 
of s 76(3) (c) under the South African Companies Act 2008, but there are also grey areas 
which need to be clarified by the UK courts when it comes to interpretation. Firstly, s 174 
requires a reasonable expectation of the objective standards expected of directors.
73
 This 
takes into account the responsibilities of directors of different types and in different 
situations.
74
 For example, there has to be a difference in what can be expected from an 
executive director vis-à-vis what can be expected from a non-executive director who is not a 
full-time employee of the company. Secondly, the standards applicable under s 174 apply to 
each of the components of the duty of care, namely care, skill and diligence.
75
 There is now 
no need to delineate between an objective duty of diligence and a subjective duty to exercise 
skill. The same standard applies to the ‗care‘, ‗skill‘ and ‗diligence‘ components of the duty.  
This may raise a question as to what exactly is this minimum irreducible objective 
standard envisaged under s 174 relating to ‗skill‘. How is it to be measured or ascertained? 
Can this be read to mean something akin to a qualification such as an MBA for example, 
which is now a requirement for most executive directors in the UK?
76
  The answer appears to 
lie in the manner in which the standards have been formulated. In addition to there being a 
reasonable expectation, the director is to be a ‗reasonably diligent person‘ who should acquire 
through diligent means, ‗the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be 
expected‘ of a person in his/her position.
77
 The objective standard owed by directors, as is 
discernible, is not and cannot be a specific skill, experience or knowledge, but ‗general 
knowledge, skill and experience‘
78
 which is circumstance-based. This seems like an elastic 
standard, and not a specific ―one-size fits all‖ objective standard. Admittedly, directors are 
not a homogenous group and necessary skills vary according to the different nature and 
purpose served by the companies.
79
 No reasonable person would expect the same standard of 
skill from an executive director in a multi-national accounting firm and a small fruit and 
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vegetables company from a small town. The legislature should be commended for choosing 
to adopt dual objective/subjective standards.    
A third element that needs to be considered pertains to the difficulties faced by the 
UK in adopting a proper judicial policy towards interpreting the codified common law duties 
which include the duty of care, skill and diligence. There are fears in the UK that courts may 
already have been tempted to subordinate statutory law to pre-existing case law in their recent 





have interpreted s174 as merely encapsulating the hybrid approach previously borrowed by 
the courts from s 214(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
82
 In other words, the judicial approach 
has been to begin with the pre-existing case law when interpreting the code as opposed to 
beginning with the s 174 text in the Companies Act 2006, which purports to codify the 
common law.
83
  For example in Gregson v HAE Trustees Ltd,
84
 the court merely said that s 
174 ―codifies the existing law‖. This is beginning to create confusion given a clear provision 
in s 170(3) which seems to give the duties in the statute a superior status to the common law 
duties which it replaces.
85
  
The confusion alluded to above is probably caused by s 170(4) which suggests that 
the duties are to be understood and applied in the same manner as the common law rules they 
replace.
86
 English courts may need to follow a judicial policy which clearly requires that the 
judiciary does not unnecessarily  subordinate statutory law to common law rules which the 
Act purports to codify. The proper approach would provide a shift from looking at the policy 
behind decided cases to approaching the issue as one of statutory interpretation based on the 
wording of the text.
87
 Rules of interpretation appear to suggest a proper approach to 
interpreting s 174 which begins by having regard to the natural language of the statute as the 
first port of call.
88
 As has been convincingly argued, this deference to the statutory wording is 
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important to ensuring that a code‘s status as the principal law is not undermined,
89
 and this 
appears to have the support of English case law on interpretation.
90
  
It is suggested and proposed here that English courts should adopt an approach that 
begins by considering the textual meaning of s 174, and only fall back on the common law 
rules as an aid to interpretation. Another extrinsic aid to ascertaining the meaning of the text, 
apart from falling back on pre-existing common law principles, is to make use of the 
Explanatory Notes accompanying
91
 the Companies Act 2006 or the reports of the Law 
Commission, the Company Law Review‘s reports and the white papers,
92




A fourth element related to the challenge of interpretation as identified by some UK 
critics, is clarity on the exact relationship between statutory law and common law relating to 
directors‘ duties. The issue raised is whether legislative standards should operate in 
substitution of, or in addition to or whether they override the common law. At least the UK 
Companies Act 2006 attempted to provide direction in this regard, even though, according to 
Ahern, subsections 170(3) and 170(4) appear to cause confusion by seemingly detracting 
from each other.
94
 Contrary to the views of Ahern, s 170(3) appears to give the statutory law 
a superior status to common law rules. Thus, a court of law should begin with the plain 
language of the text where there is no ambiguity in the text. Where there is slight ambiguity 
as suggested and feared by Ahern, then a purposive interpretation in relation to the Act 
should be employed.
95
 In this construction, s 170(4) appears to suggest that the statutory 
duties operate in addition to common law rules, and in interpretation, regard shall be had to 
common law.  
The better way of understanding the provision in s170 (4) that ‗regard shall be had to 
common law‘, is that the common law should be instructive in the interpretation of s174. 
Surely, a statutory duty of care, skill and diligence has its origin in common law, and there is 
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more benefit to be derived from not disregarding a common law understanding of the purpose 
of such a duty than to ‗jettison‘ or ignore a body of rules developed over centuries. Thus, I 
submit that there is a symbiotic relationship between s170 (3) and s170 (4). The two 
subsections should be seen as complementary rather than detracting from each other. In fact, 
a UK court in a very recent case, Towers v Premier Waste Management
96
 lends support to the 
view expressed here. Mummery LJ explained that the effect of s170 (4) read together with 
s170 (3) is that the Act did not wish to ‗consign the replaced rules and principles to legal 
history‘.
97
    The apparent confusion as alleged by Ahern, between subsections 170(3) and 
170 (4)  only  needs to be clarified through interpretation, and the correct position in my view 
should be to understand that statutory law takes precedence and rules of common law should 
play an aiding role in interpretation. There is therefore no need for the legislature to consider 
amending either s170 (3) or s170 (4) to remove the purported confusion or tension, as there is 
no such tension if the subsections are to be read properly..    I am persuaded that South Africa 
should follow the example of the UK and provide guidance for interpreting its statutory duty 
of care, skill and diligence and other duties under the statutory statement of directors‘ 
common law duties in s76(3).
98
 
The fifth point to note is that the UK opted not to counterbalance the duty of care in 
s174 with statutory defences for directors such as the BJR, delegation and reliance.
99
 As will 
be demonstrated below, other jurisdictions such as South Africa have opted to adopt these 
statutory defences in their statutes.
100
    
3.2.3 The UK decision to exclude BJR in statute 
 The UK decided against stating in statute a formulation of the BJR. The UK is content 
with keeping the BJR in its unwritten form.  This was a result of a thorough investigation into 
whether it was desirable to include a BJR under the Companies Act 2006. The Law 
Commission, in its public hearings, found no evidence that the directors were concerned by 
the statement of directors‘ duty of care, or evidence that a statutory BJR would manage to 
raise directors‘ standard of behaviour. Thus a decision was made to recommend non-
inclusion of the BJR into the Companies Act 2006 as already alluded to in this Chapter.
101
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 English courts indeed have a judicial policy of not second-guessing honest business or 
corporate decisions/judgements of company directors.
102
 Developments in English case law 
have had very persuasive value on South African courts. One of the best illustrations of the 
judicial policy of the British Commonwealth courts (which includes South Africa) towards 
business judgments is to be found in Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd.
103
 
The court remarked that ―it is not the business of the court to manage the affairs of the 
company‖, adding that ―it does not matter whether the court would come to the same decision 
or a different decision‖.
104
 The court implied that courts cannot substitute a company board‘s 
decision for its own preferred decision. Years later, Lord Green MR was to express the same 
judicial policy, which is here taken to be the business judgment doctrine (a judicial policy): 
―They (company directors) must exercise their discretion bona fide in what they consider-not 
what the court may consider-is in the best interest of the company‖.
105
 In yet another case in 
1974, Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum & Others, the court ruled that ―…there is no 
appeal to the merits from management decisions to courts of law, nor will courts of law 




3.2.4 Comparing UK and SA law reforms 
The South African Companies Act 2008 like the UK statute also adopted what 
appears like dual objective/subjective standards in the duty of care, skill and diligence 
contained in s 76(3)(c). What makes it difficult to clearly understand the exact standards 
under section 76(3)(c) is the absence of Explanatory Notes to the Act, which could aid an 
understanding of the purpose of this particular duty in the statute. This is unlike the situation 
in England, where the Explanatory Notes and the easier accessibility to Law Commission 
reports assist an understanding of the exact standards in statute. A closer reading of s 76(3)(c) 
shows that the dual objective/subjective standards, as in the case of the Companies Act 2006, 
appears to be intended to apply to each component of the composite duty of care, namely the 
‗care‘, ‗skill‘, and ‗diligence‘ elements.
107
 Concerns have been raised regarding the manner in 
which the standards of care, skill and diligence have been formulated under the Act.  
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The focus of critics of the South African statute has been on the relationship between 
limb subsection 76(3)(c) (i) (hereafter limb 1) and limb 76(3)(c) (ii) (hereafter limb 2).
108
 It 
has been argued that while limb 1 imposes an objective standard, limb 2 subjects the 
objective standards to subjective elements or considerations, thus transforming the duty into a 
subjective one.
109
 There appears to be a slight yet significant difference in the manner the 
same duty is captured under section 174 of the Companies Act 2006. As demonstrated above, 
the equivalent to limb 1 under section 174 of the Companies Act 2006 does not seem to have 
the effect of subordinating objective standards to subjective elements, due to the careful 
manner in which the duty was formulated.  It is feared by critics that the language employed 
in section 76(3)(c) shows that there is a danger that the courts may read down the legislative 
duty of care to the subjective common law standard.
110
 A cross reference between limb 1 and 
limb 2 to ―…that director and… having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that 
director‖
111
 appears to qualify the objective standard in limb 1 by considerations of the 
particular director‘s subjective personal skill and knowledge in limb 2.
112
 This could not have 
been the legislature‘s intention. It could boil down to drafting style and formulation, thus 
creating a worrying gap between legislative intent and the textual content of the duty.  
The problematic limb in section 76(3) (c) is limb 2.
113
 Just like in the case of the UK 
standards,
114
 limb 1 could be interpreted to impose a minimum objective standard by which 
all directors are to be assessed. The ‗degree‘ of standard is that which can be reasonably 
expected of a person ―carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as those 
carried out by that director‖.
115
The use of the connecting word ―having‖
116
 with reference to 
the ‗general knowledge, skill and knowledge of that director‘,
117
 appears to be a major 
turning point, from objective standards to subordinating those minimum standards to the 
subjective ability of the director. To its credit, subsection 76(3) (c) (i)‘s reference to 
‗company‘ and ‗functions‘ recognises that a single standard cannot apply to all directors. 
There is need for a dual standard which takes into account the various types and sizes of 
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companies plus the nature of the function performed and the power exercised, just like in the 
case of UK law.
118
  
South Africa‘s Companies Act does not have a provision similar to section 170(3) and 
170(4) which attempts to provide a guide on understanding the relationship between statutory 
duty of care, skill and diligence and the common law duty. The South African legislature 
omitted to provide guidance in this regard. Consequently, it is left to conjecture to decipher 
whether statutory law has a superior status to common law, or whether the two apply and 
operate together, or whether section 76(3) (c) should be interpreted by reference to common 
law rules.
119
 If the Act is not revised to provide clarity in this regard, the judiciary will have 
to develop its own policy towards interpretation of provisions of s 76. This study will make 
relevant proposals in the concluding chapter for revision of the law. Alternatively, a proposal 
shall be made for the appropriate judicial policy which should be adopted by courts towards 
interpreting statutory duties of directors.
120
 
Unlike the UK, South Africa opted to adopt statutory defences to a possible breach of 
the duty of care, namely the BJR, delegation and reliance. Section 76(4) (a) and (b) is a 
statutory adoption of the BJR.
121
 Subsection 76(4)(b) provides for the twin defences of 
reliance and delegation. In fact, the defences of reliance and delegation appear to be closely 
connected to the BJR. The presence of the interlinking word ―and‖ at the end of section 76(4) 
(a) suggests that the legislature may not have intended that reliance and delegation should be 
understood apart from the BJR provisions. S 76(5) gives examples of people whom directors 
may rely on to fulfil their obligations towards the company.
122
 The UK opted against 
adopting the BJR and the defences of reliance and delegation into statute. It was preferred 
that such matter be left to the courts to develop them on ‗a case-by-case.
123
 
3.3 Australian standards of care and the BJR 
Australia‘s value to this chapter and to this study generally is the richness of the 
principles evolved by its legislature and courts in shaping the standards of care and diligence 
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and the adoption of the BJR in the Corporations Act 2001. Apart from the role played by the 
courts in incremental development of standards of directors‘ conduct, the role being played 
by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) in enforcing the statutory 
duties of directors will be considered. Australia has pursued a robust approach in ensuring the 
evolution of objective standards of care, and appears to have found a formula which has 
proven successful in enforcement of directors‘ standards of conduct. Contrary to Australian 
success stories, there has been a paucity of cases in South Africa.
124
 Australia is increasingly 
presenting itself as a model for lessons not only for South Africa, but even for other English-
speaking common law countries.   
3.3.1 The Australian Standards of care 
 
3.3.1.1 Australian common law duty of care 
At common law the development of the duty of care in both Australia and South 
Africa followed almost identical paths up until about 1992. Both jurisdictions were heavily 
influenced by the English case law of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
125
 This is so 
despite the fact that South Africa phrased the duty as that of care, skill and diligence, while 
Australia described it simply as duty of care and diligence.  
The standards of care and diligence in Australia up until the famous decision of Roger 
CJ in AWA v Daniels
126
 were subjective. Hopes of an early development of objective 
standards of care and diligence in form of s 107 of the Victorian Companies Act 1958 and the 
Australian Uniform Companies Act 1961 were pegged back by a court decision in 1964.   In 
Byrne v Baker
127
 the court interpreted s 107(1) of the Victorian Companies Act 1958 to mean 





 the court introduced at least minimum objective standards to be observed 
by executive directors. The brief facts of the case are that AWA Ltd, a listed company, 
engaged in foreign currency trading. These were managed by Koval, a relatively young 
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employee who was inadequately supervised, and proper records were not kept. The company 
made heavy losses in 1986 and 1987 which Koval concealed. The company was audited 
twice by Deloitte Haskins and Sells, and the auditing partner warned the company of 
inadequacies in internal controls but failed to warn the board. Instead, he wrote a letter 
suggesting improvements. The board did not become aware of the extent of the losses until 
the end of March 1987. The company sued the auditors for negligence. The auditors then 
counterclaimed for contributory negligence by the company. Roger CJ of the division of the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales, held that the auditors were negligent, but that the 
company was also liable for contributory negligence.
130
 Roger CJ ruled that Australian 
directors were required to possess a minimum degree of competence to allow them to 
exercise an informed and active discretion and to acquire a basic understanding of company 
affairs. An example of such basics is a director‘s ability to read and understand company 
financial statements.
131
   
The AWA v Daniels decision came about at a time when the government in Australia 
attempted to usher in more objective standards of care and diligence into law through 
statute.
132
 Despite this seeming apparent movement towards more objective standards of care 
and diligence, Roger CJ held in AWA v Daniels that the duty of care expected of non-
executive directors was subjective in nature.
133
  
The decision of Roger CJ was described by commentators as having been 
unfortunately conservative at a time when some people expected a shift towards more 
objective standards of care and diligence for all directors.
134
 In deciding that a subjective duty 
of care was applicable to non-executive directors, Roger CJ relied on Re City Equitable Fire 
Insurance Co Ltd.
135
 Reiterating the words of Romer J, Roger CJ asserted that ―non-
executive directors are not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of the 
corporation‖.
136
  Roger CJ saw no problems with directors readily delegating responsibilities 
and relying on management for the performance of their obligations.
137
 Interestingly, the 
reliance by Roger CJ on Romer J‘s propositions echoed the position which still obtained in 
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South Africa by 1992. Margo J in Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd
138
  relied on 
earlier English decisions to state what the position regarding directors‘ standards was in 
South Africa in 1980. As pointed out earlier, this leading South African case had introduced 
or rather confirmed subjective standards of care, skill and diligence into common law.
139
 The 
state of the law espoused by Roger CJ in 1992 for Australia was therefore comparable to the 
South African position which obtained at the time.
140
 
The case of Daniels v Anderson
141
 in 1995 provided a watershed moment for 
Australian common law. It boldly introduced objective standards of care and diligence into 
law and espoused far-reaching principles for contemporary Australian law. The case was an 
appeal
142
 by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of AWA Ltd and that of AWA Ltd in part, 
and the auditors in part, which appeal was allowed by the majority of the Court of Appeal.
143
 
The Court of Appeal ruled that the auditors were negligent and guilty of a failure to comply 
with the Companies Code (then in force) in respect of the foreign exchange operations.
144
 
Daniels v Anderson was ground-breaking as an Australian case on duty of care in many 
respects.  Chief among these was a ruling by the court that the general law relating to the tort 
of negligence was an appropriate basis for the claim of common-law damages against 
negligent directors.
145
 The most outstanding part of the case was the court‘s ability to 
articulate principles applicable to the duty of care and diligence and clarifying the content of 
the relevant standards.
146
 The case further clarified other key issues relating to the duty of the 
board to monitor performance by the executive.
147
 The exact contours of delegation and 
reliance were also clarified.
148
 The court expounded on the nature of standards of care and 
diligence expected of all directors (whether they are described as executive or non-executive 
directors).
149
 All these points had raised great concern following how Roger CJ had dealt 
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with them in AWA v Daniels.
150
 In that case the court appeared determined to providing 
clarity and to settle the confusion. These points will now be briefly explained below.   
In Daniels v Anderson Clarke JA adopted the ―ordinary prudent man‖ test and 
concluded that standards of duty of care applicable to Australian directors were objective.
151
 
The court rejected the dominant common law approach in AWA v Daniels which leaned more 
towards subjective than objective standards.
152
  Clarke JA took time to clarify the objective 
standards applicable. Firstly, it was explained that a single standard could not be applied to 
all directors in all circumstances.
153
 The standard is flexible and cannot be a one-size fits all. 
Applicable standards will depend on the particular function performed, the power exercised, 
the circumstances of the specific case, and the terms on which a person has undertaken to be 
a director, inter alia.
154
  
Secondly, the court sought to clarify the position regarding whether a different 
standard was applicable to non-executive directors. Clarke JA ruled that objective standards 
were applicable to both non-executive and executive directors.
155
  
Thirdly the basis of liability for negligence by directors espoused has been described 
as a ―very important part of Daniels v Anderson‖.
156
  The Supreme Court of New South 
Wales ruled that the general law relating to the tort of negligence
157
 was an appropriate basis 
for the claim of common law damages against negligent directors.
158
  
Fourthly, the court remarked that directors are required to take reasonable steps to 
place themselves in a position to guide and monitor the management of the company.
159
 A 
fifth and related point which the court emphasised relates to delegation and reliance. The 
court agreed that delegation was possible, but that however, a prudent director would not rely 
on the judgment of others blindly, especially where there has been a notice of 
mismanagement.
160
 Directors must take diligent steps and must devote a reasonable amount 
                                                                
150
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of time to place themselves in a better position to understand and oversee the affairs of the 
company.
161
  With regards to ‗skill‘, the court emphasised that the director must be able to 




There are merits to the description of Daniels v Anderson as representing ―the 
pinnacle in Australia…of the development of directors‘ duty of care and skill…‖
163
 Australia 
has been able to raise standards of care considerably from a subjective to an objective level. 
South Africa has not yet had the opportunity to review the dominantly subjective common 
law standards established in Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd.
164
  
3.3.1.2 Australian statutory duty of care and diligence 
Australia has lately expressed the duty of care and diligence in statute. The 
Corporations Act 2001 expresses the duty in s 180 as follows: 
Care and diligence- directors and other officers 
(1) A director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their powers and 
discharge their duties with the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable 
person would exercise if they: 
(a) were a director or officer of a corporation in the corporation‘s circumstances; and 
(b) occupied the office held by, and had the same responsibilities within the 
corporation as, the director or officer. 
It is debatable whether the purpose of the statutory duty of care and diligence in Australia is 
to codify the common law duty of care and diligence or not. It can be discerned from the text 
of the Corporations Act 2001 that the statutory duty in section 180 (1) is not a codification of 
the common law.
165
 There is also a general agreement among authors that section 180 (1) is 
to be treated differently from a similar statutory duty in the UK and South Africa.
166
 In 
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Australia, the duty of care and skill serves a basis for civil penalties for offending directors in 
Australia as driven by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).
167
 In 
South Africa for example, the cases against offending directors are not necessarily driven or 
prosecuted by an organisation in the same mould as ASIC. Shareholders may be the plaintiffs 
or the company itself may be the plaintiffs in delictual claims brought against directors either 
at common law, or now in terms of s76 (3) (c).
168
 In the UK, as already established, s 174, 
like all other common law duties of directors are now subsumed under the Companies Act 
2006,
169
 is intended as a restatement of existing law. S 185 of the Corporations Act makes it 
clear that s 180 (1) applies in ―…addition to and not in derogation of any rule of law…‖
170
 It 
appears that the aim was to ensure that all the duty of care and diligence principles can be 
utilised together to develop the legal principles governing directors‘ duties.
171
  
As will be established in chapter four, the Act, in contradistinction to the Corporations 
Act 2001, or the UK‘s Companies Act 2006, does not provide clarity as to whether s 76 (3) 
applies in addition to, in substitution of or together with the common law rules. The Act does 
not have a provision similar to either s 185 of the Corporations Act 2001 or  s170(3) and 
s170(4) of the UK‘s Companies Act 2006.
172
 While the Companies Bill 2007 provided that 
standards of directors‘ conduct were to be applied in addition to and not in substitution of any 
duties at common law,
173
 drafters of the Act chose to omit a similar provision. In future, this 
may result in more questions regarding clarity of the position under the Act. It is not clear 
why the legislature chose to leave matters hanging without simply providing clarity on the 
matter. The absence of Explanatory Notes or what can be termed travaux 
preparatoires/preparatory documents as is the case in the UK and Australia further 
complicates the situation in South Africa. A proposal will be made in Chapter 7
174
 for clarity 
in this regard in the form of a provision similar to s 185 of Australian law and subsections 
170(3) - 170(4) of UK law.  
Notwithstanding the provisions of s 185, there is no denying that the standards of care 
and diligence contained in section 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 are comparable to 
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common law standards in Australia.
175
 In fact, the statutory standards in Australia cannot be 
understood without reference to the incremental development of standards through the 
evolving case law principles as will be highlighted in 3.2.3 below. In Daniels v Anderson, the 
―ordinary prudent man‖ test which was applied introduced objective standards applicable to 
the duty of care for Australian directors. Similarly, s 180 (1) adopts a ―reasonable person‖ 
test, which translates to an objective statutory duty of care and diligence.
176
 This objective 
standard in s 180(1), just as with the common law duty of care, is said to be so malleable as to 
mould itself to the peculiar circumstances of the company director. Further to this, this 
development has been hailed as a positive move which ensures that directors are required to 





One noticeable feature, in the formulation of the duty under s 180(1), is the absence of 
the ―skill‖ component associated with the duty. It is not clear either from the Explanatory 
Memorandum
178
 or from the text of the Act why there is no reference to any standard of skill 
in s 180(1). There was hope that the matter would receive attention from the court in 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Vines.
179
 Sadly the court did not address 
the rationale of the absence of the ‗skill‘ component from the formulation of the duty under 
Australian statutory law. Austin J only stated that despite the absence of a skill requirement, 
if a director is appointed because of a skill, for example as a Chief Financial Officer, the test 
to be applied is what a reasonably competent person in the position of such an officer would 
do under the circumstances. .
180
  
In the earlier case of Re Property Force Consultancy Pty Ltd,
181
 the court observed 
that unlike the common law,  the Corporations Act 1989 did not envisage an objective but 
rather a subjective ‗skill‘ component in s232 (4).
182
  Derrington J bemoaned the potential 
divergence in standards between common law and statutory law as a result of this absence of 
‗skill‘ from s180(1).
183
 In Daniels v Anderson, Clarke JA also noted the absence of reference 
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to ‗skill‘ in subsection 180(1)‘s predecessor, subsection 232(4) of the Corporations Act 
1989.
184
 Clarke JA was of the opinion that despite this omission of ‗skill‘ from the statutory 
formulation of the duty, directors are nonetheless expected to meet an objectively-determined 
minimum degree of competency required to undertake the duties of a director.
185
 The court in 
Daniels v Anderson rejected the old English common law notion that ‗a director need not 
exhibit a greater degree of skill than may reasonably be expected of a person of that director‘s 
knowledge and ability‘.
186
 Clarke JA further remarked that ‗the duty of care is not merely 
subjective, limited by the director‘s knowledge and experience or ignorance or inaction‘.
187
 
Impliedly, if a director lacks the skill to comply with the demanding duty of care, they have 
to work hard to acquire that skill or choose not to take up the position of director.
188
 
 It can be argued, that if courts will interpret s180(1) in the same manner they did in 
Daniels v Anderson, the fears of unnecessary divergence of standards in Australian law such 
as expressed by some writers could be avoided.
189
 The interpretation should be that directors 
are expected to meet an objectively determined minimum degree of competency required to 
undertake the duties of a director in Australia.
190
   
In contrast to s 180(1), s 76(3)(c) of the South African Act clearly makes reference to 
‗skill‘ in its formulation of the statutory duty of care, skill and diligence.
191
 However, on 
closer scrutiny, and as established through the case law cited above, Australian courts have, 
since Daniels v Anderson in 1995, developed a tradition of imposing objective standards. 
When the situation presents itself, courts are more likely to interpret s 180(1) by reference to 
case law. However, while, s 76(3)(c)(i) appears to introduce objective elements, subsection 
76(3)(c)(ii) undermines the objectivity of the ‗skill‘ test by asserting that the director need 
only meet the standard of a person having the ‗skill and experience of that director‘. This has 
been criticised for being ‗inappropriate in the modern commercial world‘.
192
As will be 
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highlighted in Chapter 4, s 76 (3) appears to have been designed to provide for dual 
objective/subjective standards.  
 
3.3.1.3 Emerging case law principles in Australia post 2001 – duty of care 
Evolving international corporate governance best practice principles suggest that 
directors are increasingly expected to discharge their responsibilities in a careful and 
competent manner.
193
 Recent court decisions in Australia have revealed that courts no longer 
tolerate underperformance or dereliction of duty by directors.
194
 I will briefly look at 
principles emerging from a few select cases between 2003 and 2011in Australia where the 
duty of care and diligence was applied by courts. A sizeable body of case law has emerged 
chiefly through the work of the ASIC.
195
  ASIC has done a tremendous amount of work in 
enforcing the statutory duty of care and diligence in Australia in some high profile cases 
reported between 2001 and 2011.    
It is suggested here that the evolving case law principles in Australia may prove 
instructive to the interpretation of s 76(3)(c) of the Act. The standards of care, skill and 
diligence under South Africa‘s relatively new law are yet to be tested. As mentioned above, 
the Act fortunately opens the door for the enriching of corporate governance jurisprudence 
through the infusion of comparative foreign law principles. In this regard the Act provides 




The following are some of the principles evolving in Australian case law:  
(i) Nature of standards of care and diligence expected of directors and test to be applied. 
       In Maxwell,
197
 the court made important statements regarding the law in this regard. The 
court stated that ‗in determining whether a director has exercised reasonable care and 
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diligence…the circumstances of the particular corporation concerned are relevant to the 
content of the duty‘.
198
 The court further remarked that the statutory duty of care and 
diligence in s 180(1) can be contravened ‗even if there was no actual damage [so long as] it 




It appears then that the standard of care and diligence required of directors from time 
to time depends on the nature of the company business or economic interests involved. In 
Macdonald
200
 for example, Gzell J held that the failure of directors (both non-executive and 
executive) to discharge their monitoring role constituted a breach of the statutory duty of care 
and diligence.
201
 The directors had approved the publishing of a defective, false, misleading 
or deceiving draft ASX announcement to the effect that the JHIL had sufficient funds to meet 
all legitimate asbestos compensation claims, when they knew or ought to have known that 
this was not true.
202
 According to Gzell J, publishing false or misleading statements had the 
potential to expose JHIL to legal action and that the directors ought to have known that 
JHIL‘s ‗…reputation would suffer and there would be a market reaction…‘ to the company‘s 
listed securities.
203
 Thus the sensitivity of the interests involved required that the directors 
should have given closer attention to the draft ASX statement.
204
 The directors should have 
scrutinised the statement thoroughly to check if it corresponded with the financial position of 
the company as they knew it to be or ought to have known.There is a demanding duty of care 
and diligence and a need for directors of multinational companies or large conglomerates to 
apply a basic skill such as they have [or ought to have] in the discharge of their duties in a 
modern company. Santow J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler 
(hereafter ASIC v Adler or simply Adler)
205
 expounded on an important principle regarding 
this. The court held that a director should become familiar with the fundamentals of the 
company‘s business and is under a continuing obligation to ensure that they are informed 
about the company‘s activities.
206
 For example, modern day directors are expected to approve 
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Approving financial statements is a task which requires conscientious consideration of 
detail and the exercise of the prudence expected of stewards of company resources. This was 
confirmed in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey (hereafter the 
Centro case).
208
 The key question before the court was whether directors of big publicly 
listed entities are required to apply their own minds to, and carry out a careful review of 
proposed financial statements and the directors‘ report.
209
 This was in order to determine if 
information contained therein is consistent with the director‘s own knowledge of the 
company‘s affairs and to check for any discrepancies with the company‘s financial position 
the director knows or ought to know about.
210
 The court ruled that there is a positive duty on 
directors to have the basic financial literacy to enable them to read and understand financial 
statements.
211
 Such basic skill should enable directors to ask the right questions when 
reviewing financial statements.
212
 For example in the Centro case, there was a need for a 
basic understanding of classification of liabilities. Middleton J held that each of the directors 
had breached the statutory duty of care and diligence towards the Centro entities by failing to 
have apparent errors in the financial report and financial statements corrected.
213
  
Further, Middleton J in the Centro case, espoused the principle that directors are an 
important cog in the governance of companies.
214
 At the core directors are subject to 
irreducible requirements to be involved in management of the company and to take all 
reasonable steps to be in a position to guide and monitor it.
215
 This includes directors‘ duty to 
‗…carefully read and understand financial statements before they form their opinions which 
are to be expressed in the declaration required by s 295(4)‘.
216
 The said s 295(4) of the 
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(ii) Delegation and reliance on others for performance- case law principles 
Australia has included statutory defences of reliance and delegation. There are 
extensive provisions under the Corporations Act dealing with directors‘ ability to delegate 
and rely on others for their performance.
218
 The English common law view that the ‗business 
of life could not go on if people could not trust those who are put into a position of trust for 
the express purpose of attending to the details of management‘,
219
 appears to be 
acknowledged in Australia.  The common law in Australia operated to allow very low 
standards of delegation and reliance,
220
 until Daniels v Anderson introduced higher standards. 
Clarke JA rejected the lower standards suggested by Rogers CJ in AWA Ltd v Daniels as 
inappropriate in modern company law.
221
 He went on to espouse the rule that directors should 
properly monitor and supervise the exercise of delegated authority.
222
 Now s 190(1) of the 
Corporations Act 2001 generally requires directors to remain responsible and accountable for 
the exercise of delegated authority by the delegates.
223
 The only exception to the rule is when 
a director can prove on reasonable grounds that he believed that the delegate was competent 
enough to act in a manner that conforms to the duties of directors.
224
   
In recent cases, that is, post the Corporations Act 2001, courts have sought to clarify 
questions regarding delegation and reliance. Courts have confirmed the maxim delegatus non 
potest delegare – meaning that a fiduciary may not delegate his job, especially the ultimate 
responsibility to be accountable for the exercise of powers given to him by law when 
fulfilling the role of a director.. When directors have delegated tasks to responsible company 
officials, they do not cease to be accountable ultimately. The board of directors is required by 
law to supervise those who have received delegated powers, and it is expected to continually 
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appraise the effectiveness of the ‗checks and balances‘ put in place by companies to enable it 
to fulfil its monitoring role.
225
 In Macdonald and Vines v Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission
226
 (hereafter Vines v ASIC) the courts accepted that directors are 
entitled to rely on others for performance where there is no cause for suspicion or 
circumstances demanding detailed attention.
227
 In Macdonald Gzell J confirmed the principle 
espoused by Santow J in Vines v ASIC that what is expected ‗is a level of scrutiny as befits 
supervision, not the detailed direct involvement that is associated with operational 
responsibility‘.
228
 Thus case law now confirms the modern approach to reliance and 
delegation. Directors cannot substitute reliance upon the advice of management in place of 
their own attention and examination of a strategic matter that falls within the board‘s 
responsibility.
229
 This principle appears to be generally shared by Australian courts, as 
confirmed by the recent Centro case.
230
 Thus in Macdonald, Gzell J rejected the directors‘ 
defence premised on reliance on experts. It was Gzell J‘s strong view that once management 
referred the draft ASX statement to the board members for approval, ‗none of them was 
entitled to abdicate responsibility by delegating his or her duty to a fellow director‘.
231
 Gzell 
added that the matter of approving a statement referred was the sole strategic responsibility of 
the board, and ‗…that is not a matter of reliance upon management or outside experts‘.
232
 
Case law in Australia has thus delineated between matters where directors can rely on and/or 
delegate to others and where this is inappropriate.   
 
(iii) The test applied for determining liability in terms of s180 (1) 
Australian courts have recently confirmed the modern objective test in s 180(1). As 
stated earlier, s 180 (1) imposes an objective ‗reasonable person‘ test. Such a test takes into 
account the particular context or circumstances of the company within which a director 
                                                                
225
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exercises the powers given and fulfils the responsibility expected. In approving the objective 
test in Adler,
233
 Gzell J expressed the test in Macdonald as follows: 
In determining whether a director has exercised reasonable care and diligence one 
 must ask what an ordinary person with the knowledge and experience of the 
 defendant might be expected to have done in the circumstances if he or she was 
 acting on their own behalf.
234
  
Thus, Gzell J in applying the objective ‗reasonable person‘ test, found the actions of directors 
of JHIL to have fallen below the required standards of care and diligence. The court held that 
a reasonable person with similar responsibilities would not have voted in favour of the 
resolution that the company approve and release the draft ASX announcement.
235
    
 
(iv) Different standards of performance between executive and non-executive directors? 
The question whether the law differentiated between the standard of performance 
expected of executive and non-executive directors has received the attention of the courts. As 
confirmed in the Centro case, an objective standard of care and diligence is now applicable to 
both non-executive and executive directors.
236
 Gamble v Hoffman,
237
 cited by Middleton J in 
the Centro case with approval,
238
 is authority for an assertion that the courts are not prepared 
to subjectify the duty and standards of care and diligence even for non-executive directors. 
The test applied to either a non-executive or an executive director is essentially the same. The 
test is whether the director exercised the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person 
in a like position in a corporation would exercise in the corporation‘s circumstances.
239
 In 
Macdonald, Gzell paid particular attention to the question whether the law differentiated 
between the standard of performance expected of executive and non-executive directors. 
Gzell J, like Middleton J in the Centro case also held that the same objective standard of care 
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3.3.1.4 Brief comment on lessons for SA from emerging case law principles in 
Australia 
The South African Act is yet to be fully tested at this stage as far as standards of care, skill, 
diligence and the BJR are concerned. The leading case on directors‘ duty of care, skill and 
diligence was decided in 1980.
241
 This case touched on a number of aspects discussed above 
which have recently received attention in Australian courts. For example Margo J‘s ruling 
compares fairly well with the Australian principle that standards of care, skill and diligence 
expected of directors depend on the nature of the company‘s business. There is a difference 
though regarding clarity of the extent of competence and diligence standards, for example, 
demanded of directors of publicly-listed entities. In Macdonald and the Centro case for 
example, courts made it clear that a modern director of a big entity owes a duty to have the 
basic ability to read and understand financial reports and financial statements.  
There is also a demanding duty for company directors to apply diligence and keep 
themselves informed of the financial performance of the company they serve. There is a 
possibility that such an extent of a duty of care, skill and diligence could be seen to be too 
demanding in a developing country like South Africa. Fears could be raised that companies 
may struggle to attract people willing to serve as board members if the bar is raised too high. 
This explains why respected academic Du Plessis has defended the possibility that s 76(3)(c) 
may have elements which prevent a purely objective approach in interpreting the 
provision.
242
 Du Plessis opines that such an approach (open to criticism as it is) may not be 
inappropriate for South Africa given the limited skills-pool in the country. The argument by 
Du Plessis is vital in two ways. Firstly, coming from a member of the International Reference  
Group in the writing of the Act, this can be an indication of the reason why s 76(3)(c) does 
not contain purely objective standards of care, skill and diligence. Secondly, the argument 
could help demonstrate that it may take a while for case law in South Africa to impose 
standards as demanding as the duty of directors of publicly listed entities in Australia to have 
a basic financial literacy to read and understand financial statements in order to make 
informed decisions.  
Du Plessis‘s argument can be criticised for subjectifying standards under s 76(3) (c). 
This may work against the DTI Policy Document 2004‘s goal of promoting the global 
competitiveness of South African companies and the economy by ensuring compatibility and 
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harmonisation of the Act with the best practice jurisdictions internationally.
243
 The Act has 
incorporated the common law defences of delegation and reliance.
244
 Australian case law has 
clarified the contours regarding when directors are entitled to rely on others for performance 
and when it is inappropriate to do so. On the other hand, South African courts have not yet 
had the opportunity to interpret section 76(4)(b). The position espoused in South African 
common law appears to compare fairly well with the recent case law in Australia.
245
 The 
emphasis in recent Australian case law that delegated authority should be properly 
supervised, could be used to enrich standards of reliance and delegation in South Africa. It 
seems though that the statutory requirement in South Africa that directors are entitled to 
delegate ‗functions that are delegable under applicable law‘
246
 can be interpreted by courts in 
future to be in line with the maxim delegatus non potest delegare.
247
 In this vein, directors in 
South Africa could be held to be accountable for the exercise of delegated authority. While 
the Act is to be applauded for incorporating statutory defences of delegation and reliance, the 
clarity offered by Australia‘s sections 189, 190 and 198D is preferable in some respects. 
There are clear provisions on reliance under the Corporations Act 2001 in s189, and clear 
provisions on delegation in s198D. S 190 in particular sets Australian law apart in that it 
clearly reminds directors that they remain accountable for the exercise of delegated 
authority.
248
 The South African Act does not have an equivalent provision under s76 (4) (b). 
It is preferable to make the position as clear as is the position under the Corporations Act 
2001. 
With regards to the applicable test, as established above, Australia has an objective 
duty of care and diligence, and courts have applied an objective test in interpreting the s 
180(1). On the other hand the duty of care skill and diligence under s 76(3)(c) is not as purely 
objective as the Australian duty. In the same vein, the interpretation of the South African 
statutory duty is likely to involve a dual objective/subjective test. If an objective test is to be 
applicable, then the duty will have to be amended first. The problematic part as highlighted in 
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3.2 above, is s 76(3)(c)(ii) which could perhaps be read to allow for lowering of the objective 
standard  introduced by s 76(3)(c)(i). Traditionally a subjective test was followed in South 
Africa but there may be some indications that the law was moving to an objective/subjective 
approach.
249
                  
Courts in Australia have settled the question whether different standards of 
performance are applied between executive and non-executive directors.
250
 In South Africa, 
Margo J drew a distinction between executive and non-executive directors in Fisheries 
Development Corporation of SA Ltd. He held that a non-executive director is not bound to 
give continuous attention to the affairs of the company.
251
 This out-dated approach in modern 
times was corrected in Howard v Herrigel & Another NNO.
252
 In criticising Margo J‘s 
remarks, the court emphasised that the standards applicable to directors are the same for all 
directors whether the inquiry was one in relation to negligence, recklessness or fraud. This 
decision demonstrates that South African case law now compares fairly well with Australian 
case law.  
3.3.2 The Australian BJR - S 180(2) 
Section 180 (2) of the Corporations Act 2001 adopts into statute what is considered a 
legislative modification of the US‘s BJR.
253
 The subsection provides that a director or officer 
who makes a business judgment is considered to have met the requirements of s 180(1) of the 
Corporations Act 2001, and their equivalent duties at common law and equity, if he: 
(a) makes a business judgment in good faith for a proper purpose; 
(b) does not have a material personal interest in the subject matter of the judgment; 
(c) informs himself/herself about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they 
reasonably believe to be appropriate and 
(d) rationally believes that the judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.254   
 
It is important to note that s180 (2) is a standard of review which has a relationship with 
the standard of conduct provided in s180 (1).
255
  The subsection applies to officers and other 
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managers, not only directors as s180 (2) clearly refers to ‗a director or other officer who 
makes a business judgment‘. It applies to the statutory duty of care and diligence and the 
equivalent duties at common law and in equity. Conditions (a) to (d) which are based on the 
American Law Institute (ALI) Draft have to be fulfilled.
256
 One of the requirements of the 
rule is that a ‗business judgment‘ must have been made. S 180 (3) defines a ‗business 
judgment‘ to mean ‗any decision to take or not to take action in respect of a matter relevant to 
the business operations of the corporation‘. This should be distinguished from an omission to 
act where there is a positive duty to act, which could qualify as negligence, and negligence is 
a ground which may exclude application of the BJR. This provision (s180 (3)) distinguishes 
the Australian BJR formulation from either the ALI Draft or the South African BJR 
formulation. The latter formulations, unlike the Australian rule, do not define ‗business 
judgment‘.
257
 S 76 (4) (a) of the Act in particular makes no specific reference to a ‗business 
judgment‘ and does not seem to emphasise that a ‗business judgment‘ must have been made 
for the rule to apply.
258
   Another interesting feature in s180 (2) is the reference to ―good faith 
and for a proper purpose‖ which differentiates it from the ALI Draft and the Act - s76 (4) (a). 
The South African BJR formulation interestingly excludes ―good faith and for a proper 
purpose‖ in its reference to conditions in s76 (3) which must be satisfied for directors to 
enjoy protection of the rule in South Africa. It is also important to note s180 (2)‘s reference to 
―reasonableness‖ of the informed decision and the requirement of ―rationality‖ in (d), just 
like  s76 (4) (a). The fact that the reference to ―proper purpose‖ in s180 (2) has rendered the 
subsection inapplicable to insolvent trading in Australia perhaps may warrant consideration 
in view of the application of the rule in South Africa.  
Section 180 (2) may be criticised for the divergence of standards between the 
standards of conduct and standard of review. While the standard of care in s180 (1) is clearly 
objective, it appears that the standard of review in s180 (2) threatens to limit the objectivity 
of s180 (1). S 180 (2) appears to leave it up to the director to decide the appropriateness and 
reasonableness of his diligence in ensuring that the business judgment is an informed one. 
Whether the decision is in the best interest of the corporation is also left to the director to 
decide. The standard in this regard has been said to be ‗rationality‘ as opposed to 
‗reasonableness‘ as standard of conduct under s180(1) and the common law.
259
 There is thus 
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a prima facie divergent standard of review in s180 (2), unless the court decides to read this 
seemingly lower standard through the lens of the objective standard of conduct in s 180(1).  
Challenges in the application of the rule apparently surfaced in Australia a few years 
after the Corporations Act 2001 was enacted, where the rule was found to be inapplicable to 
insolvent trading.
260
 The challenges of incompatibility with the Australian legal system were 
raised long before the adoption of the rule.
261
 It is believed that not enough research was done 
to understand the nature of the development of the rule and what it applies to in the US, a 
country which has decided against codifying the common law rule and where the rule‘s 
application is specified. It has been argued that s 180(2) which adopts the rule is defective. 
This is probably for reason of alleged incompatibility of the BJR to the Australian legal 
system as argued by the Australian government prior to adoption of the rule under the 
Corporations Act 2001.
262
 After 2001, Australian courts are said to have adopted a hardened 
or even pessimistic stance towards application of the BJR, leaving the future of the rule in 
doubt given its alleged ineffectiveness.
263
  
Between 2009 and 2011 the BJR was considered by Australian courts, but could not 
successfully apply to protect directors against liability. In Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd,
264
 the Federal court had ruled that 
the BJR attached to protect the defendant director against liability claims. However the full 
bench of the court overturned the decision for the reason that the director could not rely on 
the BJR protection after failing to provide evidence that he had made a business judgment in 
good faith. In another case, Australian Securities and Investments Commission v 
Macdonald,
265
 the BJR could not attach to protect the defendant director Macdonald for 
alleged breach of duty of care. The reason for the finding was that there was no evidence that 
Mr McDonald rationally believed that a business judgment made was in the best interest of 
the company. 
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As respected author Farrar points out, it would nevertheless be mistaken to think that 
the BJR has not found favour with Australian judges.266 The fact that the BJR could not apply 
to protect directors as per their plea for protection in some cases considered above, does not 
necessarily  translate to failure of the BJR in Australia.  Evidence that the BJR is not dead in 
Australia
267
 is to be seen in most of the cases cited above but more especially in the outcome 
of the recent case of ASIC v Rich.268 Austin J dismissed ASIC‘s application to persuade the 
court to hold defendant directors liable for breach of their statutory duty of care and diligence 
in terms of s180 (1) of the Corporations Act 2001. Even though the court found it 
unnecessary to invoke the BJR, Austin J intimated that if the defendant directors (Jodee Rich 
and Mark Silbermann) had breached s180(1) they could have been able to successfully 
invoke protection of the rule in any case.
269
  
3.4 United States of America   
American law is relevant to this study not so much because s 76(3) (c) borrows from 
USA law, but because the BJR adopted in s 76(4)(a) essentially derives from US common 
law.
270
 Some South African critics have long dismissed the value of the US duty of care in 
enriching standards under s 76(3)(c)
271
and much has been written about how the South 
African duty is essentially different from the US duty.
272
 The discomfort around the US duty 
of care and the BJR stems from the fact that it regards the duty of care as a fiduciary duty and 
sometimes further conflates the duty of care and the duty of loyalty in the context of the 
BJR.
273
 The argument of South African authors is therefore that adopting any principle 
relating to the duty of care and the BJR will result in blurring the celebrated distinction 
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between the duty of care and fiduciary duties.  While there may be merits to this argument, 
some elements under the duty of care in US law may prove instructive to the interpretation of 
the standards under s 76(3)(c) by the courts. 
3.4.1 The duty of care in the USA 
There are two well-known formulations of the duty of care in the USA today. The 
latest one is the American Law Institute‘s Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations (1994) (hereafter the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance). This is 
based on the earlier Revised Model Business Corporation Act 1984 (hereafter, the Model 
Act).  
Section 4.01 of the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance presents the duty of care 
as closely linked to some fiduciary duties in the following manner: 
A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director‘s or officer‘s 
functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best 
interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinary prudent person would 




While it appears that there is limited focussing on the different facets of the duty of care in 
the USA formulations when compared to other common law jurisdictions,
275
 the known 
content of the duty in the formulations is interpreted to reveal standards of care and diligence. 
Cassidy is of the view that the tests in both the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance and 
the Model Act contain both elements of subjectivity and objectivity. The author makes an 
important point, when she argues that the ‗ordinary prudent person‘ test in both formulations 
leads to an objective test in the final scheme of things.
276
 The objectivity of the test from both 
formulations is reinforced by the requirement that the conduct be that of a ‗prudent 
person…in a like position and under similar circumstances‘.
277
 In other words, just like the 
duty in Australia and South Africa, the USA duty of care takes into account the 
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 has provided an interpretation of the content of the duty of care in the 
USA which breaks down into four sub-duties with an emphasis on care and diligence, 
namely:  the duty to monitor; the duty to inquire, the duty to be informed; and the duty to 
make reasonable decisions.  
The sub-duty to monitor entails a supervisory role of a director to ‗take reasonable 
steps to keep abreast of the information that flows to the board as a result of monitoring 
procedures and techniques‘.
279
 In the USA all directors are expected not to abdicate their 
responsibility of providing oversight since ‗all directors are responsible for managing the 
business and affairs of the corporation‘.
280
  
The sub-duty to inquire requires directors firstly to have a continuing obligation to 
keep informed of the affairs of the corporation. Secondly, based on that knowledge, directors 
and officers are therefore expected to critically apply their minds to information presented to 
them for approval. For example in Francis v. United Jersey Bank this duty to have an 
inquiring mind was held to be critical during a review of financial statements.
281
 Directors 
should have the care to be alert to any suspicion raised in the documents placed before them, 
and they cannot be so negligent as to ‗shut their eyes‘ to possible evil going on around 
them.
282
 In fact if a director shuts his eyes to evil which he is aware of, that could be viewed 
as a sign of bad faith.  A director who sleeps on the wheel and is not alert to his duty of care 
was held to add no value to the corporation.
283
  
The sub-duty to be informed has very interesting elements which appear to have 
influenced recent Australian case law. The sub-duty involves the need to make an informed-
decision, a directors‘ obligation to place himself or herself in a position to do so, and a duty 
to acquire basic competence to discharge normal responsibilities of directors.
284
 Thus in the 
recent Australian Centro case discussed in 3.2 above, it was held that a director of a large 
corporation had a duty to acquire a basic ability to read and understand financial reports and 
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 This sub-duty could prove instructive to the interpretation of the duty of care, 
skill and diligence in s 76(3)(c) of Act.  
While the general duty of care in the USA has elements which could prove useful to 
any common law jurisdiction, it is not without its challenges. Some authors
286
 in the USA 
have warned that the distinction between the duty of care and a fiduciary duty is not always 
clearly delineated, leading to concerns about conflation of the two concepts. Another 
challenge complained of by USA authors relate to the acceptance of gross negligence as a 
standard of review, as was held in various cases.
287
 Such a standard is arguably not suitable as 
a general standard of review given the modern commercial realities and international best 
practises in corporate governance. 
 
3.4.2 The US BJR experiences 
 
 3.4.2.1 Approaches to and rationale for the BJR  
 
Different approaches to the BJR were developed in the USA between the nineteenth 
century and the present day in a manner that can be potentially confusing to any jurisdiction 
planning to incorporate the BJR into statutory law for the first time.  US case law, as will be 
illustrated below has applied the BJR to similar situations in different ways and with different 
outcomes. For example, in one approach used,
288
 the onus or burden of proof rests on the 
defendant director.
289
 In another approach,
290
 the plaintiff shareholder carries a heavy burden 
of proof. In the Shlensky v Wrigley case
291
 the application of the BJR resulted in a strong 
presumption against judicial review of board room decisions. In a more recent situation, in 
Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc,
292
 the BJR was applied as a standard of review and permitted 
the court to examine the substantive merits of the board‘s decision.  The above demonstrates 
the extent of the variations in the approaches to the BJR in the USA. At times there may even 
be nuances in the manner the same approach to the BJR.  
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This part considers the traditional formulations of the BJR in the USA, and the current 
competing conceptions of the BJR in the US generally. Before considering the traditional 
formulations, it may be necessary to consider the purpose and policy rationales for the BJR in 
the USA. It must be conceded that this may not be an easy task given the contestable nature 
of the BJR in the USA. 
 
3.4.2.2 Purposes of and policy rationale for the BJR in the USA 
The purposes and policy rationale for the BJR can be discerned from the traditional 
formulations of the rule which are discussed in this Chapter below, from US case law and 
also the literature which explores it.  
 Drafters of the American Law Institute‘s Principles of Corporate Governance, posit 
that the BJR is necessary to protect ‗directors and officers from the risks inherent in hindsight 
reviews of their business decisions‘. In addition it helps to avoid ‗the risk of stifling 
innovation and venturesome business activity‘.
293
 The rationale appears to be to encourage 
optimal risk-taking by directors.
294
 Thus the BJR ensures that decisions made by directors in 
good faith are protected even though, in retrospect, they may prove to be unsound or results 
may turn out badly.  
With the understanding that people are generally risk-averse, if directors had to worry 
about liability regardless of the circumstances, they would insist ‗on playing it completely 
safe‘.
295
 The consequence, if this were to happen is that shareholders, as the firm‘s residual 
claimants,
296
 would not get a good return on their investment. Shareholders are known to 
prefer maximisation of their wealth. For example in some jurisdictions like the USA, there is 
even an implied obligation for directors to maximise the wealth of shareholders.
297
 Yet the 
reality is that there is a general correlation between risk and return. Business decisions rarely 
involve black-and-white issues.
298
 Decisions have to be made under pressure and imperfect 
circumstances given factors such as information asymmetry
299
 and bounded rationality
300
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 The essence of bounded rationality is that rationality of individuals during the decision-making process is 
     affected by some factors. These are:  
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which factors affect the quality of decisions made.
301
 As has been argued by Bainbridge, 
given the vagaries of business, even carefully made business choices among alternatives may 





 is one of the known results of judicial review of a business decision, 
especially in circumstances where a jury is aware of the connection between the plaintiff‘s 
injury and the impugned conduct of the defendant.
304
 It has been argued that hindsight bias 
will take place even if, viewed ex ante, there was a very low probability that such an injury 
would occur and taking precautions against such an injury was not cost effective.
305
 Hence 
the desire by drafters of the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance to provide a 
mechanism to prevent the spectre of hindsight bias through the BJR. This is where the 
descriptive ‗safe-harbour‘ concept of the ALI formulation of the BJR comes from.
306
 
 A further rationale for the BJR is provided by the Delaware formulation. In this 
formulation, the BJR is seen as a presumption of good faith in favour of a director.
307
 This is 
a director-centred rationale.
308
To fully understand the policy rationale of the Delaware 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
(i) limited available information regarding possible alternatives and consequences; 
(ii) cognitive limitations of people‘s minds & 
(iii) time constraints or pressures in decision-making.     
301
 In Joy v North, 692 F. 2d 880, 885-886 (2d Cir. 1982), this point was supported by the court. Ralph Winter J 
captured the essence of this as follows: 
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information. The entrepreneur‘s function is to encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned 
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 See Bainbridge (2004) Vand. L. Rev 113-114.   
303
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L. Rev 114-115 from where these statements were borrowed by the court. 
304
 See McMillan (2013) Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev 535. Also see C Jolls ‗A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economic (1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev 1471 at 1523-1527. 
305
 Jolls (1998) Stan. L. Rev 1523-1527. 
306
 See Branson (2011) SAcLJ 692. 
307
 In Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), BJR was presented as a presumption in the 
following way: 
‗…As a rule of evidence, it creates a ‗presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis [i.e., with due care], in good faith and the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interest of the company.‘ 
308
 L P.Q  Johnson ‗Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose‘ 
     (2013) 38 Del. J. Corp. L 405 at 412. 
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formulation of the rule, one needs to understand the role or purpose of the rule as elucidated 
in case law and in the Delaware General Corporate Law. In Smith v Van Gorkom, the role of 
the BJR was explained as follows: 
Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental 
principle, codified in [Delaware General Corporation Law] § 141 (a), that the 
business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of 
directors…The business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free 
exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors.
309
 
Directors‘ freedom to manage companies is a revered corporate law principle in Delaware, 
hence the protection. This policy rationale of the BJR begins with the recognition of 
directors‘ legal mandate or authority to manage the corporation.
310
 It recognises directors, and 
not the courts, as experts in deciding on the best course of action when directing the business 
and affairs of a corporation. This point has been strongly underscored in US case law. In 
Shlensky the court remarked that ‗…the directors‘ [board] room rather than the courtroom is 
the appropriate forum for thrashing out purely business questions…‘
311
 Directors‘ legal right 
to exercise authority and power to manage assets of absentee owners, as of necessity 
implicates or has to be constrained by a duty to be accountable.
312
 Thus the unavoidable 
tension between authority and accountability has to be balanced within corporate 
governance.
313
 This study is based on a conviction that the BJR can contribute to ensuring 
that this compromise is struck so as to balance competing interests within a corporation.   
Two more rationales for the BJR are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. One such 
frequently cited policy argument for the rule claims that courts as public officials, unlike 
directors, are not business experts,
314
 and as such are incompetent to review business 
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  The other rationale for the BJR is the divergence of standards in corporate law 




3.4.2.3 US traditional formulations of the BJR 
There are thus two well-known traditional formulations of the BJR in the USA, 
namely the American Law Institute (‗ALI‘) formulation of the rule,
317




 The ALI formulation is said to be the formulation with wider currency in the US since 
it has been adopted by the highest courts of several states.
319
 ALI formulates the rule as 
follows: 
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfils [the duty of
  care] if the director or officer: 
(1) is not interested in the subject of his business judgment; 
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the 
extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under 
the circumstances; and 




This ALI formulation is what has come to be known as the safe harbour provisions of the 
BJR. For the BJR protection to apply, firstly a director must have made a business 
judgment/decision. The decision should not have been tainted by conflicts of interest. 
Secondly, the directors must have exercised some measure of care (not necessarily an 
exercise of reasonable care) by informing themselves properly of the subject matter of the 
decision. Thirdly the directors should have had a rational basis for believing that the decision 
arrived at is in the company‘s best interests.  
 The Delaware formulation is not set out in statute. In this construction, the BJR is 
formulated as a presumption of good faith in favour of directors.  In some circles this 
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 American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (1994), 
hereafter the ALI Principles as adapted from P Lipton & A Herzberg Understanding Company Law 6
th
 ed 
(1995) at 393, referred to in M Havenga ―The Business Judgment Rule-Should We Follow the Australian 
Example? (2000) 12 SA Merc LJ 25 at 28. 
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formulation is viewed as a presumption against judicial review of negligence claims arising 
from the merits of a company board‘s decision.
321
  This formulation was aptly captured in 
Aronson v Lewis. The BJR is said to be a "presumption that in making a business decision the 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief 
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company".
322
  
The court in Technicolor explained how the presumption in favour of the director 
works: 
Thus, a shareholder plaintiff challenging a board decision has the burden at the outset 
to rebut the rule‘s presumption. To rebut the rule, a shareholder plaintiff assumes the 
burden of providing evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged decision, 
breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary duty – good faith, loyalty or due care. 
If a shareholder plaintiff fails to meet this evidentiary burden, the business judgment 
rule attaches to protect corporate officers and directors and the decisions they make, 
and our courts will not second-guess these business judgments. If the rule is rebutted, 
the burden shifts to the defendant directors, the proponents of the challenged 




There are similarities between the elements that the Delaware courts look for and those the 
courts applying the ALI formulation look for. The similar requirements for the BJR were 
captured by Weng as follows: (1) that directors must have made a decision, generally the rule 
is inapplicable to an omission, (2) directors may not have an interest, financial or familial, in 
the subject matter of the business decision, if the interest will reasonably be expected to affect 
their judgment, the standard of review will be heightened and the business judgment will not 
apply, (3) the decision-maker must have rationally believed that he made the decision in the 
best interests of the corporation (4) decisions should be made in good faith, and if the 
decision does not meet this requirement, the BJR is inapplicable.
324
 
 There are however important differences regarding the approaches of these 
formulations to the BJR. For example, there is a difference in terms of where the burden or 
onus of proof of facts lies. In South Africa and many other common law jurisdictions, the 
person who alleges a fact must prove it. However, in the ALI formulation, the burden of 
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establishing the presence of the BJR elements lies with the defendant directors.
325
 If the 
directors discharge this onus, they become unassailable and are safe. In contrast, the 
presumption, as demonstrated above, operates to give a plaintiff a heavy burden to prove that 
the board, in making the disputed decision, breached one or more of its fiduciary duties of 
loyalty and good faith or failed in process due care. Where the plaintiff fails to meet this 
burden, the BJR applies to protect the directors. In case of successful rebuttal of the 
presumption, a reverse onus applies as explained in the Technicolor case cited above. 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION. 
This chapter set out to consider international best practices for purposes of enriching 
the standards in s76(3)(c) and s76(4)(a) of the Act . It was stated that the UK and Australian 
laws share a rich common law heritage and that experiences in those countries post their 
respective corporate reforms would be most instructive of the development of South African 
company law jurisprudence.
326




 this chapter further 
considered the USA
329
 experiences in the development of standards of care, skill and 
diligence as well as the BJR. 
During the comparative analysis drawn with the UK and Australia, certain strengths 
of the Companies Act 2006 and the Corporations Act 2001 respectively were extracted and 
comparisons were made with the Companies Act 2008. Differences were acknowledged and 
explained too. Proposals were thus made for improving the interpretation of subsections 
76(3)(c) and 76(4) (a) of the Act . For example, it has been established that there are some 
gaps and ambiguities in section 76(3) and especially subsection 76(3)(c), which could be 
cured by learning from certain strengths in the UK and Australian laws. The Act lacks a 
provision which clarifies the relationship between the common law duty of care, skill and 
diligence and the statutory duty under section 76(3)(c). As stated above, it is not clear under 
section 76(3), whether statutory law has a superior status to common law, or whether the two 
apply and operate together, or whether section 76(3) (c) should be interpreted by reference to 
common law rules. This will prove problematic for courts when interpreting the law in a 
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given situation in future. Lessons can be drawn from the UK and Australian laws which have 
provisions which clarify the relationship between common and statutory law in this regard.
330
  
The UK Companies Act 2006‘s section 174(1) and (2) may provide lessons on how 
section 76(3)(c) could possibly have been drafted, or how it should be redrafted.  The same 
can be said of the simplicity with which subsection 180(1) of the Australian Corporations Act 
2001 was drafted. Both these provisions from UK and Australian laws could prove instructive 
to the revision of subsection 76(3)(c), as will be proposed in chapter 7.    
As noted in this Chapter, with regards to reliance and delegation, South African courts 
can learn from jurisprudence being developed in international best practices such as Australia 
and the USA. South Africa can learn from Australia when it comes to emphasising the maxim 
delegatus non potest delegare,
331
 and to emphasise the fact that the exercise of delegated 
authority needs to be properly supervised by a director.  
With regard to the BJR, USA and Australian law has been analysed to provide 
comparisons with the BJR formulation under the Act. It has been established that there are 
similarities regarding the scope and content of the USA and Australian versions of the BJR. 
The USA provides lessons from case law, the ALI Draft and the Delaware formulation. There 
are some similarities regarding the content of the USA, Australian and South African BJR 
versions. One such similarity is the fact that BJR serves as a standard of review to provide a 
test a court is to apply when reviewing a director‘s conduct.
332
 The only major difference 
between the content of the BJR versions from these countries and that of South Africa is the 
absence of the good faith requirements in the South African BJR formulation. Thus foreign 
law can provide a good aid to analyse s76(4) (a).  
One of the purposes of the Act is to promote the global competitiveness of the South 
African companies and economy by ensuring international harmonisation of corporate law. 
Now that the Act is in place and has clear influences from countries such as the UK, Australia 
and the USA, now is the time for the second phase of harmonisation. This can be achieved 
through the mechanism provided for in the Act – the interpretation clause of the Act. S 5(1) 
envisages an interpretation and application of the provisions of the Act which seek to 
promote its purposes. S 76(3)(c) of the Act remains fairly untested. The Australian, UK and 
USA experiences afford South Africa with an opportunity to incorporate international best 
practices through interpretation.  
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CHAPTER 4: MODERN STANDARDS OF CARE, SKILL & DILIGENCE IN SA:  




This Study seeks to answer the central question whether the Act has made the 
standards of care, skill and diligence comprehensively clearer, more accessible and more 
enforceable than before. This inquiry is made in the light of the adoption of the BJR. Some 
relevant questions in this regard include an inquiry into the exact standards established in 
South African law by s 76(3) (c) of the Act and whether s76 (3) (c) introduces into the law a 
purely objective test or rather perpetuates a dual objective/subjective test for the duty of care, 
skill and diligence. These questions cannot be answered without establishing first what 
lacunae the law reform process sought to close or resolve.
1
 This will necessitate briefly 
tracing the development of the law through case law in South Africa, and establishing policy 
goals for law reform in this regard.  
The major aim of Chapter 4 is to provide a critical analysis of s76 (3) (c) within the 
context of the key research question and relevant sub-inquiries sketched in the above 
paragraph. Section 76(3)(c) will be analysed partly in light of relevant goals of law reform 
outlined in the DTI Policy Document 2004 in tandem with the purposes of the Act
2
 and 
international best practices already considered in Chapter 3.   
Chapter  4 begins by considering the state of the law prior to the Act, and the need for 
law reform. Thereafter, the contribution of the King Reports‘ recommendations will be 
briefly considered.  After highlighting the policy goals for law reform and considering the 
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4.2 Duty of care, skill and diligence prior to 2008: The need for reform 
 
4.2.1 The common law duty in SA before 2008 
Under the South African common law, it is generally accepted that a director‘s 
paramount duty is to undertake all actions and make decisions in good faith for the benefit of 
the company.
5
 In so exercising his powers and discharging his functions, a director is 
expected to act with the required degree of care, skill and diligence.
6
 The composite duty of 
care
7
 is vital to corporate governance. It is viewed in this work as the vehicle through which 
directors perform their functions and exercise their powers. As has been argued, the duty of 
care has a broad reach.
8
 It applies to all decisions directors make or should make were they to 
act in the best interests of the company.
9
 Despite the importance of this requirement, the 
common law faced and still faces the challenge of a low standard of review for duty of care. 
In fact, the exact standards of care, skill and diligence applicable at common law do not seem 
to be crystal clear.
10
 
 As pointed out in Chapter 3, English law greatly influenced the development of South 
African common law standards of care, skill and diligence.
11
 While English case law 
principles remain persuasive and not binding on South African court, English they appear to 
have been readily accepted in our law.
12
  A perfect example of this is to be seen in how 
Margo J incorporated English law principles in Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd 
v Jorgensen & Another.
13
 A decision delivered in 1980, this case remains the leading case on 
applicable standards of care, skill and diligence in South Africa. A more detailed discussion 
of principles adopted into South African common law was done in Chapter 3.
14
 It is thus not 
considered necessary to repeat that discussion here.   
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 The adoption of English standards in Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd 
had implications for the state of South African common law even prior to the Act. One such 
implication is that a subjective approach has been followed at common law in South Africa.
15
 
This is the result of Margo J adopting principles from cases such as Re City Equitable Fire 
Insurance Co Ltd,
16
 Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates L
17
 and Lagunas Nitrate Co 
v Nitrate Syndicate Lt.
18
  
The South African common law, as is evident from Margo J‘s ruling in Fisheries 
Development Corporation of SA Ltd,
19
 employed a dominantly subjective approach/test to the 
duty of care, skill and diligence. There is a striking difference in this case between the 
demanding duties of loyalty and good faith and the less onerous common law duties of care, 
skill and diligence.
20
 The overly lenient approach to the common law duty of care was 
premised on assumptions that no longer find support in a modern commercial world. The 
assumptions stemmed from the view where directors were regarded as benevolent amateurs 
who lacked specialist skills or technical talent.
21
 Thus the directors could not be expected to 
maintain involvement in company affairs or even exercise any skill they were not required to 
possess. In addition, this subjective test failed to require directors to ensure diligent 
attendance to their duties. Hence Margo J ruled that directors were not required to give 
continuous attention to the affairs of a company.
22
 This principle which was borrowed from 
Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd was developed with non-executive directors in 
mind. These directors were considered mere figureheads or ornaments. With regards to 
standards of skill, the leading South African case subjectively required the directors to 
exercise the knowledge and experience such as they possessed.
23
  This is now out-dated and 
inappropriate in a modern commercial world. 
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To its credit, the court in Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen 
& Another ruled that the extent of a director‘s standard of care and diligence required is 
circumstance-based. Such circumstances include the nature of the company business or 
economic interests involved, the size of the company and the particular obligation assumed 
by or assigned to the specific director.
24
 The court in Howard v Herrigel & Another NNO, 
where part of the ruling of Margo J was quoted with approval, stated that ―one of the 
circumstances may be whether he [the director] is engaged full-time in the affairs of the 
company‖.
25
 The need to judge a case on its own merits has been accepted as being consistent 
with modern standards in recent case law in Australia.
26
  
Common law in South Africa appears to have been following the trends of 
development in English law as is evident in the manner South African law has treated the 
question whether different standards should apply to executive and non-executive directors. 
In Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd, Margo J ruled that a differentiation of 
standards must be done. When English case law moved to dual objective/subjective standards 
based on section 214(4) of the Insolvency Act, 1986, it appears that South African case law 
followed suit. For example in Howard v Herrigel & Another NNO,
27
 the court followed the 
English approach at the time, and even adopted a view expressed in Dorchester Finance Co v 
Stebbing
28
 against distinguishing between an executive director and a non-executive director. 
The court in Howard v Herrigel & Another NNO appears to have taken a different view. The 
court regarded as unhelpful or even misleading such a classification of directors for purposes 
of ascertaining their duties to the company.
29
 The court ruled that the standards of care owed 
were the same for all directors.
30
 The court also appeared to have adopted into South African 
common law, the principle espoused in Dorchester Finance Co v Stebbing that where a 








 See Howard v Herrigel & Another NNO (1991) (2) SA 660 (A) at 678 A-F. The words in italics are my own 
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 [1989] BCLC 498. 
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 See Howard v Herrigel & Another NNO (supra) at 676. Also see Havenga (2000) SA Merc LJ 35 and Bekink 
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It is not clear whether the court in Howard v Herrigel & Another NNO overruled 
Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd regarding the differentiation of standards 
applicable to executive and non-executive directors. There are two possibilities. The first one 
is that the A.D could have realised the error in the leading case
32
 and sought to correct it, 
which could imply overruling that case.
33
 The alternative view is that the A.D only put into 
perspective
34
 the circumstances when a court of law would distinguish the extent of the duty 
of care and standard of skill expected. This understanding stems from the fact that Margo J 
had attempted to explain that the extent of the director‘s duty of care and skill depends to a 
considerable extent on the nature of the company‘s business and the role assumed by the 
director in the company. While the exact position regarding this is not crystal clear, what is 
clear is that the post 1990s cases in South Africa followed the position in Howard v Herrigel 
& Another NNO. This was the case with Philotex (Pty) Ltd & Others v Snyman & Others.
35
 
There are some indications in Philotex (Pty) Ltd & Others v Snyman & Others that the 
courts were moving towards a dual objective/subjective test when it comes to the common 
law duty of care and skill  as applied in English law at the time.
36
 The court held that the test 
for recklessness is an objective standard measured against the standard of a notional 
reasonable person, but balanced by subjective elements which take into account the 
knowledge possessed by the particular director.
37
 Thus the subjective elements required that 
considerations be made of the additional knowledge, experience and determinable skills 
which evidence revealed that the director had.
38
 In this case, the court held that directors were 
personally liable for recklessly increasing the debts of the company.
39
 The court also related 
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Insolvency Act 1986 it could only be interpreted or concluded that he applied a dual objective/subjective 
approach.  For a fuller discussion of the English position in this regard, see part 3.2.1 of Chapter 3.  
37
 Philotex (Pty) Ltd & Others v Snyman & Others (supra) at p8. 
38
 See Bekink (2008) SA Merc LJ 95 at 101. 
39
 The summary of the case and findings are as follows: The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) action of the 
appellants was based on allegations that the directors had breached s424 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
The directors were charged with carrying on the business of the company recklessly, leading to the liquidation 
of Wolnit Limited on 20 November 1989.  This prejudiced creditors of the company who instituted action 
against the directors of Wolnit. The action failed in the court aquo, leading to the successful appeal in the 
SCA. The main prayer of the appellants was for an order declaring respondents personally liable for the debts 
of Wolnit incurred after 1 July 1987. This was a breach of the duty of care, skill, and diligence. It was a result 
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the test for recklessness to the common law duty of care and skill of a director and implied 
that the test for negligence in both cases would be the same.
40
 This case was,  based on 
allegations that the directors had breached s424 (4) of the Companies Act, 1973.  It does not 
appear that South African common law applies gross negligence as the standard of liability 
for breach of the duty of care. The correct view should be that, while directors are not liable 
for mere errors, they are liable for negligence.
41
 This matter is further canvassed in part 4.4.3 
below. The basis of liability for breach of the duty of care as per the Act is further discussed 
in part 6.2.1 of Chapter 6.  
 
4.2.2 King Reports’ contribution to law reform 
The King Reports were discussed in detail in Chapter 2 as part of the overall corporate 
governance regulatory framework of South Africa.
42
 The first two King Reports ( namely 
King I Report and King II Report) sow the seeds for law reform, specifically the partial 
codification of directors‘ common law duties and statutory adoption of the BJR. These two 
reports got South Africa debating about the pros and cons of law reform. At the end of a 
raging debate regarding the compatibility of the BJR with South African law, one fierce critic 
of adoption of the BJR into statute reluctantly conceded defeat to the influence of the King 
Reports which, contrary to South African academics, pushed for statutory adoption of the 
BJR. Jones bemoaned the fact that contrary to the views of the majority of South African 
legal writers, the BJR became part of the Act.
43
  There is thus evidence that the King Reports‘ 
influence bore some fruits. The Act now contains a statutory duty of care, skill and diligence, 
and counts the BJR among its numerous innovations. 
King III, unlike King I and King II, does not contain recommendations for law reform. 
Part of the purpose or function of King III is to provide a clear link or synergies between 
governance principles
44
 and the law.
45
 The Report notes that South Africa now follows a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
of carrying on company business recklessly, even though the claimants in this case were the company‘s 
creditors. See Philotex (Pty) Ltd & Others v Snyman & Others (supra). See the judgment of Howie JA at p2.  
40
 See Philotex (Pty) Ltd & Others v Snyman & Others (supra) 134. The court in Heneways Freight Services 
(Pty) Ltd v Grogor 2007 (2) SA 561 (SCA) at 564D-E accepted that the statutory requirement of recklessness 
as set out in s424 of the Act would also embrace the common law concept of gross negligence.. This is only 
with reference to reckless trading in terms of s424(1) of the Companies Act, 1973. 
41
 See Blackman, Jooste & Everignham Commentary on Companies Act 190. 
42
 See part 2.2.2 of Chapter 2. 
43
 Jones (2007) SA Merc LJ 326. Also see Bekink (2008) SA Merc LJ 110. 
44
 Contained in the King III as a corporate governance code. 
45
 As represented by the Act. To gain more insight into the synergies between the Act and King III, see M King 




hybrid system of corporate governance. There is a legislated basis of governance compliance, 
premised on legal rules in the Act on one end. On the other end, there is voluntary basis of 
governance compliance based on recommended principles in the King III.
46
 The value of 
King III is that it promotes a link between good governance and legal compliance, making it 
‗inappropriate to unhinge governance from the law‘.
47
 Implication of the symbiotic 
relationship between King III and the Act is that courts of law are likely to refer to principles 
in King III and its Code when interpreting relevant provisions of the Act. 
 
4.2.3 Corporate law reform objectives- the DTI Policy Paper 2004  
 Corporate law reform was undertaken with the understanding that company law plays 





Consistent with this understanding was the need by government to ensure that regulation of 
business entities was consistent, effective, predictable, transparent, fair, comprehensive and 
understandable.
49
 The law reform process envisaged development of a ―clear, facilitating, 
predictable and consistently enforced law‖.
50
 Closely linked to this was a desire that company 
law would provide ―a protective and fertile environment for economic activity.‖
51
 The DTI 
Policy Document 2004 thus highlights broad objectives of law reform linked to the global 
competitiveness and development of the national economy. Discussing these in detail is 
beyond the scope of this chapter.
52
 Discussion in this part shall be limited to three specific 
objectives (extracted from the broad objectives) which have relevance to the focus of this 
Study and this chapter. These specific goals include; firstly, the need for a clear, facilitating, 
predictable and consistently enforced law. The second goal relates to the need to establish a 
simple yet comprehensive, transparent and accessible legal framework. The third goal is the 
need for harmonisation of law with the best practice jurisdictions internationally.  
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 See the ‗Introduction and Background‘ to the King III Report.  
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 See the ‗Introduction and Background‘ to the King III Report.  
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 The DTI Policy Paper 2004 op cit para 1.2 lists the broad objectives as follows: 1.Encouraging 
entrepreneurship and enterprise diversity by simplifying the formation of companies and reducing costs 
associated with the formalities of forming a company and maintaining its existence, thereby contributing to 
the creation of employment opportunities; 2. Promoting innovation and investment in SA markets and 
companies by providing a predictable and effective regulatory environment and flexibility in the formation 
and the management of companies; 3. Promoting the efficiency of companies and their management; 4. 
Encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate governance, recognising the broader social role of 




The goal to have a law that provides for clarity, predictability, consistent enforcement 
and a law that is facilitating has implications for the duty of care.
53
 In relation to the duty, it 
can be deciphered that the desire was to create clear, unambiguous and easily enforceable 
standards of care, skill and diligence. Coupled with the decision to opt for partial as opposed 
to total codification, the objective was to avoid stunting growth of the common law fiduciary 
duties and the duty of care, skill and diligence. This would allow for continued incremental 
development of common law duties through application to different arising situations by 
courts of law. It has been correctly stated that directors‘ common law duties have ―endured 
remarkably, subject to incremental refinement by the courts to meet new factual scenarios 
and changing societal expectations‖.
54
 The DTI Policy Paper envisaged that the judiciary 
would continue to play its obligatory role of developing the common law where it is found 
wanting.
55
 Courts are under a general obligation to develop the common law by applying 
constitutional values as mandated by sections 8(3), 39(2) and 173 of the Constitution.
56
 It is 
true that courts have a role to develop law through interpreting it in given scenarios. The Act 
also acknowledges this role.
57
 While this is true, it is equally correct to say that an Act 
‗should not leave matters of fundamental importance to its schedules or to common law‘.
58
  
Whether s76 (3) generally, and specifically s 76(3) (c) of the Act have made the 
statement of directors‘ common law duties a clear or facilitating legislative statement of 
directors‘ common law duties is debatable. As will be argued in this chapter, s76 (3) (c) is 
couched in an ambiguous manner and there are gaps which make it difficult to understand the 
exact standards established. For example, it is difficult to understand the status of the 
statutory duty of care. Does s76 (3) (c) establish new and improved standards of care, skill 
and diligence? Or does the section propose to be simply declaratory of the common law 
position without amending common law in any way? Does the statement of common law 
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  See s76 (3(c) of the Act. 
54
 See D Ahern ‗Directors‘ duties, Dry Ink and the Accessibility Agenda‘ (2012) 128 L.Q.R 114. 
55
 DTI Policy Paper 2004 op cit 5 at para 3.3. 
56
 B Mupangavanhu ‗Yet another Missed Opportunity to Develop the Common Law of Contract? An Analysis 
of Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZACC 30‘ (2013) 1 Speculum 
Juris 148. See abstract to the article. Also see the following cases quoted in this article which confirm this 
point:  
  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 
(CC) paras 54-6;   Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA); Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 
28-9; Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA).   
57
 See s158 (a) of the Act. It states as follows: 
When determining a matter brought before it in terms of this Act, or making an order contemplated in this 
Act— 
(a) a court must develop the common law as necessary to improve the realisation and enjoyment of rights 
established by this Act. 
58
 DTI Policy Paper 2004 op cit 5 at para 3.3. 
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duties in s76 (3) apply in place of, in addition to or together with common law equivalent 
duties? These are questions which indicate both a lack of clarity and possible interpretative 
difficulties courts and all users of law are likely to encounter.. This chapter will attempt to 
provide answers to these questions which call for clarity. 
Predictability of regulation as part of the goals of law reform is confirmed by the 
Act.
59
 This implies two closely related issues. The first issue is the decriminalisation of 
company law sanctions where possible, as envisaged by the Companies Bill, 2007.
60
 Once 
this happens, the gap created by scrapping criminal sanctions should be filled by civil 
sanctions. The second related issue is the DTI Policy Paper 2004‘s proposal that company 
law should be enforced through appropriate bodies and mechanisms, either existing or newly 
introduced.
61
 This study will consider whether the Act has responded appropriately to this 
sub-goal by creating a clearly specialised enforcement agency. The Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (ASIC) is an example of such a specialised agency with a specific 
role of enforcing statutory duties of directors.  It appears like the Act envisages the newly 
established Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) to perform some kind 
of a role of an enforcement agency,
62
 but maybe, not exactly in the mould of ASIC. It 
remains to be seen if the CIPC will be as effective as ASIC has proven to be in Australia. 
While ASIC is a specialised enforcement agency, the CIPC appears to have wide functions 
which could encumber its effectiveness as an enforcement agency.
63
 As noted in Chapter 3, 




The second goal- the need to establish a simple yet comprehensive, transparent and 
accessible legal framework, is related to the first goal discussed above. The goal of simplicity 
takes into account the language used and the manner in which provisions are drafted.
65
 This 
relates to clarity and the need for law to be enabling and facilitating. There is always a risk 
that in trying to keep with the objective of simplicity, provisions could be drafted in an 
unclear and ambiguous manner which can confuse readers and end-users of the law. There is 
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 In this regard s7 (l) provides that one of the purposes of the Act is to ―provide a predictable and effective 
environment for the efficient regulation of companies.‖ 
60




 In Chapter 8 of the Act, the CIPC is listed as the main regulatory agency, with wide functions.   
63
 See s186(1) (a)-(e) and s187(2) (a)-(i), for the many objectives the CIPC has to fulfil. It is expected to carry 
out numerous functions with respect to the administration of the Act. See s187 for the CIPC‘s enforcement 
function. For further details see Chapter 6.  
64
 See the body of case law emerging in Australia in this regard, discussed in part 3.3.3 of Chapter 3.  
65
 DTI Policy Paper 2004 op cit 5 at para 3.3. 
118 
 
also the objective of accessibility of the duties. Just like the situation in the UK leading to the 
Companies Act 2006,
66
 accessibility of duties was associated with transparency in the law 
and ease of reference for the user. There was also a tacit assumption of a positive correlation 
between accessibility of the law and compliance.
67
 The argument was that before the 
Companies Act 2008, directors of companies found it difficult to access their duties which 
were locked up in case reports. Such duties, it was contended, require quite advanced legal 
expertise to be comprehensively understood.
68
 The accessibility policy objective is also 
closely linked to the broad 2004 DTI policy paper goal of ―encouraging transparency and 
high standards of corporate governance…‖ in the country.
69
 This goal has since been 
incorporated by the Act and forms part of the purposes of the Act listed under section 7.
70
   
In the UK, empirical research revealed widespread support among directors who 
believed that codification would help them readily access what is required of them. It was 
somehow hoped that a statutory statement of duties would be the panacea for issues of clarity 
of the law.
71
 Similarly in South Africa, research showed that directors welcomed a statutory 
statement of their duties on the back of the belief that codification (partial or total) would 
save them time, effort and money in ascertaining the law.
72
 It is highly likely that some 
directors in South Africa, prior to the adoption of the Companies Act 2008, did not know 
what their common law duties are and to whom such duties are owed.
73
 
The need for harmonisation of law with best practice jurisdictions internationally as a 
goal was partially discussed in Chapter 3 and is confirmed by the Act.
74
 Harmonisation has 
the twin goals of reducing costs of doing business and increasing certainty in regulation for 
overseas companies and investors. It also reduces costs of applying company law locally. The 
understanding was that where there is clarity, an enabling environment is created, a great 
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 C45 of 2006. 
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 Ahern (2012) L. Q. R 114. 
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 See Cassim et al Contemporary Company 2ed (2012) 508. 
69
 DTI Policy Paper 2004 op cit 5 at para 1.2. 
70
 See s7(b)(iii) of the Act.  
71
 See The (English) Law Commission and The Scottish Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating 
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 Bekink (2008) SA Merc LJ 113, quoting I Esser & J Coetzee ―Codification of Directors‘ Duties‖ (2004) Juta’s 
Business Law 12 at 26.   
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 This is exactly what a survey in the UK by the UK Institute of Directors established. See Modernising 
Company Law (2002) CM 5553-1, para 3.2 at 26, referred to in Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 
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74
 S7 (e) the Act  
119 
 




4.3 The Companies Bill 2007  
 The Companies Bill 2007 (hereafter the Bill) was referred to in the discussion of 
corporate law reform objectives in 4.2 above. Three key aspects particularly from the 
approach adopted in certain provisions of the Bill are very relevant to this study.  
The first aspect concerns the manner in which the Bill clarifies the relationship 
between the proposed new company legislation‘s provisions and the common law duties of 
directors. The Bill‘s Explanatory Memorandum also reveals that the policy rationale for law 
reform included introduction of a ‗new law in the form of a codified regime of directors‘ 
duties‘.
76
 The codified common law duties are referred to as ‗standards of directors‘ conduct‘ 
under both the Bill and the Act.
77
 The Bill provided that its provisions on standards of 
directors‘ conduct were to apply in addition to, and not in substitution of, any of the directors‘ 
common law duties.
78
In this regard the Bill‘s provisions are reminiscent of the position 
adopted by the Corporations Act 2001 of Australia as discussed in Chapter 3.
79
 The UK 
Companies Act 2006 provides that the statutory duty of care in s174 has ‗effect in place of‘ 
the common law duty which it seeks to replace.
80
 While the Bill provides clarity regarding 
the relationship between standards of directors‘ conduct in the Act and at common law, the 
Act is conspicuous by its omission and silence. It has to be repeated here that it was vital for 
the Act to provide the same clarity as the Bill offered on this matter. It is a very helpful global 
trend as seen in the best practice international jurisdictions, to provide such clarity. A 
provision in the mould of Clause 91(6) of the Companies Bill 2007 could have clarified the 
relationship between the statutory standards of care, skill and diligence and the common law 
position. Importantly this could have also ascertained the status of statutory law vis-à-vis 
common law. It was preferable to have this matter clarified in the Act rather than for it to be 
left to the courts of law to provide clarity through interpretation.   
The second issue which stands out from the Bill is the manner in which the duty of 
care, skill and diligence was framed. If ever there were doubts regarding the enduring 
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 DTI Policy Document 2004  para 3.5. 
76
 See the Companies Bill 2007 p12. 
77
 See the similar titles of Cl 91 of the Companies Bill 2007 & s76 of the Act. 
78
 See Cl 91 (6) of the Companies Bill 2007. Also see Bouwman (2009) SA Merc LJ 513. 
79
 See part 3.3.2 which refers to provisions of s185 of the Corporations Act 2001, which is comparable to Cl 
91(6) of the 2007 Bill. 
80
 See part 3.2.2 of Chapter 3. 
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influence of English company law on South African law even up to the point of law reform, 
then those doubts can be put to rest when one closely looks at the Bill.
81
 It is clear that the 
test proposed in the Bill is a dual objective/subjective test. It has been correctly said that the 
formulation of this proposed test is similar to the test proposed in English case law of the 
1990s, especially in Re D’Jan of London Ltd.
82
 This case applied s214(4) of the Insolvency 
Act, 1986 of the UK which sets out a dual objective/subjective test to be considered by a 
court when assessing whether or not a director breached the duty of care during wrongful 
trading. The Companies Bill 2007 thus gives the biggest hint that the intention of the 
legislature in formulating standards of care, skill and diligence under the Act, was to follow 
the English example of a dual objective/subjective test. As pointed out in 3.2.2 above, this 
test was transposed to the Companies Act 2006 from s214(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986.    
The third aspect relevant to this study is the formulation of the BJR, which appears 
from the wording of the Bill to have been initially intended to relate only to the breach of the 
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company.
83
 This formulation excluded the 
possibility of limiting directors‘ liability for breach of their duty of care, skill and diligence.
84
 
A detailed examination of the BJR follows in Chapter 5.  
I now turn to the task of critically analysing s 76(3) (c) and the related s 76(4) (b). The 
latter section relates to the statutory defences of reliance and delegation. 
 
4.4 Analysis of s76 (3) (c) of the Act  
 Section 76(3) (c) will be analysed to establish the exact standards introduced into law 
by the statutory duty of care, skill and diligence. The analysis will be presented, as mentioned 
earlier, in the light of policy objectives for law reform
85
 in tandem with the purposes of the 
Act.
86
 International perspectives examined in Chapter 3 will be employed to offer perspective 
to the probable future interpretation of the subsection by courts and possible amendment of 
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 Cl 91 (1) (a) of the Companies 2007 Bill provides as follows: 
‗(1) Each director of a company, when acting in that capacity, or as a member of a committee of directors, or 
when gathering information or similarly preparing to act in either of those capacities, is subject to -  
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(2009) SA Merc LJ 512. 
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 See Cl 91(2) of the Companies Bill 2007.  
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 See 4.2.3 above for a discussion of the law reform policy objectives based on the DTI Policy document 2004. 
86
 See s7 of the Act. 
121 
 
the Act. It is also vital to consider the context within which the subsection is presented. 
Subsection 76(3) (c) forms part of s76 (3) which partially codifies the common law duties of 
directors for the first time in South Africa. The Companies Act 1973 did not contain any 
statement of directors‘ common law duties. This subsection codifies two fiduciary duties 
namely duties to ‗act in good faith and for a proper purpose‘ and to act ‗in the best interests 
of the company‘
87
. It also codifies the duty of care, skill and diligence.  As has been discussed 
above there are important policy motivations for this partial codification of common law 
duties under the Act,
88
 the main objective being to establish a simple yet comprehensive, 
transparent and accessible legal framework.    
4.4.1 S 76 (3) (c) in context and implications thereof 
Before analysing provisions of s76 (3) (c), it is important to consider the implications 
of the fact that subsection 76(3) (c) is presented in the context of s76 and especially 
subsection 76 (3). Subsection 76(3) simply begins by stating that ―subject to subsections (4) 
and (5), a director of a company, when acting in that capacity, must exercise the powers and 
perform the functions of a director…‖  Section 76 defines a director, for purposes of the 
section, to include an alternate director, a prescribed officer, a member of the committee or 
audit committee of a company. It does not matter whether such a person is a member of the 
company board of directors or not.
89
 Impliedly, a director in terms of this section includes 
any person acting in the capacity of a director.
90
 The use of the word ‗includes‘ in reference 
to the ambit of the term ‗director‘ has been said to mean that the term is inclusive rather than 
exclusive.
91
  The wide ambit of the person of a ‗director‘ contemplated by the section pulls in 
an alternate director, a prescribed officer,
92
 or even a member of the sub-committee of a 
company board, whether the person sits on the board or not.
93
  As will be explained in more 
detail in Chapter 6, there is a purpose to the widening of the ambit of a ‗director‘. 
What is the implication of the phrase ―when acting in that capacity‖? Part of this is to 
ensure that anyone who exercises the powers of a director is held accountable for any breach 
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 See s76 (3) (a) & (b).   
88
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partial codification.  
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 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 404. 
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Does s76 provide clarity in the relationship between the statutory duty and the 
common law duty of care, skill and diligence? In that regard, it is commented that another 
implication of the location of s76 (3) (c) under s76 is the limited clarity of the status of the 
statutory duty vis-à-vis the common law duty of care, skill and diligence. Where Australian 
and UK company legislation provide for clarity regarding the relationship between statutory 
and common law in this regard, the position under s76 is not crystal clear. For example, the 
UK Companies Act 2006 provides that while the statutory duties are based on common law, 
they apply or have effect in place of comparable common law duties.
95
 Similarly, the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001 attempts to provide clarity regarding the relationship 
between statutory law and common law. The duty of care and diligence in s180 (1) applies 
together with, and not in substitution of the common law rules.
96
 Unfortunately s76 (3) does 
not bring about the same clarity regarding the status of s76 (3)(c) and relationship with the 
common law.  It may be inferred from s77 (2) (b)
97
 that the legislature might have intended 
s76 (3) (c) to be merely declaratory of the common law. As will be discussed shortly, this 
presents some difficulties because a closer analysis of s76 (3) (c) appears to reveal an attempt 
to amend the common law.  
It is preferable to provide clarity on matters of the relationship between common law 
and the statutory duty where there has been partial codification. An omission to provide for a 
clear provision under s76 which clarifies this matter is an anomaly. It is not clear whether the 
legislature intended s77 (2)(b) to be used as a door way to infer that the legislature intended 
to make s76(3) merely declaratory of the common law without amending the standards of 
care, skill and diligence applicable at common law. It was important to make the position 
clearer especially given the absence of an explanatory memorandum to the Act. Clarity could 
have been achieved by providing a subsection under s76 in the mould of s170 (3) of the UK 
statute or s185 of the Australian statute to clarify the said relationship.
98
 Consequently, the 
absence of such clarity will mean potential future difficulties for courts when interpreting 
provisions of s76 (3) (c) in given scenarios. 
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4.4.2 Provisions of s76 (3) (c)  
Section 76(3) (c), as part of s76 (3) provides as follows: 
Subject to subsections (4) and (5), a director of a company, when acting in that 
capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of director— 
… with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected  
     of a person— 
(i)  carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as those 
carried out by that director; and 
(ii)  having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director. 
A critical analysis of the standards of care, skill and diligence introduced by the Act now 
follows. 
 
4.4.3 A critical analysis of the standards in s76 (3) (c)  
  As set out above one of the main questions is what the exact standards introduced into 
law by s76 (3) (c) of the Act are.
99
 This question is asked in light of the fact that prior to the 
Act South African common law is said to have applied a  subjective approach to the duty of 
care, skill and diligence.
100
 The emphasis in this part focuses on the test to be applied under 
s76 (3) (c) and whether the standards of conduct applicable are dual objective/subjective 
standards.  
 A brief comment needs to be made about the implications of the phrase ‗a director of 
a company when acting in that capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions 
of a director…‘ This long phrase should be read in the context of the expansive definition of 
a director given in s76.
101
 The definition of a director in s76 (1) focusses on the individual 
when acting in the capacity of a director. The purpose appears to have been to capture into 
the ambit of s76 (3), including s76 (3) (c), the exercise of directorial power or the 
performance of the directorial functions, regardless of the title of the person playing this role. 
It appears that the legislative intent was to protect the integrity of the office of a director by 
ensuring good governance through holding persons accountable for the exercise of powers 
                                                                
99
 See part 4.1 of this Chapter. 
100
 See Cassim et al Contemporary Company 2ed (2012) 554. Also see Bekink (2008) SA Merc LJ 95 at 100. 
101
 See s 76(1) for a wide definition of a ‗director‘. 
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and performance of functions of the director‘s office. Directors are accorded authority by law 
as now expressed by the Act ‗to exercise all of the powers and perform all of the functions of 
a company‘ except as specifically limited by the Act or the MOI.
102
  Hence s77 holds 
accountable/liable anyone who exercises directorial power or acts in the capacity of a director 
‗irrespective of whether or not the person is also a member of the company‘s board‘.
103
 Thus 
section 77 can be read to imply that liability in certain circumstances will be incurred not 
only by members of the board but also by anyone who may act in the capacity of a 
director.
104
  For this reason I agree with the analysis of respected author du Plessis that even 
non-directors who serve on board committees, are brought within the ambit of the statutory 
duties under s76(2) and (3).
105
 As this analysis demonstrates, if such persons breach the duty 
in s76(3)(c) while acting in the capacity of a director,  they will be held liable in terms of s77.  
 
(i) ‘…degree of care, skill and diligence that may be reasonably expected of a person…’ 
 The first observation to be made with respect to the phrase above is that the standards 
of directorial conduct in s76 (3) (c) appear to apply to all components of the statutory duty, 
namely ‗care‘, ‗skill‘ and ‗diligence‘.   Unlike the Australian statutory duty which mentions 
only ‗care and diligence‘
106
 the South African duty is reminiscent of the UK duty in this 
regard.
107
  It is to be noted that South African courts prior to the Act, rarely described the 
duty as ‗duty of care, skill and diligence‘.
108
 Often there was reference only to the duty of 
‗care and skill‘.
109
 Occasionally, when determining whether there was recklessness on the 
part of defendant directors, courts would refer to ‗reasonable skill and diligence‘ as was the 
case in Howard v Herrigel & Another NNO.
110
  
It is not clear whether the phraseology adopted under the statutory duty in s76 (3) (c) 
envisages the duty of ‗care, skill and diligence‘ as a composite term. Or are there different 
expectations regarding ‗care and diligence‘ on one hand and ‗skill‘ on the other hand? In 
other words, is this duty to be viewed as one indivisible duty or are these three different 
duties lumped together? It is submitted that while there could be little difference between the 
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effect of ‗care and diligence‘, there are different implications when it comes to the ‗skill‘ 
component of the duty. In Daniels v Anderson,
111
 a clear distinction between care and skill 
was explained. According to Roger CJ, skill means the knowledge and experience a director 
brings to the performance of his function and exercise of his powers. It (skill) is the technical 
competence of a director, a result of aptitude developed by special training and experience, 
while care is the manner in which that skill is applied.
112
 Another important difference 
between care and skill is that while care may be objectively assessed, skill varies from person 
to person.
113
 This understanding appears to have been alive in the minds of drafters of the 
Act. Impliedly it is for this reason that there is a clear distinction between expectations of a 
director in s76 (3) (c) (i) and s76 (3) (c) (ii) of the Act.  
When one thinks of the term ‗diligence‘, synonyms which come to mind include 
meticulousness, conscientiousness, thoroughness and carefulness in applying oneself to the 
task at hand. Diligence can be seen as a good link or chain that connects ‗care‘ and ‗skill‘. 
While care and diligence have a symbiotic relationship, they are not necessarily the same 
thing. Care is the manner of execution, while diligence may relate to the length to which a 
director, as a fiduciary, goes in fulfilling his obligations towards the company. The legislature 
should have intended that the inclusion of the word ‗diligence‘ to the description of the duty 
under s76(3)(c) should have implications. As pointed out earlier, ‗diligence‘ was not a 
common part of the duty under common law.
114
 The duty was commonly referred to as duty 
of care and skill. The statutory duty now contains the word ‗diligence‘. The clearest 
implication of the requirement for diligence is to be seen in association with the BJR.
115
 In 
this connection diligence has to do with a directors‘ continuing obligation to keep themselves 
informed of the affairs of the company. This should engender an inquiring mind, which in 
turn should place the director in a position to make a reasonably informed decision. In the 
USA case law, a director with a sluggish disposition to duty, or a director who sleeps on the 
wheel and is not alert to his ‗diligence‘ obligations, was held to add no value to the 
corporation.
116
   
When the occasion arrives, South African courts of law are likely to apply the same 
meaning to diligence as has been applied under foreign law. Foreign case law has interpreted 
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the diligence requirement to imply the meticulous and at times continuous attention given by 
directors to company affairs. Each situation or circumstance or the nature of the business of 
the company at any given time determines the amount of focussing a director is required to 
give to company affairs. In Re Barings plc (No 5) directors were found to have failed in their 
duty to act diligently in managing the affairs of the company.
117
 Diligence as a requirement 
demands that directors must acquire and maintain sufficient knowledge and understanding of 
the company‘s business to enable them to properly discharge their duties.
118
 Recently, 
Australian courts have interpreted the statutory duty of care and diligence in similar ways. In 
the Adler case
119
 Santow J held that a director should become familiar with the fundamentals 
of the company‘s business. In addition, a director is under a continuing obligation to keep 
informed about the company‘s activities.
120
   
As was the experience in Australia a short while  ago, South African courts are likely 
to be called upon to make a decision regarding the level of diligence expected of directors at 
multinational companies operating in the country. The Centro case
121
 gave Australian courts 
probably their most recent experience with interpreting the ‗diligence‘ requirement. The key 
question before the court was whether directors of big publicly listed entities are required to 
diligently apply their own minds to review proposed financial statements and reports. The 
court answered this question in the affirmative. Despite the fact that the South African 
statutory duty of care, skill and diligence is not as objective as its Australian counterpart, 
there is potential for a similar interpretation when the occasion presents itself. As shall be 
established below, the seemingly  dual objective/subjective standards under s76 (3) (c) can 
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(ii) Implications of omission of the emphasis that a director be a ‘reasonably diligent 
person’   
 The Act states that a director of a company in South Africa is expected to exercise 
that degree of care that  ‗may reasonably be expected of a person‘ carrying out the same 
functions in relation to a company as those carried out by the director whose conduct is under 
scrutiny.
123
 The subsection conveys a sense of ‗reasonable expectations‘ in terms of the 
standard of conduct expected of directors when they exercise their powers and perform their 
functions as directors. As already pointed out in 3.2.2 under Chapter 3, s76 (3) (c) is 
comparable to the UK‘s statutory duty of care in s174 of the Companies Act 2006. Also as 
pointed out in Chapter 3, use of reasonable expectations allows courts, when deciding 
whether the requisite standard of conduct has been met, to take into account the 
responsibilities and circumstances of directors of different types and in different situations. 
This allows an approach akin to comparing apples with apples.
124
 In the UK and Australian 
acts, the use of a ‗reasonable person‘ phrase,
125
 amounts to a reasonable person test. The UK 
reform policy never intended the standards of care to be completely objectified. The UK 
statutory duty applies dual objective/subjective standards. Australian law on the other hand 
followed the common law developments and thus the reasonable person test under the 
statutory duty translates to objectified standards of care and diligence.
126
 The question is 
whether s76 (3) (c) can be read to include a reasonable person test. 
The exact implications of the phrase ‗may reasonably be expected of a person‘, used 
in s76 (3) (c) may be difficult to establish with certainty. The reason for such difficulties may 
be found in the manner the subsection was drafted and the language used. It cannot be 
gainsaid that the intention must have been to draft s76 (3) (c) along the lines of the UK law. 
This can be discerned from the manner in which its forerunner, Cl 91(1) (a) of the Companies 
Bill 2007 was drafted.
127
 While the Companies Bill 2007 imposes on directors ‗a duty to 
exercise the degree of care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably 
diligent individual…‘,
128
 s76 (3) (c) phrases the duty differently and omits the requirement 
that a director be ‗a reasonably diligent individual‘. It is to be noted that the Bill and the UK‘s 
Companies Act 2006‘s inclusion of the phrase ‗a reasonably diligent person‘ gives the 
statutory duty under both the Companies Act 2006 and Companies Bill 2007 formulations a 
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reasonable person test flavour. Without that phrase it may be more difficult to read an 
objective standard into the s76 (3) (c).  
It is Du Plessis‘s view that not much should be read into the phrase ‗may reasonably 
be expected of a person‘ and impliedly, to the exclusion of the phrase ‗a reasonably diligent 
individual‘. Du Plessis adds, ‗except that s76(3)(c)(ii) introduces subjective elements, making 
it impossible to have used the ‗reasonable person‘ concept‘.
129
 Indirectly or even quite clearly 
Du Plessis suggests that the phrase ‗may reasonably be expected of a person‘ instead of the 
requirement that the director be ‗a reasonably diligent individual‘, does have an impact on the 
standards of care, skill and diligence under s76(3)(c). May be Du Plessis‘s argument meant to 
communicate that the test is subjective because of the wording of s 76(3)(c)(ii) and not 
necessarily because of the use of the phrase ‗reasonably be expected‘. Hence the explanation 
that not much should be read into the phrase.  
Another writer Cassidy, appears to believe that the ‗person‘ referred to in the phrase is 
a ‗reasonable director‘.
130
  There appears not to be consensus among authors regarding the 
exact meaning of the phrase. Cassim et al for example, disagree with Cassidy and provide an 
opposite view and argue that the standard of a director envisaged under s76(3)(c)(i) ―is that of 
a reasonable person and not that of a reasonable director‖.
131
  The term ‗director‘ under s76 is 
defined to include not only members of the company board but also prescribed officers and 
the board‘s sub-committee members. These different views by different authors may at first 
glance seem like just a question of semantics, but they are not. They are disagreements based 
on substance regarding difficulties of interpreting s76(3)(c). The duty has not been 
formulated in a manner that is free from ambiguities.  
It is to be noted that where the Companies Bill 2007 strikes a balance between reasonable 
expectations and the requirement that a director has to be a ‗reasonably diligent individual‘, 




   without the requirement that a director ought to be ‗a 
reasonably diligent individual‘ could be read to betray what appears to be the true intention of 
the legislature – which is to introduce clearly a reasonable  person test in the context of a dual 
objective/subjective standards along the lines of s174 of the UK‘s Companies Act 2006. The 
present formulation of the standard of conduct under s76 (3) (c) could be read to mean that it 
does not equally emphasise the reasonableness of the conduct to be expected of directors. To 
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this end, the Act differs from its UK and Australian counterparts that use the phrases 
‗reasonably diligent person‘ and ‗reasonable person‘ respectively.  Use of the phrase 
reasonably diligent person in the UK, as was argued in Chapter 3, clearly results in dual 
objective/subjective standards of care, skill and diligence.
134
 The subjective elements of this 
duty do not operate to limit the irreducible minimum objective standard, but rather enhances 
it. It is also important to highlight that in the UK reasonable expectations of directors are 
balanced with the ‗reasonable person‘ test.
135
  Retention of the phraseology of Cl 91 (1) (a) of 
the Companies Bill 2007 will solve the ambiguities currently experienced with s76 (3) (c). 
Australia applies a clear objective ‗reasonable person test‘ which takes into account the 
context in which directorial powers are exercised.
136
 The UK applies clear dual 
objective/subjective standards and phrases its statutory duty of care under s174 in a manner 
as free of ambiguity as is the position under the South African Companies Bill 2007. The 
current ambiguity under the Act is possibly a consequence of a drafting style which went 
wrong. The omission of the requirement that a director should be ‗a reasonably diligent 
person‘ from s76 (3) (c) is very unfortunate.   
 
(iii) Dual objective/subjective or dominantly subjective standards of review retained? 
At first glance, s76 (3) (c) appears to have introduced into law objective standards of 
care, skill and diligence which take into account the context in which the directorial powers 
are exercised and the function of a director performed.  At least this is the prima facie 
impression created by the reading of s76 (3) (c) (i). However, on closer scrutiny, it is clear 
that s76(3)(c), unlike Australia‘s s180 (1) of the Corporations Act 2001, has not introduced 
purely objective standards of care, skill and diligence as acknowledged by some South 
African authors.
137
 . Like the UK Act, it seems apparent that the legislative intent was to 
introduce a type of a hybrid system of standards of conduct under the Act (Companies Act 
2008). The UK‘s hybrid standards of conduct have been referred to throughout this Study as 
dual objective/subjective standards.
138
 However, South African statutory standards of care, 
skill and diligence in their present state, cannot be clearly and confidently be classified as 
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dual objective/subjective standards as intended, when one considers Cl 91 (1) of the 
Companies Bill 2007.  While standards in s76(3)(c) appear to have been intended to have an 
objective flavour, the subsection‘s wording is not crystal clear. This makes the subsection 
susceptible to at least two different interpretations, to which I will now turn. 
 One way of looking at this is that s76(3)(c)(i) or limb 1 appears to introduce into law, 
objective standards of ‗care and diligence‘ while limb 2
139
 imposes subjective standards of 
skill. Limb 1 states that the degree of standards is to be reasonably expected of a person 
‗carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as those carried out by the 
director‘. The intention appears to have been to impose an irreducible objective standard of 
care for directors by comparing apples with apples.  That is, to expect standards which can be 
reasonably expected of a director in similar circumstances as the director whose action is 
under review. There is recognition in limb 1 that the circumstances within which the power is 
exercised and function performed by the ‗director‘ should be taken into account. Under 
Australian case law this has been held to mean the type of the company, size and nature of 
the company‘s business.
140
 It also includes the composition of the board, the director‘s 
position and responsibilities within the company, the particular function the director is 
performing, the experience or skills of the particular director, including circumstances of the 
specific case.
141
  In this construction, limb 1 recognises the need for a standard flexible 
enough to accommodate a variety of positions which may exist, given the variety of business 
entities doing business in South Africa today.
142
  
 In keeping with this view, limb 2 (s76 (3) (c) (ii)) can be interpreted to have been 
designed to impose subjective standards of skill. There is emphasis in limb 2 on ‗the general 
knowledge, skill and experience of that director‘. Use of the word ‗skill‘ would have been 
enough to capture the ‗knowledge and experience‘ aspects, as highlighted above. Use of the 
phrase appears to have been borrowed from s174 of the UK Companies Act. General 
knowledge is to be differentiated from specific skill. Therefore, by implication, the standard 
of skill expected in s76(3)(c) appears not to be a specific skill, experience or knowledge, but 
‗general knowledge, skill and experience‘. The purpose could have been to emphasise the 
fact that directors are not a homogenous group and cannot be regarded as a separate 
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profession like lawyers and accountants. As such, necessary skills vary according to the 
different nature and purpose served by the companies.
143
 
  The alternative view is that as opposed to the dual objective/subjective standards as 
described above, s76 (3) (c) imposes hybrid standards of the duty of care, skill and diligence 
with subjective elements which detract from the objectivity of standards. The objective 
element, as per limb 1 is that the director is expected to exercise a degree of care, skill and 
diligence that may reasonably be expected of a person in a similar position and under similar 
circumstances, which implies equity or a measure of objectivity. The objectivity of this test in 
limb 1 is on this approach is undermined by subjective considerations of limb 2, that is, ‗the 
general knowledge, skill and experience‘ which that director possesses. Several authors 
suggest that a lower standard will be required from a director who has general knowledge , 
skill
144
and experience that are lower than those that could generally be expected from a 
person who carries those functions.
145
 It can potentially be argued that this is the import of 
the subsection in its present state. If this alternative view is to be taken, then good corporate 
governance will be undermined rather than be tightened up.  
 It is important to add that the first view, that South Africa has introduced dual 
objective/subjective standards of care appears to be the view better aligned to the legislative 
intent. As already established in this part of the Chapter, Cl 91 (1) of the Companies Bill 
2007 was drafted alongside s214 (4) of the UK‘s Insolvency Act 1986 which clearly imposes 
dual objective/subjective standards. These standards in the UK were then transposed into 
s174 of the Companies Act 2006. Thus by way of looking at the Companies Bill 2007, one 
can deduce that the legislature must have intended to model s76 (3) (c) along the present UK 
statutory standards of care and impose dual objective/subjective standards.  It should be 
stressed that the language used to express the statutory duty of care in s76 (3) (c) betrays the 
legislative intent because it is ambiguous and appears to emphasise subjective considerations. 
Thus at present, s76 (3) (c) can be read to be more on the subjective/objective side than it is 
on the dual objective/subjective standards side it was intended to be at. 
There is something to learn from foreign law, as permitted by the Act.
146
 Australian courts in 
particular, have even interpreted s180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 to determine the 
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standard of skill required, despite exclusion of the ‗skill‘ component from the subsection.
147
  
Thus, there is potential to interpret s76(3)(c) to mean that there is a minimum objective 
standard to be met by each type of a director, taking into account the context in which the 
powers are exercised and function performed.
 148
 The subsection does not seem to impose a 
uniform type of standard. The dual objective/subjective approach intended under s76 (3) (c) 
can allow the courts to take into account the circumstances of each company and the context 
in which a director acts in this capacity.  It is possible to interpret s76 (3) (c) (i) as imposing 
an objectively determinable minimum standard to be expected of any director on a case to 
case basis. Courts should be encouraged to adopt a judicial policy of interpretation of s76 (3) 
(c), which is flexible enough to deal with the merits of each case. A case will be made in 
Chapter 6 for a purposive interpretation approach which takes into account the purposes of 
the Act.   
 
(iv) What is the test to be applied for breaching the s76(3)(c) duty? 
 Importantly, the Act needs to be amended to clearly provide for a reasonable person 
test flavour which is currently missing from s76 (3) (c). It is beyond comprehension why the 
requirement that a director needs to be ‗a reasonably diligent individual‘ as reflected in Cl 91 
(1) (a) was omitted under the Act. There is a case to be made for amendment of s76 (3) (c) 
and the rephrasing of the section to reflect that requirement. After such a requirement, it can 
then be said with confidence that the section reflects a reasonable person‘s test.  
Having made the above observations with regards to the gaps in s76(3)(c), it is 
nonetheless important to point out that there remains potential to improve the subsection to be 
interpreted to include a reasonable person‘s test. There are two ways of doing this. The first 
method is to amend the entire s76(3)(c) to be based on clearly determinable reasonable 
person‘s test. Limb 1 for example requires that when reviewing the conduct of a director, 
comparison be made with a person ‗carrying out the same functions in relation to the 
company as those carried out by that director‘.
149
 This shows great potential for a reasonable 
person‘s test. This is possible if the entire s76(3)(c) assumes a flavour that strikes a balance 
between emphasising the reasonableness of the conduct of the director and the reasonable 
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 Much can be borrowed from the manner s174 of the Companies Act 2006 
was formulated or Clause 91(1)(a) of the Companies Bill 2007. This will allow for 
application of a flexible standard premised on subjective considerations of the context in 
which a director acts in that capacity balanced with objective elements under s76(3)(c).  
The second method is for the courts to give meaning to s76 (3) (c) through a policy of 
interpretation premised on the relevant purposes of the Act. One of the purposes of the Act is 
to ‗promote the development of the South African by-…encouraging transparency and high 
standards of corporate governance as appropriate given the significant role of enterprises 
within the social and economic life of the nation‘.
151
 The objects of the Act can be to promote 
high standards of corporate governance can be clearly discerned from the Companies Bill 
2007 as highlighted above.  Thus even before amendment of the Act, courts could give a 
more generous interpretation of the Act to with respect to s76 (3) (c) to promote higher 
standards of care, skill and diligence than the standards currently imposed by the subsection 
in its unambiguous state. In terms of the Act, a court of law or any forum, when determining 
a matter before it, must as of necessity prefer an interpretation of the Act which best 
promotes the spirit, purposes and objects of the Act.
152
 Even where a provision of this Act is 
capable of two meanings, the court must prefer the meaning which is more aligned to 
promotion of objects of the Act than one which is not.
153
  Part 4.2.3 above has examined 
policy objectives and linked them to the purposes of the Act. That part pointed the way 
towards the context within which s76 (3) (c) should be interpreted. Chapter 6 will examine 
the appropriate  interpretation based on considerations sketched above.    
     




   In South Africa this question has been addressed by courts between the 1980s and 
late 1990s, but the matter has not received direct attention from the Act. In Fisheries 
Development Corporation of SA Ltd
155
 the court, as per Margo J, at first glance appeared to 
have adopted a differentiated approach to standards applicable to executive and non-
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executive directors. Margo J‘s attempt to draw a distinction between an executive and a non-
executive director is susceptible to misinterpretation and certainly requires clarification and 
to be located in its proper context.
156
It is unlikely that Margo J implied that the standard or 
level of care expected of non-executive directors is less onerous than the one required of 
executive directors. Unfortunately, this is the impression created on some writers by Margo 
J‘s statement.
157
  The message that Margo J intended to convey was that ‗the extent of a 
director‘s duty of care and skill depends to a considerable degree on the nature of the 
company‘s business and on any particular obligations assumed‘ by or assigned to the 
director.
158
  The general rule  is that once a person accepts an appointment as a director, he 
becomes a fiduciary in relation to the company.
159
 The application of such a rule to any 
particular director is dependent on the facts of each case or the circumstances in which the 
power given to a director is exercised and a directorial function performed.   An example of 
such circumstances could be whether the director was engaged by the company on a part-time 
or full-time (executive) basis, director‘s access to information relevant for his/her 
performance and justification for reliance on reports received from others or reliance on 
relevant expertise.
160
 Thus according to Margo J the level of care expected of a full-time 
director is more onerous than that of a part-time non-executive director who was not obliged 
to give continuous attention to company affairs.  
The confusion that might have arisen as a result of remarks made by Margo J in 
Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd regarding the application of standards to either 
executive or non-executive directors was clarified in Howard v Herrigel & Another NNO.
161
 
The court considered it unhelpful or even misleading to classify company directors as 
executive and non-executive for purposes of ascertaining their duties to the company and the 
expected standard of conduct. Whether the inquiry is one that relates to negligence, reckless 
conduct or fraud, it was held that the standard of care expected of directors (executive or non-
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executive) is the same.
162
 These views were accepted as good law and confirmed seven years 
later in Philotex (Pty) Ltd & Others v Snyman & Others.
163
   
  As set out above, the Act in s76(3)(c) considers the context within which the 
directorial power is exercised and the function of a director is performed.
164
 Based on this 
construction, the standards applicable should be what ‗may reasonably be expected of a 
person‘ of a  director within the context of a directorship he/she holds.  If expectations are to 
be reasonable, it means that one cannot expect a non-executive director to apply a similar 
standard of skill for example, as would be expected of a specially-skilled full-time director.  
4.5 Reliance and delegation in s76 (4) (b)  
To delegate means to transfer some powers which a director is given by law to 
another person, a prescribed officer for example, to enable the delegatee to perform a task for 
the benefit of the delegator. This of course has to take place within the bounds permitted by 
applicable law.
165
 Reliance means acting upon information supplied or guidance given by a 
person who is considered to be in a position to give quality information and/or advice as a 
basis for decision-making. In corporate governance, directors make strategic decisions for the 
benefit of companies. The quality of decision-making will depend on quality information 
available to members of the board. The business of large corporations makes it unavoidable 
that directors have to delegate their powers to others and rely on information supplied by 
others to fulfil their leadership role.
166
  In South Africa, reliance and delegation are now 
regulated by both common law and the Act. 
 
4.5.1 Common law reliance and delegation 
  South African common law borrows principles on reliance from English law. 
Directors‘ need to rely on others for performance was underscored in an early English case of 
Dovey v Cory.
167
 The Earl of Halsbury LC made an important point when he remarked that 
‗the business of life could not go on if people could not trust those who are put into a position 
of trust for the express purpose of attending to the details of management‘.
168
 It needs to be 
acknowledged that there has been a paucity of cases which have dealt with reliance and 




 Philotex (Pty) Ltd & Others v Snyman & Others (supra) at 145. 
164
 See the formulation of this duty as captured in part 4.4.2 above. 
165
 The Act in this case, s76 (4) (a) in particular, and the common law. 
166
 See Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 561. 
167
 1901 AC 477. Also see part 3.3.1 (ii). 
168
 Ibid at 486. 
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delegation under South African law,  and principles from English law have been helpful in 
the development of jurisprudence. Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v 
Jorgensen,
169
  adapted English law principles on reliance and delegation into South African 
common law. Margo J remarked that in the absence of suspicion, directors are entitled to trust 
in and rely on the information supplied by relevant company officers who are employed by 
the company.
170
 There is also an understanding at common law that a director‘s reliance 
and/or delegation needs to be reasonable, thus making reliance on these defences to be on 
rational basis.
171
  Margo J relied on the English case of Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co 
Ltd
172
 to lay down the common law position in South Africa in this regard.  
The English law‘s earlier position on delegation, which in turn influenced the South 
African position, is considered to have been lax and far too lenient to be appropriate in a 
modern world.
173
  The requirement that there be ‗absence of grounds for suspicion‘ has been 
criticised in this regard for paying little attention to the competence and trustworthiness of the 
person receiving the delegation, or even more importantly, to the monitoring of the 




 confirm the maxim delegatus non potest 
delegare – meaning that a fiduciary may not delegate his  duty, but powers necessary to 
performing it.
176
  A director‘s duty to exercise care, skill and diligence in overseeing the 
affairs of the company according to USA common law, cannot be met solely by relying on 
other persons.
177
 Where directors have delegated authority to company officers, they are 
required in Australian common law, to supervise the performance of such delegated 
authority. In Daniels v Anderson,
178
 Clarke JA rejected Romer J‘s ‗absence of grounds for 
suspicion‘
179
 test as being outdated and unsuited to modern commercial requirements.   
The leading case on director liability for supervision of delegated authority in South 
Africa today is Barlows Manufacturing Co Ltd v RN Barrie (Pty) Ltd.
180
 Principles 
enunciated therein compare very well with international trends as reflected in foreign case 
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 or even foreign legislation.
182
 Conradie J considered it a fundamental principle of 
company law, that a director may delegate some or even all of his powers to others, but may 
not delegate his duty or abdicate his/her ultimate responsibility towards the company.
183
 The 
implication of this common law principle is that directors remain fiduciaries even after 
delegating authority to sub-committees of the company board or to some servants of the 
company. A director is accountable to the company for the exercise of powers delegated to 
officers of the company. It is the director who owes a duty to his/her company and cannot 
divest himself of that duty while he remains a director.
184
 Thus a director cannot shield 
behind delegation to escape from liability where he failed to monitor the exercise of 
delegated powers.  
 
4.5.2 Reliance and delegation in ss76 (4) (b) and 76(5) - A commentary  
South Africa has adopted into statute standards of reliance and delegation which 
compare favourably with standards in the best practice jurisdictions. The statutory principles 
of reliance and delegation are fairly comprehensive, clearer and more in line with modern 
commercial demands when compared to the common law. It is noteworthy that the standards 
of directors‘ conduct under the Act
185
 are subject to statutory defences listed in subsection 
s76(4) and 76(5) of the Act. This shows the close connection between principles of reliance 
and delegation and the standards of care, skill and diligence under s76(3)(c).  
  Generally, a director is permitted by the Act to rely, for their own performance, on 
certain persons designated by the Act.  The board might reasonably have delegated to these 
persons formally or informally the authority to perform the board‘s functions which are 
delegable under the law.
186
  
Section s76 (5) provides a list of the persons and/or professionals who merit 
confidence and whom directors can rely on for their performance.
187
 A director can delegate 
some of or all his powers or may rely on guidance from others provided the director believes 
                                                                
181
 See the Australian position reflected in Daniels v Anderson (supra) at 663. For the US position, see Federal 
     Deposit Insurance Corporation v Stanley (supra) at 770.  
182
 I have in mind s190 (1) of the Corporations Act 2001 of Australia, already referred to in part 3.3.1 of Chapter 
     3.  
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 See s76 (3) (a) – (c). 
186
 See s76(4)(b)(i). 
187
 See s76(5)(a)-(b). 
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the persons are reliable, have necessary skills and competence to be in a position to advise, 
perform or guide.    
Directors may also rely on information, official company documents, expert opinions 
or advice provided by those who are employed by the company or those engaged by the 
company for a specialised service that is outsourced.
188
 Examples of specialist services 
directors may rely upon for their own performance include the skills or expertise of legal 
counsel, accountants, or other professional persons retained by the company, the board or a 
committee.
189
 The statutory principles of reliance and delegation confirm the common law 
understanding that a director should make a good judgment call in utilising the human 
resources, skills and competences at his or her disposal.
190
 Reliance and delegation apply to 
all directors‘ duties under s76(3), including the duty to act in the best interest of the company 
in s76(3)(b). These defences or principles are discussed here in connection with part of the 
major focus of this study – the duty of care, skill and diligence. Employment of such care and 
diligence as are demanded by the statutory reliance and delegation principles will enable 
directors to discharge their functions effectively.  
 While a director is entitled to rely on performance of others and information supplied, 
advice given by employees and/or expert opinion, the Act has put in place a mechanism for 
delineating between acceptable reliance/delegation and what may not be acceptable.  These 
are interesting principles which will surely enrich corporate governance in South Africa. A 
few observations need to be made in this regard.  
(i) There is a  
strong emphasis in s76(4)(b)(i) and s76(5) the fact that a director‘s reliance on 
performance of an employee should be reasonable.  
(ii) A director should have believed that the employee so delegated to perform a function 
is reliable and competent to perform functions so delegated. If there are any ‗red 
flags‘
191
 or anything not to warrant trust, then the reliance on such an employee, or 
information provided will be found by a court of law to have been unreasonable. If 
reliance is placed on a board committee or even experts, the requirement is that the 
committee, employee or expert should ‗merit confidence‘.
192
 Even reliance on experts 
                                                                
188
 See s76(4)(b)(ii). This may include any information, opinions, recommendations, reports or statements, 
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for specialist skills, should be based on a director‘s reasonable belief that the matters 
for which advice is sought fall within a person‘s area of competence. Blind or 
presumptive reliance might be found by a court to be irrational and unjustifiable, and 
protection of the statutory defences will be excluded.   
(iii)Reasonable reliance/delegation test and implications: This test requires a director to  
have a rational basis for trusting the reliability or competence of the employee 
delegated to perform a task, or the information or advice given.
193
 If reliance satisfies 
the requirement of reasonableness, then the director will not incur liability.
194
 
(iv) Subsection 76(4)(b), 
apart from requiring that the delegation must be reasonable, states that the functions 
delegated should be those functions ‗that are delegable under applicable law‘.
195
 
South Africa has now joined nations like Australia in delineating between matters 
where directors can rely on and/or delegate to others and where this is inappropriate.  
A director should not abdicate responsibility by delegating his or her duty to a fellow 
director or an employee. For example, a director of a multinational company may 
delegate the task of preparing financial statements to a finance manager, but the duty 
to scrutinise those statements to ensure that they are not misleading remains the non-
delegable duty of the director.
196
 Similarly in the Australian Centro case,
197
 the court 
rejected the directors‘ defence premised on reliance on experts because it was 
inappropriate to rely on others in a matter which needed directors‘ focussing on the 
matter.  Directors thus cannot substitute reliance upon the advice of management in 




Subsections 76(4) (b) and 76(5) now compare well with standards in the best practice 
jurisdictions. In fact, South African statutory principles of reliance/delegation now go even 
further than Australian standards. For example, Australian provisions do not require reliance 
and delegation to be reasonable as s76 (4) (b) and s76 (5) do.
199
  Australian statutory law also 
does not seem to specify the persons to whom directors may delegate their powers, whereas 
the Act has extensive provisions in this regard in s76 (4) (b) and s76 (5). It would have been 
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preferable for s76 (4) (b) to have clarified if delegation is only permitted if it is done at board 
level or whether an individual director is also permitted to delegate. As it stands, s76(4)(b) 
gives the impression that reliance on employees by directors is only possible once the board 
has delegated those functions which are delegable under law, to employees. Nonetheless, the 
depth of the reliance and delegation principles under the Act is commendable. Any gaps in 
s76 (4) (b) can easily be filled up through purposive interpretation, in line with the spirit, 
purpose and objects of the Act.
200
   One proposal which can be made for the sake of 
completeness though, is to add a statutory provision which emphasises that directors remain 
accountable for the exercise of a delegated power by the delegate if the requirements of s 
76(4)(b) and (5) are not met. While this principle may be read into s76 (4)
201
 (b) and (5), it is 
preferable to explicitly provide for it in the Act. Chapter 7 includes a proposal to this effect.   
4.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter critically analysed the standards of care, skill and diligence under s76 (3) 
(c) in light of the corporate law reform objectives and
202
 the purposes of the Act
203
 and 
international benchmarks. The analysis sought an answer to the central question whether the 




 The chapter has established
205
 that the standards at common law in South Africa were 
not crystal clear, but that they were predominantly subjective. Even though later cases 
attempted to incorporate principles from English law as they developed, these cases did not 
move the common law much further than Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd. 
Hence the need for the Act to provide clear standards of care, skill and diligence expected of 
directors in s76 (3) (c) as read with ss76 (4) (a) - (b) and 76(5).  
  A critical analysis of s76 (3) (c), s76 (4) (b) and s76 (5) has revealed several worrying 
gaps and ambiguities but also many positive aspects.  Recommendations to deal with these 
will be made in Chapter 7.  Some of the positives include firstly, the codification of 
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 As required by s158. 
201
 Through an interpretation that gives effect to the purposes of the Act in terms of s5 (2) of the Act. Such an 
      interpretation, if seen also through the prism of Barlows Manufacturing (supra) at 611, will ensure  
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204
 As was envisaged by the law reform objectives. See s7 (b)(iii) of the Act. 
205
 See part 4.2 above. 
141 
 
directors‘ standards of care, skill and diligence in s76 (3) (c).
206
 Secondly, inclusion of an 
interpretation clause, s5 read with s7 and s158, enhances the potential of the provisions of s76 
(3) (c) through interpretation.
207
 Thirdly the reliance/delegation provisions in s76 (4) and s76 
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 See part 4.2.3 above. 
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CHAPTER 5: BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the many innovations and novelties introduced by the Act into corporate law 
in South Africa is the BJR. S 76(4) (a) introduces the BJR into company legislation within 
the context of s76 of the Act.
1
 While the Act does not use the phrase ‗business judgment‘ in 
s76 (4) (a) and does not define the phrase, the subsection undoubtedly has elements of the 
US-style BJR as will be demonstrated in this chapter. The BJR originated in the USA almost 
two centuries ago, and developed alongside the duty of care as a common law standard of 
review.
2
 As will be further demonstrated below, in its relationship with the duty of care, the 
BJR relates specifically to the decision-making aspect of the duty.
3
 S 76 presents the BJR as 
part of standards of directors‘ conduct and relates to two directors‘ statutory duties, namely, 
the fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company,
4
 and the duty of care, skill and 
diligence.
5
  This study adopts the view that the BJR, though classified as part of ‗standards of 
conduct‘ in s76, is rather, a standard of review as will be clarified later.  
In this study, the BJR is examined specifically with regard to its relationship with the 
standards of care, skill and diligence, already analysed in Chapter 4. Prior to the Act, a lot 
was written about the BJR, and the majority of South African academic commentators argued 
against inclusion of the BJR in statute. This was due to a shared mistrust of the BJR. The rule 
was suspiciously viewed as a ‗transplant‘ from ‗a foreign legal regime‘ (namely the USA),
6
 a 
jurisdiction   criticised by some writers for what has been termed ‗conflation of a fiduciary 
duty and the duty of care‘.
7
 Therefore the argument in South Africa was that the introduction 
of the BJR was unnecessary for two reasons. The first was the fear that an introduction of the 
BJR would blur the celebrated distinction between fiduciary duties and the duty of care in 
South Africa because of said conflation of duties in US law.
8
 The differences between USA 
corporations law and South African company law were also raised; especially in the manner 
                                                                
1
 S 76 is entitled ‗Standards of directors‘ conduct‘.  
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 Weng (2010) Fordham Int’l L.J 124-147. In this chapter, different conceptions of the BJR will be briefly 
considered.  
3
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6
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327. 
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US law treats a fiduciary duty and duty of care.
9
 It was contended that prior to the Act, the 
duty of care was a tenuous ground on which to found a legal claim against directors. The 
argument went further to say that the BJR was an added means to further limit the duty of 
care, and that this would further lower standards of care.
10
 Secondly, inclusion of the BJR 
into statute was criticised for the reason that South African courts had demonstrated a culture 
of not second-guessing the decisions of the courts. It was argued that our (South African) 
courts have in the past allowed directors to make decisions in a spirit of enterprise and have 
not sought to usurp the power of management where decisions are justifiable.
11
 This Study 
demonstrates that there is no legislative intent in the Act that s76 (4) (a) should lead to a 
conflation of a fiduciary duty and the duty of care. While I do not share the sentiments 
expressed by my fellow South African writers prior to the Act, I appreciate what influenced 
the apprehensions about adoption of the US-style BJR under the Act. It is demonstrated in 
this chapter that even US writers acknowledge the potential for conflation of duties under the 
framework of the BJR that exists under the Delaware state law in the US. In part 5.2 below, 
the modern challenges associated with the BJR are explored 
There are some important principles to consider when analysing s76 (4) (a). Firstly, 
it‘s vital to note that the Act now recognises the board of directors as the legitimate organ to 
manage company affairs.
12
 Secondly, there are instances of added liability under the Act.
13
 
Important to consider also is the spirit, purport and objects of the Act, in this case the need to 
‗balance the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors within the company‘ as 
required by the Act.
14
 Another purpose of the Act relevant to BJR includes the promotion of 
the South African economy by encouraging entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency.
15
     
In a nutshell, the purpose of this chapter is to analyse the adoption of the BJR under 
the Act in light of relevant international experiences,
16
 the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Act
17
 and corporate law reform objectives as outlined in the DTI Policy Document 2004. 
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Given that this is a post-law reform examination of the BJR, this analysis will inter alia seek 
to establish three broad aspects. The first aspect is the scope and content of the BJR. The 
second aspect relates to the debate regarding the effect of the BJR on the relationship 
between a fiduciary duty and the duty of care: Is there any chance that the BJR could operate 
to conflate or blur the distinction between the two duties? Closely related to this is the 
question whether the BJR operates to limit or dilute the effectiveness of standards of care, 
skill and diligence under the Act. Thirdly, does the BJR have a positive impact on corporate 
governance in South Africa, for example by striking a delicate balance between interests of 
shareholders and directors‘ freedom to manage companies? In addition to the three broader 
key aspects aforementioned, there are many other specific inquiries or important issues which 
this Study has to establish through an analysis of s76 (4) (a) of the Act.  For example, a 
preliminary issue is to explore the question whether there is a South African common law 
business judgement rule, and if so, what its role is post the Act.  
Another important matter to determine is the proper characterisation of the BJR under 
Act.
18
 The relationship between the BJR and the duty of care will obviously receive attention. 
Another important issue which requires clarification is whether the BJR in s76 (4) (a) is 
presented as a presumption in favour of a director or as ‗safe harbour provisions‘.
19
 A related 
issue, also vital to South African law, is to provide clarity as to who should bear the onus of 
establishing the requirements of the BJR as set out in s76 (4) (a) (i) to (iii). Another point 
which certainly requires attention is the possible policy motivation for and implications of the 
non-inclusion of a good faith element in the BJR formulation in s76 (4) (a). Yet another 
important issue to consider is the effect of the requirement of a rational belief
20
 that a 
decision referred to in s76 (4) (a) (iii) was made in the best interest of the company. 
Interestingly some of the seven sub-inquiries highlighted above received the attention of 
Austin J in the Australian case of ASIC v Rich.
21
 Background issues relating to the BJR were 
introduced by the previous chapters and this Chapter builds upon such a foundation. Chapter 
2 has already established the meaning of the BJR,
22
 and this Chapter
23
 will correctly 
characterise the BJR as a standard of review in its relationship with the duty of care, skill and 
diligence. This study agrees with a definition which views the BJR as a standard of judicial 
                                                                
18
 See 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 below for an attempt to answer this question. 
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22
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review providing for some review of business decisions.
24
 In this construction, the duty of 
care is a standard of conduct, while the BJR provides a standard of review, and thus must not 
be confused with a standard of conduct.
25
  Chapter 3 traced the origins and objects of the BJR 
in the USA. It also analysed the adoption of the BJR into Australian statutory law and briefly 
considered emerging case law principles. Such international experiences will be employed in 
this chapter when analysing the adoption of the BJR under the Act.  
This chapter begins by looking at the modern challenges relating to the BJR in 
practice. Reference will be made to the most instructive US case law in this regard. The aim 
of this part is to answer the question whether the BJR is a standard of conduct, a standard of 
review/ liability or whether there is any room for it to be viewed as a presumption against 
judicial review as argued by others. Thereafter the focus shifts to the analysis of s76 (4) (a).  
5.1.2 BJR in practice: varying approaches and modern challenges 
Any jurisdiction that intends to incorporate the BJR into statutory law
26
 has to gain an 
understanding of the shape and form that the BJR takes in practice. The BJR in practice can 
be best seen through the window provided by US common law, but it has to be admitted that 
the view through that window is not crystal clear. The US experiences were chiefly dealt with 
in Chapter 3.
27
 In this part of the Chapter, I seek to briefly recapture aspects of US case law 
which reveal variations in the approaches adopted by US courts when applying the BJR in 
cases brought by litigants and the attendant challenges. The BJR is a concept which invokes 
different opinions and approaches as already established.
28
 It is for this reason that there is 
not one, but two formulations of the BJR in US law.
29
 Also, there are at least two different 
approaches or competing conceptions of the BJR in US case law. There is a more modern 
conception which views the BJR as a standard of review.
30
 The other conception looks at the 
BJR as a presumption against judicial review of duty of care claims.
31
 There are at least two 
more conceptions of the BJR which will be mentioned in passing, but the discussion will 
focus on whether the BJR is a standard of conduct or a standard of review. This is relevant to 
the analysis of s76 (4) (a).   . Before I consider the various conceptions of the BJR, it is 
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important to give an outline of the modern challenges with the BJR which incorporating 
jurisdictions must take cognisance of so as to take measures to mitigate against them. These 
challenges stem from the ‗inconsistent and confusing‘ state of US case law which gives the 




5.1.2.1 Modern Challenges associated with BJR 
There are various challenges associated with the modern BJR as can be gleaned from 
 US case law and literature. These challenges range from lack of consensus on the theory of 
the proper relationship between the BJR and the duty of care, to the problem of putting the 
cart before the horse – that is, the overemphasising of the BJR and the concomitant 
diminishing in importance of directors‘ duties - a legacy of the development of the Delaware 
corporate law. 
 
(i) Lack of consensus on theory of the proper relationship between duty of care and the BJR. 
It is generally agreed that the BJR is intimately associated with or closely related to 
the duty of care.
33
 Others describe the BJR as a corollary to the duty of care.
34
 While there is 
this general acceptance that the BJR developed concomitantly with the duty of care close to 
two centuries ago,
35
 there is no general consensus on exactly what the BJR‘s function should 
now be vis-à-vis the duty of care in the face of liability claims before a court. As will be 
shortly highlighted in this work, the concept of the BJR appears to be so malleable as to lead 
one to think that it is still undergoing evolution of some sort. Hence the conflicting views 




No less than four conceptions have emerged over the years to try and answer the 
question regarding the proper function of the BJR broadly, as well as what its proper 
relationship with the duty of care should be.  Each of these conceptions, to be considered 
below, enunciates a different approach to the BJR and the differences in emphasis have 
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resulted in conflicting outcomes of cases in the US.
37
 Should the application of the BJR in 
duty of care claims result at all in judicial scrutiny/ review of the board‘s decision-making 
process or should courts always abstain from judicial review? If it is to be accepted that 
application of the BJR may result in some form of judicial review, where do we draw the line 
between when judicial scrutiny begins and ends, and where the policy should simply be 
judicial deference/judicial non-review in case of duty of care claims?  
To Bainbridge, the answer to the questions posed above is simple. He argues that ‗the 
whole point of the business judgement rule is to prevent courts from even asking the 
question: did the board breach its duty of care?‘
38
 For this reason Bainbridge criticised the 
Delaware Supreme court for allowing judicial review of substantive merits of the board‘s 
decision in Technicolor.
39
  Johnson too is critical of Delaware‘s formulation of the BJR as ‗a 
centrepiece for corporate fiduciary analysis‘.
40
 The author argues that the BJR would be 
‗better understood as a narrow-gauged policy of non-review than as an overarching 
framework for affirmatively shaping judicial review of fiduciary performance‘.
41
 Implied in 
Bainbridge‘s arguments is that courts should be particularly precluded from reviewing 
directors‘ observance of their duty of care obligations in decision-making. In stark contrast to 
the argument for judicial non-review of duty of care obligations, US courts are not precluded 
from reviewing the substance of director decisions in cases of fraud, illegality, conflict of 
interests or irrationality.
42
   
Other writers are differently persuaded, and believe that courts have ‗in fact reviewed 
directors‘ business decisions to some extent from a quality of judgment point of view…and 
will continue to do it because directors are fiduciaries‘.
43
 So quite clearly, there appears to be 
                                                                
37
 US case law presents conflicting outcomes in the application of BJR due to different approaches followed by 
the courts. For e.g. in Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S. 2d 807 (1976), aff‘d, 387 N.Y.S. 2d 993 
(App. Div. 1976) at 810-811, the court, upon application of the BJR, dismissed the applicant‘s case despite a 
demonstrably wrong decision by the board. In contrast, in a later case in Cede & Co. v Technicolor (supra) 367, 
the Delaware Supreme Court, in applying the BJR as a procedural guide to the facts before it, gave the 
plaintiffs/litigants the opportunity to rebut the presumption (of good faith in favour of directors) by allowing 
them to present evidence that the board had failed to exercise due care in their decision-making process. When 
the plaintiff successfully rebutted the presumption, the court did not only review the process by which the 
decision was made, but ultimately also the substance of the directors‘ decision.   
38
 Bainbridge (2004) Vand. L. Rev 95. 
39
 Ibid 95-102. 
40




 Ibid at 97-99. See reference to the decision in Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S. 2d 807 (1976), 
aff‘d, 387 N.Y.S. 2d 993 (App. Div. 1976) at 810-811. Also see Shlensky v Wrigley 237 N.E. 2d 776 (III. App. 
Ct 1968) at 780. 
43




no consensus on the theory of the proper relationship between the BJR and duty of care. This 
challenge creates uncertainty in the law relating to the BJR. 
 
(ii) Justification of the dichotomy/divergence of standard of conduct and standard of review 
in corporate law as a rationale for the BJR 
 
The fact that standards of conduct and review
44
 diverge in corporate law has been put 
forward as a possible rationale for the BJR.
45
The clearest example of this dichotomy is to be 
seen in the relationship between the BJR and the duty of care. Just as a reminder, when 
directors accept appointment as fiduciaries of a company, they make an affirmative 
undertaking of a good faith-inspired intention to care for companies.
46
 This includes 
obligations to exercise business judgments, to monitor, and generally to assume the mantle of 
authority and responsibility.
47
 There is a correct mode of ascertaining whether an agent was 
at fault. It is by enquiring whether the fiduciary neglected the reasonable exercise of that 
diligence and care, which was necessary to a successful discharge of the affirmative duty 
imposed on him/her.
48
 Under South African common law, the standard used to determine 
liability for breach of the duty of care is one of negligence, and not gross negligence.
49
 In the 
context of decision-making by directors, the BJR gives substance to the question: What does 




In most areas of law, the standard of conduct and standard of review tend to conflate. 
However with respect to corporate decision-making, the standard of conduct for duty of care, 
which is ordinary negligence, diverges with the standard of review – gross negligence under 
the BJR. US courts have ruled that gross negligence and not ordinary negligence is the 
appropriate standard of review in duty of care claims in the context of decision-making.
51
  
Information asymmetry and bounded rationality have been cited as explanations why there is 
divergence of standards of conduct and review.
52
  The effect of the dichotomy of standards in 
                                                                
44
 Standard of conduct and standard of review are defined in 5.2.1 below 
45
 Rhee (2013) Notre Dame L.R 1152–1156.. 
46




 See Percy v Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s) 68, 74-75 (La. 1829). 
49
 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Commentary on Companies Act 190. Stegmann J confirmed the standard in 
    Ex parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd 1989 (3) SA 71 (T) 106. Also see Du Plessis NO v Phelps  
    1995 (4) SA 154 (C) 170.  
50
 Rhee (2013) Notre Dame L.R 1169. 
51
 See Smith v Van Gorkom 488 A.2d (supra) at 873. 
52
 Eisenberg (1993) Fordham L. Rev 437-438. 
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the application of the BJR in Delaware is that it has curtailed the scope of enforcement of the 




(iii) The generally accepted claim that courts are incompetent to review business decisions 
 
Another motivation or rationale for the BJR is the oft-made claim in US case law that 
the complexity of business decisions is beyond the reach of judges (that judges are not 
business experts), and therefore they are incompetent to review corporate decision-making.
54
 
This view has been correctly criticised. Rhee argues that such a view is misleading in that it 
‗elevates the business profession to some rarefield level of incomprehensibility‘ and 
disingenuously suggests that courts must not even attempt a review of corporate decisions.
55
 
It is misleading to suggest that courts are incompetent to review a corporate governance 
issue. Courts have been reviewing business decisions for years and courts continue to review 
other even more complex issues such as healthcare legislation, the economics of antitrust law, 
inter alia.
56
 This claim threatens to limit the courts‘ role to provide judicial review to the 
conduct of directors during the decision-making process. It also raises fears of trivialising the 
role of courts and enforcement of laws. As correctly observed by Rhee, the fundamental role 
of courts is to apply rules of law, determine wrongs and assigning liability.
57
 Determination 
of liability for breach of duty is a legal question which must be settled in a neutral forum such 
as a court. If courts ever feel that any matter is beyond their reach, they can call upon the 
assistance of assessors or even of their own accord enlist expert guidance or assistance.  
                                                                
53
 See Brehm v Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del.2000). As per the court in In re Caremark Int’l Inc. 
Derivative Litig., 698 A. 2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch.1996), what matters is whether correct process was followed in 
decision-making in order to advance corporate interests. Whether that decision was ‗egregious‘, ‗stupid‘ or 
‗irrational‘ is immaterial. 
54
 It is surprising, at least to me, that it is the judges themselves who seem to be at the forefront of propagating 
the notion that they are incompetent to review corporate decision-making. See the following comments by 
judges in the following US cases: Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (supra) at 684 – ‗The judges are not business 
experts‘; Auerbach v. Bennett (supra) at 1000 – ‗The business judgment doctrine, at least in part, is grounded in 
the prudent recognition that courts are ill-equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate what are and must be 
essentially business judgments‘; Brehm v Eisner  (supra) at 263 – ‗Courts are ill-fitted to attempt to weigh the 
‗adequacy‘ of consideration under the waste standard or, ex post, to judge appropriate degrees of business risk‘; 
Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 367 (Mont. 1990) – ‗Judges are not business experts 
and therefore should not substitute their judgement for the judgment of the directors‘; Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 
692 A.2d 1042, 1046 (Pa. 1997) – ‗The business judgment doctrine prevents courts from becoming enmeshed in 
complex corporate decision-making, a task they are ill-equipped to perform‘.  
55
 Rhee (2013) Notre Dame L.R 1151. 
56
 Ibid at 1152.  
57
 Ibid at 1153.  
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The language employed to justify the BJR rationale that the judiciary is incompetent 
to review business decisions is puzzling, worrying and potentially misleading.
58
  BJR is 
justified with the explanation that because judges are not business experts, they should not 
‗review‘ or ‗second-guess‘ the substance of business decisions,
59
 absent a showing by the 
plaintiff of a breach of directors‘ duties.
60
 There could be something mischievous or 
misleading in the language of ‗judicial non-review‘ and not ‗second-guessing‘ directors‘ 
business decisions. It‘s not only non-American writers like myself who seem to have quite a 
problem with such language used by US courts and other commentators to justify the 
elevation of the BJR above directors‘ duties. Some American writers too are critical of the 
language used in arguing that judges are incompetent to review business decisions or the call 
not to ‗second-guess‘ boards‘ business  judgment calls.  Johnson for example, agrees that the 
phraseology misleadingly suggests that there is ‗some jurisprudential basis for interfering (or 
not) in a business decision when there is no such basis apart from a duty breach‘.
61
  Thus 
Johnson disagrees with the view that courts ‗review‘ or ‗second-guess‘ the substance of 
business decisions by directors. The author correctly explains that rather than arguing that 
courts ‗review‘ or ‗second-guess‘ directors‘ business decisions, the correct view is that courts 
‗simply proceed with the analysis under the fiduciary duty principles‘.
62
  
When a plaintiff asserts a claim, the ‗clarion call‘ is not for the court to review the 
board of directors‘ or a director‘s business decision. The plaintiff basically requests a court to 
determine whether a director has breached his affirmative duty towards the company. A good 
case in point is the claim brought before the Delaware Supreme Court by the plaintiff 
Cinerama in the Technicolor case.
63
 Cinerama‘s case against the directors of Technicolor 
arose out of a shareholder‘s duty-of-care-based challenge to the Technicolor board of 
directors‘ decision to approve a merger.
64
 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant directors 
                                                                
58
 Refer to comments captured in n54 above. 
59
 L P.Q  Johnson ‗Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose‘ 
     (2013) 38 Del. J. Corp. L 405 at 426. 
60
 See a similar comment made by the court in Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc (supra) at 361. 
61




 See Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc. (supra) at 345. 
64
 Ibid. Cinerama Inc., a minority shareholder which owned 4.4 percent of Technicolor Inc.‘s outstanding stock 
was the plaintiff in the matter. Technicolor was the defendant. The Technicolor board approved a merger with 
and to become a subsidiary of the MacAndrews and Forbes Group, Inc. (MAF).  In the merger so concluded, 
Technicolor shareholders received $ 23 cash per share. Cinerama dissented from the merger, filed an appraisal 
proceeding and brought a separate suit for damages. The action for equitable relief arose from its claim that the 
Technicolor board of directors violated its duty of care obligations when approving the merger. Also see 
Bainbridge (2004) Vand. L. Rev 91.  
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had violated their duty of care obligations towards the company.
65
 In other words, the 
plaintiff‘s pleading amounted to a claim that directors had breached their affirmative 
obligations towards the company. Thus when analysing directors‘ performance during 
decision-making, the focus of the Delaware Supreme Court was on directors‘ duty of care 
obligations, which courts are legally competent to address.
66
 From the premise of duty 
analysis, the court in Technicolor identified five decision-making ‗process failures amounting 
to a breach of the duty of care‘.
67
 The gross negligence finding by the court was based on the 
conclusion it reached that the plaintiff successfully showed that the defendant Technicolor 
directors failed to inform themselves fully concerning all material information reasonably 
available prior to approving the merger agreement.
68
 Thus it can be argued that the Delaware 
Supreme Court did not exactly set out to review the substance of directors‘ business decision. 
The court applied what can be termed the Van Gorkom test, which is a procedural or process 
due care test – a prerequisite for invoking the BJR.
69
 According to this test, directors who fail 
to ‗act in an informed and deliberate manner‘ may not assert the BJR as a defence against 
duty of care claims.
70
 Hence the BJR could not be successfully invoked to protect the 
Technicolor directors.     
While courts may not be competent to review the merits of directors‘ business 
judgments, they are competent to address the question whether or not a fiduciary has 
breached his/her affirmative duties towards the principal – the company. This is true 
particularly when it comes to courts‘ role to evaluate director performance in decision-
making, for purposes of assigning liability, especially where pleadings are rooted in duty of 
care claims. Care
71
 is entirely process-oriented.
72
 Hence the view that there is no substance to 
duty of care reviews.
73
  In any case, due care in the context of decision-making is procedural 
or process due care only.
74
 When it comes to evaluating procedural issues, it is difficult to 




 Johnson (2013) 38 Del. J. Corp. L 426.  
67
 See Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc. (supra) at 369 for a detailed presentation of the five decision-making 
process failures by the Technicolor board which resulted in the Delaware Supreme Court making a finding of 
gross negligence by the board of directors. Also see Bainbridge (2004) Vand. L. Rev 93. 
68
 Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc. (supra) at 371. 
69




 At least in the decision-making context. 
72




 Brehm v Eisner  (supra) at 264. Also see In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig. (supra) at 967. 
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find any singular person or institution with better expertise than courts of law.
75
 For these 
reasons, it may sound unfair, if not absurd, to insist that courts are incompetent to review 
directors‘ decision-making process. 
 
(iv) Overemphasising the BJR and the concomitant de-emphasising of the duty of care – the 
proverbial danger of putting the cart before the horse 
 
A unique aspect of corporate governance in the US, especially in the state of Delaware,
76
 is 
the primacy accorded to the BJR over directors‘ duties in the analysis and evaluation of 
director performance by the courts.
77
 The BJR should be utilised as a standard of review.
78
 
However, in Delaware the rule has been assigned a bigger role than simply as a standard of 
review. The BJR has been deployed as a ‗doctrinal artefact for both conceiving and reviewing 
director compliance with‘ their duties as fiduciaries.
79
 Instead of elevating the directors‘ 
duties to be the focal point in judicially analysing director conduct,
80
 the Delaware Supreme 
Court has subordinated the duty of care for example, to become a mere ‗element of the 
rule‘.
81
 With ‗…care and loyalty alike relegated to secondary status as mere reflections of the 
BJR…‘,
82
 the most significant aspect of the Technicolor case was its ultimate resolution.
83
 
The directors were ultimately not held liable despite a finding of gross negligence because the 
transaction was apparently found to be nevertheless entirely fair.
84
 It has been argued, 
understandably, that the effect of this decision was to subordinate or even erode the 
importance of the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.
85
 The duty of care in particular has 
been consistently underenforced in Delaware,
86
 and even its few celebrated gains such as Van 
Gorkom
87
 are in danger of being reversed through a backlash from the legislature. As a 
                                                                
75
 Velasco similarly remarks that ‗courts are particularly skilled at evaluating procedural issues, which are less 
likely (although not entirely unlikely) to be issues about which reasonable minds would differ‘. See J Velasco 
‗A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care‘ (2015) 40:3 J. Corp. L 648 at 661 
76
 This is somewhat of a misnomer. 
77
 Johnson (2013) 38 Del. J. Corp. L 424. 
78
 See Velasco (2015) 40:3 J. Corp. L 681-682. 
79
 Johnson (2013) 38 Del. J. Corp. L 424 
80
 Ibid at 427. 
81
 Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc. (supra) at 366. 
82
 See CM Bruner ‗Is the Corporate Director‘s Duty of Care a ‗Fiduciary‘ Duty? Does it Matter?‘ (2013)48 
Wake Forest L. Rev 1027 at 1040. 
83
 See Velasco (2015) 40:3 J. Corp. L 682. 
84
 See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1179 (Del. 1995). 
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 See Velasco (2015) 40:3 J. Corp. L 682 
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 Ibid at 680. 
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 Smith v Van Gorkom 488 A.2d (supra). 
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response to Van Gorkom, the Delaware legislature enacted exculpation provisions
88
 directed 
at limiting the duty of care.
89
 
  The fact that what should be a standard of review enjoys a pride of place and has 
analytical pre-eminence in analysing director conduct in Delaware
90
 over directors‘ duties 
should be confusing to corporate lawyers from other common law jurisdictions. It is for the 
simple reason that directors‘ duties are and should be very central to corporate governance.
91
 
The duties are broader in scope and in their reach than the BJR.
92
 Whereas the BJR only 
applies to business decision-making,
93
 the duties apply whether or not a director‘s conduct is 
reviewed in court later.
94
 It is important to note that a corporate law duty, such as care, 
affirmatively requires action on the part of the fiduciary.
95
 If there are questions regarding 
whether that affirmative obligation has been fulfilled or not, it is at that point that the BJR as 
a standard of review becomes relevant and applicable. Thus, duties should retain a central 
focus and should be showcased, not obscured, whether in jurisprudence or when judicially 
analysing director performance.  
While objectionable but certainly not excusable, the primacy of the BJR over duties in 
Delaware is nonetheless understandable from a historical perspective. Apparently the BJR 
was a forerunner to the arrival or recognition of the duty of care in Delaware.
96
 Thus the BJR 
became so predominant in Delaware to the extent that it essentially became a doctrinal vessel 
into which the directors‘ duties
97
 became fitted and subsumed.
98
 For that reason Johnson 
                                                                
88
 Exculpation provisions are provisions which allow companies to eliminate or limit personal liability of a 
director. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, s 102 (b) (7) (2014) which authorises corporations to add provisions to 
their charters which protect directors against personal liability for breach of their duty of care – also see Velasco 
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 Ibid at 424. 
93
 BJR is applicable only if an identifiable business judgment is made. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 
(Del. 1994).  
94
 Johnson (2013) 38 Del. J. Corp. L 424. 
95
 See Velasco (2015) 40:3 J. Corp. L 678. 
96
 See an article by Justice Henry Ridgely Horsey ‗The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business 
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been on the bench in the Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc (supra) 345., explores the history of the development of  
the BJR and the duty of care in Delaware. According to Justice Horsey, the Delaware Supreme Court only came 
to recognise the duty of care in 1963, i.e. in the Graham v. Allis – Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A2d 125, 130 (Del. 
1963) – The correctness of this claim by Justice Horsey that the duty of care only appeared on the Delaware 
scene in 1963 is doubtful though, given the fact that in 1961, a Delaware court had held independent directors 
liable for gross negligence in Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585 (1961). The BJR, adds the claim by Justice Horsey, 
had been a key feature of Delaware jurisprudence decades before the recognition of duty of care in 1963. 
97
 Such as the duty of loyalty & the duty of care. 
98
 Johnson (2013) 38 Del. J. Corp. L 424 
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aptly describes the domineering role of the BJR vis-à-vis the directors‘ duties when judicially 
assessing directors‘ performance in Delaware as ‗an accident of history‘.
99
 A situation where 
affirmative obligations are less emphasised while a standard of review is over-emphasised 
should be seen to be jurisprudentially and doctrinally flawed.
100
  
 While Delaware is struggling to shake-off the effects of ‗the accident of history‘,
101
 
other jurisdictions such as South Africa who recently incorporated the BJR, should endeavour 
to avoid repeating the mistake of subordinating the duties of care and loyalty to the BJR. A 
director‘s duty, as a standard of conduct, should not be mistaken to be an element or 
‗reflection‘ of BJR.
102
 The BJR, itself a narrowly applicable doctrine,
103
 is better off viewed 
as a standard of review
104
 than as an umbrella concept for the broader reaching duties.
105
 
Conceptualising the BJR as a model for enforcement of the directors‘ duties
106
 and thus 
according it primacy while casting a shadow that pales duties into insignificance, is a mistake 
and it is indeed tantamount to putting the cart before the horse as explained above.  
 
5.2.1 BJR: A standard of conduct or a standard of review? 
  It is appropriate at this stage of the study to distinguish between the standards of 
conduct on one hand and standards of review on the other hand in the context of decision-
making in a company. This is vital given the fact that the central focus of this study is an 
inquiry into the effectiveness of standards of care, skill and diligence in the light of adoption 
of the BJR provisions under the Act.  
While the BJR is closely connected to directors‘ observance of certain aspects of their 
fiduciary duties
107
 and the duty of care, it will be incorrect to confuse it with a standard of 
conduct.  A standard of conduct informs how a director should conduct himself when 
                                                                
99




 As described by Johnson (2013) 38 Del. J. Corp. L 424. The overemphasis on the BJR in Delaware which 
has resulted in diminished emphasis on the directors‘ duties such as the duty of care is a result of the fact that 
the duty of care is a doctrinal late comer in Delaware and together with the duty of loyalty has become 
subordinated or even subsumed into the BJR.  
102
 See the criticism of Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc (supra) 345 by Bruner for making duties of care and 
loyalty a subspecies or elements of the BJR – see Bruner (2013)48 Wake Forest L. Rev 1040.  
103
 Johnson (2013) 38 Del. J. Corp. L 424. 
104
 See Velasco (2015) 40:3 J. Corp. L 682. 
105
 Johnson (2013) 38 Del. J. Corp. L 424.  
106
 Or as an organising framework  
107
 In the US, as is the case elsewhere, the duties to avoid a conflict of interest and to act in the best interest of 
the company coalesce to form the broader duty of loyalty to the company. Under the Act, the fiduciary duties 
involved are the duty to act in the best interest of the company (s76 (3)  (b)), and the duty to avoid conflict of 
interest in s75. 
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exercising the powers of a director, or when fulfilling the function of that role.
108
  A standard 
of review provides the test a court is to apply when it reviews a director‘s conduct.
109
 In the 
context of the BJR, this is done with the view of determining whether to impose personal 
liability or not on a director in the face of duty of care claims.
110
  The BJR was recently 
acknowledged as one of the standards of review available in Delaware.
111
 
The BJR is triggered when due-process allegations are raised against directors 
regarding their decision-making process. This happens when a litigant (usually a disgruntled 
shareholder) is unhappy with the results of past decisions taken by directors. A case before 
the court challenges the standard of conduct and allegations of failure of the expected 
standard of conduct are made. Due care,
112
 good faith (absence of conflict of interests) and a 
rational basis for decision-making (for example, a decision made in the best interests of the 
company) are examples of the expected standard of conduct. The court will have to apply a 
standard of liability test to determine whether a director indeed failed to meet the required 
standard of conduct in a manner that gives rise to personal liability.
113
 If the party that bears 
the burden of proof discharges that burden and proves the directors‘ failure to meet the 
expected standard of conduct, the BJR will not apply to protect the directors. However, if the 
party fails to discharge the onus of proof, then the BJR will apply. Now, in a nutshell, the 
above is the relationship between a standard of conduct and a standard of review.
114
 Recent 
cases in the US confirm the view that the BJR offers a standard of review.
115
  How this works 




                                                                
108
 S 76(3) of the Act is a clear example of a standard of conduct. It provides for how an actor should conduct a 
given activity or play a given role. See part 4.4.2 of Chapter 4. Alternatively standards of conduct can be 
defined to mean ‗rules addressed to actors, specifying expectations regarding their behaviour…‘ – see 
Velasco (2015) 40:3 J. Corp. L 651. 
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 Eisenberg (1993) Fordham L. Rev 437. 
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Branson (2011) SAcLJ  695. 
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 In Omincare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003), BJR as a standard of judicial 
review was said to amount to a common law recognition of the statutory authority to manage a corporation 
that is vested in the board of directors. 
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5.2.2 The BJR: A standard of liability, presumption of good faith in favour of 
         directors or a presumption against judicial review?  
 There are many suggested conceptions of the BJR which seek to provide an 
understanding of the philosophy behind and the approach to the BJR. There are at least four 
conceptions, and there is no space to consider all of these conceptions. Just to mention a few, 
there is the conception of the BJR as a standard of conduct or standard or review;
116
 the BJR 
as a standard of liability; the BJR as a presumption of good faith in favour of directors or the 
BJR as a presumption against judicial review. This discussion below will mainly focus on the 
conception of the BJR either as a standard of liability
117
 or as presumption against judicial 
review, because the two are clear opposites.  
 Standard of liability as a conception basically means that the BJR entails some 
objective review of the quality of the company board‘s decision.
118
 A cursory peep at recent 
court decisions in the US supports the view that modern case law tends to look at the BJR as 
a standard of liability.
119
 The Technicolor case is one of the best recent illustrations of the 
BJR as a standard of liability.
120
 The court in this case applied the Delaware formulation of 
the BJR -as 'a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation 
acted on an informed basis,  in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in 
the best interests of the company‘.
121
 . A plaintiff has to ‗rebut the presumption by 
introducing evidence either of director self-interest, if not self-dealing, or that the directors 
either lacked good faith or failed to exercise due care‘.
122
 The plaintiff in Technicolor , 
Cinerama, carried the burden to rebut the rule‘s presumption that the directors had acted with 
due care, in good faith and with loyalty. After the shareholder plaintiff had successfully 
rebutted the presumption, the burden shifted to the defendant directors to prove to the trier of 
fact the ‗entire fairness‘ of the transaction to the plaintiff.
123
 At that point, it appears as if the 
Technicolor board would be found liable of breach of their duty of care.  The application of 
the ‗entire fairness‘ test to what were essentially duty of care claims could have confused 
                                                                
116
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In coming to its decision, the court in Technicolor emphasised its approach to BJR as 
a standard of liability and relied for its process on Van Gorkom
125
 as precedent. The 
plaintiff‘s claim was also premised on the fact that directors of Technicolor had failed to 
comply with their Van Gorkom obligations.  Van Gorkom had established what can be termed 
the BJR requirement of procedural or process due care.
126
 To be precise, the court in Van 
Gorkom ruled that directors who ‗fail to act in an informed and deliberate manner‘ in their 
decision-making process may not assert the BJR as a defence to duty of care claims.
127
  It is 
for this reason that the Technicolor directors were denied the protection of the BJR given the 
finding by the Supreme Court of Delaware that they had failed the process due care test. Thus 
the BJR operated in the Technicolor and Van Gorkom as both a procedural guide for litigants 
and a substantive rule of law.
128
 This is evident in that after respective plaintiff shareholders 
had successfully rebutted the presumption in favour of directors, duty of care claims were 




Proponents of the doctrine of judicial abstention have been critical of the outcomes of 
most modern cases that approach the BJR as a standard of review. According to this doctrine, 
the court should abstain from reviewing the substantive merits of the directors‘ conduct, 
unless plaintiff can rebut the BJR‘s presumption of good faith.  Using Brehm v Eisner as their 
basis, the proponents argue that courts should apply the BJR only in the absence of self-
interest, lack of independence relative to the decision and gross negligence.
130
 Bainbridge has 
led such a chorus of criticism by going further to argue that the BJR should be applied to 
prevent litigants from arguing that directors violated their duty of care.
131
 Bainbridge is of the 
conviction that the duty of care elements should not form part of the triad of the traditional 
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considerations before a court decides whether the BJR is applicable or not.
132
 Bainbridge 
buttresses this point by emphatically stating that ‗the whole point of the business judgment 
rule is to prevent courts from even asking the question: did the board breach its duty of 
care?‘
133
 Bainbridge further posits that the approach to the BJR as a standard of liability as 
adopted in Technicolor and Van Gorkom puts ‗the cart before the horse‘ in that it allows for a 
substantive review of directors‘ conduct.
134
  The argument goes further to say that with 
authority resting in the directors to run the affairs of corporations, judicial review by courts 
should be the exception, rather than the norm.
135
 Limited judicial review in fact, it is argued, 
should be the norm.
136
  It is further argued that excessive judicial review would shift true 
authority from the directors to the court room.
137
   
The doctrine of judicial abstention can be criticised for good reasons. Firstly, the rule 
appears misguided in its appreciation of the origin of the BJR. While there is now what the 
Delaware Supreme Court has taken to calling a ‗triad‘ of fiduciary duties,
138
 the BJR 
developed alongside the duty of care as a common law standard of review.
139
 Hence the BJR 
is said to be most intimately associated with the duty of care.
140
 Therefore taking duty of care 
elements out of the equation is tantamount to destroying the very original motivation for the 
BJR.  Secondly, the argument by Bainbridge that judicial abstention should be the norm 
rather than the exception, threatens to confuse matters. The essence of BJR is that a court of 
law should decide, based on presumed conditions whether the rule should apply to protect 
directors against personal liability or not. Whichever approach to be adopted should lead to 
either a successful or unsuccessful rebuttal of a presumption by plaintiffs, which should lead 
to either application of the BJR or a result that the matter should proceed to trial.  
Despite its limitations, the BJR conception as a standard of liability or standard of 
judicial review is a better approach than a conception of the BJR as an abstention doctrine. 
There is a clear relationship between a standard of conduct and a standard of review, making 
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it easier for courts to apply BJR as a standard of review than as abstention doctrine. Under the 
BJR as a standard of review, there is at least clarity as to the process to be followed. It is 
known which party bears the onus of proof, and what follows after failure of the rebuttal of a 
presumption in favour of directors, or after the plaintiff successfully rebuts the 
presumption.
141
 The only criticism which may be levelled against the conception of the BJR 
as a standard of liability concerns the level or standard of negligence required. The rule, as 
can be discerned from case law,
142
 is said to move the liability bar from ordinary negligence 
to a lower standard such as gross negligence.
143
 Johnson is critical of gross negligence which 
he describes as a ‗permissive recklessness standard‘.
144
 This standard may however be 
explained by the fact that the original purpose of the rule was to protect directors from 
personal liability for mere negligence during the decision-making process. Otherwise, there is 
no protection for egregious violations of duty of care such as failure to be properly informed 
where information is readily available to inform decision-making, as was the case in 
Technicolor.  In addition the standard of gross negligence is the standard applicable for 
liability in case of violation of duty of care under US law, especially in Delaware.
145
 A 
jurisdiction that chooses to incorporate the BJR like South Africa will have to establish the 
standard of negligence applicable.  
5.3 SA courts’ experience with the BJR, international influence and law reform  
South Africa was influenced by English case law in its earlier limited application of 
business judgment doctrine. Developments in many parts of the world regarding adoption of 
the US-style BJR into statute, also got South Africa to debate the pros and cons of 
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5.3.1 Business judgment doctrine in SA prior to 2008: the common law 
  Even prior to 2008, South African courts followed the same approach as English law 
regarding the BJR, namely that the courts did not second-guess or substitute its opinion for 
management decisions made in good faith.
146
  In addition, South African courts accepted that 
a director is not liable for mere errors of business judgment.
147
 Courts further acknowledged 
the spectre of hindsight bias in the judiciary‘s ex post review of a risky business decision 
taken by directors ex ante, in the hope of reaping commensurate rewards for their 
companies.
148
 From a number of obiter statements by courts one can decipher from the 
common law a principle of judicial restraint and deference to the business judgment of 
directors.
149
    
In Levin v Felt and Tweeds,
150
 the court expressed the view that ‗it is not part of the 
business of a court of justice to determine the wisdom of a course adopted by a company in 
the management of its own affairs‘.  The South African courts have in the past therefore, 
albeit in just a handful of cases, demonstrated preparedness not to unjustifiably interfere with 
business decision-making of a company. This appears to be the case whether a business 
decision was made by directors, shareholders or creditors during a time when a company 
engages in insolvent trading as was underscored in recent cases. In  Howard v Herrigel,
151
 
and in another similar case,
152
 the courts  confirmed a policy of deference to directors‘ 
business judgments where this is desirable and justifiable in order to promote a spirit of 
enterprise.  
Given the statements as cited above, is there scope to ever think or assume that there 
is something that can be referred to as a South African common law BJR? Although it can be 
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said that prior to 2008 South African courts followed a business judgment doctrine,
153
 it is 
difficult to state that courts followed the BJR as applied now in Australia or in the US. Where 
the BJR is applied, it is my conviction that a jurisdiction must develop a clear approach. It 
must be easy to establish (from the empowering legislation) a relationship between the BJR 
as a standard of review and a standard of conduct. Statements made by judges during 
decision-making to the effect that courts do not second-guess management decisions, may 
only qualify as a business judgment doctrine, and not the BJR as established in earlier parts 
of this chapter. Therefore prior to 2008, South Africa did not formally provide for the 
application of the BJR.
154
In fact the term the ‗BJR‘ was not used in South African case 
law.
155
  Thus, it is safer to insist that there is no South African common law BJR to talk about 
prior to the Act.
156
 South Africa followed a business judgment doctrine, a watered down 
version of BJR. Nonetheless, South African common law‘s demonstrable preparedness to 
follow a principle of judicial restraint and deference to the business judgment of directors (as 
indicated above) is very important for the interpretation of s76 (4) (a).
157
 The BJR which was 
only introduced by the Act, will be discussed shortly.  
5.3.2 The BJR debate and rationale for inclusion in the Act  
There were basically two contrasting views regarding the suitability and necessity of 
adopting the BJR in modern South African company legislation in the late 1990s to early 
2000s. The King Reports represented a view in favour of including the BJR in a statute. All 
three reports contained references to the BJR, with the first two reports particularly 
advocating for inclusion of the BJR into statute. That the BJR is now part of the Act
158
 is 
clear evidence that the advocacy of the King Reports bore fruit. 
The motivation for the proposal for inclusion of the BJR by King I triggered an 
immediate and strong opposition to the prospect of a BJR in South African company law. 
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Most academic writers represented this opposite view, a view clearly not in favour of the 
inclusion of the BJR for various reasons. The reasons ranged from the perceived ability of the 
law not to second-guess corporate decisions to inter alia, concerns about the incompatibility 
of an American ―legal transplant‖ with South African law.
159
 Firstly, those who were opposed 
to the BJR were united in the view that the rule was unnecessary in South African company 
law. It was argued that South African courts have, over the years, allowed directors to make 
business decisions in a spirit of enterprise and have not sought to usurp the power of 
management where decisions are justifiable.
160
 It was further argued that the King Committee 
conveniently ignored this fact in making its recommendation in King I.
161
  
Secondly, the academic commentators were also in agreement that the motivation for 
limiting the duty of care by including a BJR in statute was premised on the King Committee‘s 
wrong understanding of the South African legal position. In King I the committee had argued 
that ‗particularly in the case of non-executive directors, their appointment is onerous in the 
context of the present tests of a breach of the duty of care and skill‘.
162
 It was thus argued that 
the King Committee had wrongly concluded that an onerous duty was imposed on company 
directors by the duty of care, skill and diligence. As argued, the fact that there is a paucity of 
cases where the duty of care was successfully enforced is well-known.
163
   
Thirdly, there were serious doubts as to whether a proper study of the legal position 
relating to the USA and the unique South African law on the duty of care had been properly 
done to safely import a ―legal transplant‖ in form of a BJR into South African company law 
without consequences.
164
 Fourthly, there was opposition to statutory adoption of the BJR in 
South Africa without a trial run. In the BJR‘s place of origin (the USA) attempts at 
codification of the BJR, a common law rule, had failed twice. It was thus seen as spelling 
future disaster caused by challenges such as a likelihood of incompatibility. A related point 
(fifth) is the different approach to directors‘ common law duties in the USA and in South 
Africa. South African law insists on the distinction between fiduciary duties and the duty of 
care, skill and diligence. Unlike other common-law jurisdictions, the USA is said to blur the 
boundaries almost with reckless abandon by lumping the two duties under a ‗fiduciary‘ 
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 something which distinguishes South African and USA company laws. Transplanting 
of a legal doctrine and importing it into a jurisdiction without proper investigation was said to 
be a risky affair.
166
  
The proposal made by King I to provide the BJR in order to limit the duty of care, was 
sure to raise obvious criticisms and fears.  The concern here was that a limitation of a duty 
which had already proved to be ―a very tenuous and risky foundation on which to found a 
legal claim against a director…‖ was a sure gateway to the further lowering of standards and 
limit enforcement of the duty of care, skill and diligence.
167
 The South African standards of 
care at common law were believed to have failed to meet commercial realities at the time.
168
 
The DTI Policy Document 2004‘s policy motivations for adoption of the BJR and 
general law reform leading to the Act were discussed in Chapter 4.
169
 The objectives form 
part of the rationale for adoption of the BJR under the Act.
170
 It was also believed that 
introducing the BJR was in line with the need to encourage particularly aspiring candidates 




5.4 Analysis of s 76(4) (a) of the Act – BJR provisions 
Despite the misgivings and pessimism with which the possibility of inclusion of the 
BJR into statute in South Africa was debated by scholars, the Act can now count among its 
many novelties, the BJR provisions, thus following in the footsteps of jurisdictions like 
Australia.
172
 Section 76(4) (a), it can be argued, partly contains a South African version of the 
BJR.  It provides as follows: 
In respect of any particular matter arising in the exercise of the powers or the 
performance of the functions of director, a particular director of a company— 
(a) will have satisfied the obligations of subsection (3) (b) and (c) if— 
(i) the director has taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed 
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                                          about the matter; 
(ii) either— 
(aa) the director had no material personal financial interest in 
        the subject matter of the decision, and had no reasonable 
                                                        basis to know that any related person had a personal 
                                                        financial interest in the matter; or 
(bb) the director complied with the requirements of section 75 
                   with respect to any interest contemplated in subparagraph  
                                                        (aa) and   
 
           (iii) the director made a decision, or supported the decision of a 
                                           committee or the board, with regard to that matter, and the director 
                                           had a rational basis for believing, and did believe, that the decision 
                                           was in the best interests of the company. 
 
To say that s76 (4) (a) evinces a BJR (which, arguably is correct) is a matter of 
interpretation really, based on the presence of the BJR elements akin to the BJR versions 
found in US and Australian laws.
173
 There is very little doubt that subsection 76 (4) (a) (i) – 
(iii) contains the BJR elements. It has to be noted, however, that s76 (4) (a), while it contains 
the typical BJR elements, appears to be distinguishable from the American and Australian 
versions. For example, whereas the latter two versions of the BJR focus on protecting 
‗business judgments‘,
174
 s76 (4) (a) appears to offer a wider protection
175
 and protects much 
more than business decisions.
176
 This is evident from the introduction to s76 (4) (a). That part 
provides that the subsection applies to ‗any particular matter arising in the exercise of the 
powers or the performance of the functions of a director‘. Impliedly the scope of application 
of s76 (4) (a) extends beyond what the traditional BJR seeks to protect – business judgments.  
For that reason the drafters of the Act appear to have carefully avoided use of the phrase 
‗business decision‘ and simply refer to ‗a decision‘ in s76 (4) (a) (iii).
177
 The fact that s76 (4) 
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(a) appears to provide wider protection to ‗any matter arising in the exercise of power or the 
performance of functions of a director‘ does not mean it excludes a BJR. What it could 
simply mean is that 76 (4) (a) cannot simply be limited to a traditional, American style BJR. 
With every analysis, it gets clearer that s76 (4) (a) applies to more than a traditional BJR.  
Thus care has to be taken to ensure that the subsection is not ‗boxed‘ into the same frame of 
interpretation given to the American traditional rule. The focus of the analysis below falls 
only on the BJR elements of s76 (4) (a).   
5.4.1 Relationship of the BJR to standards of conduct in s76 (3) (b) and 76(3) (c)   
It is clear from s76 (4) (a) that the BJR relates to only two of the three codified 
directors‘ common law duties under the Act. These are the duty to act in the best interests of 
the company in s76 (3) (b) and the duty of care, skill and diligence in s76 (3) (c).  It is to be 
noted that s76(4)(a), read on its own, appears to provide requirements which a director should 
meet when exercising powers given or performing her function as director in order to satisfy 
the obligations imposed by the two duties.
178
 In other words, as a fiduciary, the director ‗will 
have satisfied obligations of subsections (3) (b) and (c)‘ if he fulfils the requirements of the 
South African version of the BJR.
179
 
By expressing the link between obligations on directors imposed by subsections 76(3) 
(b) and (c) and requirements of the BJR, the Act is, arguably, revealing a relationship 
between a standard of conduct and a standard of review.
180
  In this context, subsections 76(3) 
(b) and (c) provide standards of conduct, while s76 (4) (a) provides the standards of review. 
For example, s76(3)(b)
181
 is a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the company. This standard of 
conduct seeks to ensure that the overriding factor in decision-making by directors should be 
the promotion of the best interests of the company or the success of the company. Thus, a 
decision tainted or infected by conflict of interests will not meet the requirement that the 
director must exercise the powers and performs her function in the best interests of the 
company.
182
 What is in the best interests of the company however, is a matter to be decided 
by company directors in the board room, and not necessarily by judges in the courtroom.
183
 
Thus the BJR requires the director to show that he believed rationally that his decision was 
likely to promote the best interests of the company. It is difficult to conceive of how the 
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requirement for rationality can exclude good faith.
184
 It does not appear as if the rationality 
requirement at present would necessarily cover cases of bad faith. The absence of a rational 
basis can be considered under English and as accepted in South African law, to be indicative 
of the directors‘ lack of good faith when making a decision.
185
 For the reason that a failure to 
meet the obligations to act in the best of interests of a company may indicate bad faith, it is 
unfortunate that s76 (3) (a)
186
 does not form part of the BJR scheme in s76 (4) (a). The point 
being made above, if it is to be summarised, is that the link between good faith and the duty 
to act in the best interests of the company shows that the legislature was wrong in not 
including good faith as a requirement for reliance on the BJR. 
With regard to obligations imposed by s76 (3) (c), the standard of conduct should be 
reasonable care, not slight care or anything less.
187
. Some writers have expressed concern that 
the BJR when viewed as a standard of review or liability moves the liability bar from mere 
negligence to a lower standard – namely gross negligence.
188
 An important question needs to 
be asked: Will the application of the BJR on the basis of s76 (4) (a) result in the divergence 
of standards as is the case in the USA? In Delaware,
189
 for example, because of the strongly 
non-interventionist philosophy underpinning the BJR,
190
 the rule is worded as a presumption 
in favour of directors.
191
 To succeed in a duty of care claim, a Delaware plaintiff carries a 
heavy burden of upsetting the presumption
192
 by proving that a board‘s conduct amounted to 
gross negligence, not just ordinary negligence.
193
 A closer examination of s76 (4) (a) 
however does not seem to suggest that a lower standard of review is envisaged under the 
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     directors, the BJR is designed to protect the authority of the board to govern the corporation without judicial 




 In Smith v Van Gorkom 488 A.2d (supra) at 873, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate 
      standard of review or standard of liability was gross negligence. In practice, this heavy burden may prove a 
      barrier to a plaintiff‘s prospects of success.  
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subsection. The subsection demands that a director should take ‗reasonably diligent steps to 
become informed about‘ the subject matter of the business decision.
194
 It can thus be argued 
that the standard of review is couched in more objective terms.  As already stated, the 
standard of conduct under South African common law is negligence.
195
 Despite the 
ambiguities associated with the drafting of s76 (3) (c) as observed in Chapter 4, the statutory 
duty can be interpreted to be equally providing for negligence as a standard of conduct. On 
this basis, courts of law should interpret and apply both s76 (3) (c) and s76 (4) (a) not to 
result in a divergence of standards.  
When it is alleged that a board‘s decision did not satisfy the obligations of subsections 
76(3) (b) and (c), a court of law will apply a standard of review in s76 (4) (a). This is a 
standard of liability or standard of review test whose purpose is to determine whether a 
director indeed failed to meet the required standard of conduct in a manner that gives rise to 
personal liability.
196
 If the directors meet the standard of review under s76 (4) (a), then that 
becomes their defence against liability claims. This is the essence of the BJR. I now turn to 
the requirements (components) of the BJR or the standard of review which must be satisfied 
either by a plaintiff or defendant. 
5.4.2 The components or requirements of the BJR under s76 (4) (a)  
For a defendant director to enjoy protection of the BJR against liability claims, or for 
a plaintiff to succeed in liability claims against defendant directors in South Africa, about 
three to four requirements of the BJR in s76 (4) (a) should be satisfied. These requirements 
are – informed decision-making; absence of disabling conflicts of interest (that is personal 
and familial interests); that a decision/ was made and that there was a rational basis for the 
decision, which amounts to a decision made in the best interests of the company. A brief 
discussion of each of these components follows below.  
 
(i) Informed decision-making 
Subsection 76(4) (a) (i) requires that the decision made by the director in the context 
of the company board should be an informed decision – a result of reasonably diligent steps 
taken by the director. The director and his colleagues are expected to have considered 
material information that any reasonable director in the shoes of the director(s) involved 
                                                                
194
 See s76(4)(a)(i). 
195
 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Commentary on Companies Act 190. 
196
 See McMillan (2013) Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev 529.  
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should have taken into account before making a decision.
197
 If no reasonable person in the 
shoes of the directors could have omitted the information which the directors whose conduct 
is impugned omitted, then the directors would have failed the test. The due care process 
requirement is that directors should carefully consider matters, including carefully 
scrutinising alternatives. 
  Where directors‘ knowledge is limited, the Act allows directors to consult experts and 
get expert guidance in order to make informed decisions.
198
 The board should also make a 
diligent search for information by requiring employees of the company to supply relevant 
information to guide decision-making by the board. If there are allegations that directors 
failed to take into account material information at their disposal, the inquiry is whether the 
directors should have ‗taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed‘.
199
 Therefore a 
defence by the defendant directors such as that they had little information to consider because 
company employees did not volunteer information is not a defence that can avail directors 
facing duty of care claims.
200
 Directors are expected to employ diligent means to ensure that 
they place themselves in a position to make an informed decision which serves the best 
interests of the company. The US case of Van Gorkom is persuasive authority for the 
assertion that directors who fail to act in an informed and deliberate manner may not assert 
the BJR as a defence against duty of care or other liability claims.
201
  
The use of reasonableness in s76(4)(a) means that an objective test is employed when 
reviewing the standard of conduct of a director who faces claims of breaching his/her duty of 
care. It should be noted that 76 (4) (a) (i) is phrased differently from s180 (2) (c) of 
Australia‘s Corporations Act 2001. Unlike the Australian subsection, s76 (4) (a) (i) does not 
necessarily require a director/prescribed officer to inform himself about the subject matter of 
the decision to the extent to which they reasonably believe appropriate. The phrase ‗to the 
extent to which they [the directors] reasonably believe appropriate‘ is not part of s76 (4) (a). 
The South African subsection requires a director to ‗have taken reasonably diligent steps to 
become informed about the subject matter‘ of the decision.
202
 This purely objective test is not 
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 A reasonable person‘s test is the test to be applied in the standard of review under s76(4)(a)(i. 
198
 See the reliance & delegation provisions in s76 (4) (b). 
199
 See s 76 (4) (a) (i).  
200
 In the US case of Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc 634 supra at 371, the Delaware Supreme Court identified 
several process failures by Technicolor (defendant directors), which amounted to a breach of duty of care. 
The court ruled that Technicolor directors failed to inform themselves fully concerning all material 
information reasonably available prior to approving the merger agreement with MAF. This failure included 
failure to make ‗prudent search for alternatives‘ and failure to acquire relevant information reasonably within 
the directors‘ reach before making a decision which affected the company.  
201
 Smith v Van Gorkom 488 A.2d supra at 871-872. 
202
 See s 76 (4) (a) (i). 
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diluted by subjective considerations regarding a director as is the position in terms of s180 (2) 
(c). S 76(4) (a) (i)‘s reasonableness requirements must be juxtaposed with s76 (4) (a) (iii)‘s 
rationality requirement which sets down a more subjective rationality requirement. Thus, s76 
(4) (a) (i) imposes a requirement that a director must employ diligent means to gather 
information and must be reasonably informed for decision-making purposes.  
 
(ii) Absence of disabling conflict of interests (familial interests included) 
S76(4)(a)(ii) lists as one of the components of the BJR under the Act, the requirement 
that a director must not have a ‗material personal financial interest in the subject matter‘
203
 of 
the decision. Materiality of a ‗personal financial interest‘ speaks to a significant interest with 
potential to colour or affect the quality of judgment or even sway judgment in a particular 
direction during a decision-making process.
204
 The interest should be ‗direct‘, to the 
exclusion of what may be indirect. It (the interest) should be ‗material‘ as defined in s1 of the 
Act. Impliedly, in order to determine what is material a court will need to make an objective 
assessment, and the outcome will depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular case 
under consideration.  Alternatively, a director, in line with s75, should make proper and 
honest disclosures. S 75 in particular requires that if a director has a personal financial 
interest in the subject matter of the decision-making process, or knows that a related person
205
 
is so interested, he/she is expected to make certain disclosures regarding such interests before 
the board meeting.
206
 The conflicted director is not allowed by law to participate in decision-
                                                                
203
 The term ‗material personal financial interest‘ is not defined as a composite term. However parts of the term 
     are defined in s1 of the Act. ‗Material‘ in this context means significant in the circumstances of a particular 
     matter, to a degree that might reasonably affect a person‘s judgment or decision-making. ‗Personal financial 
     interest‘ is defined in s1 to mean ‗a direct material interest of that person, of a financial, monetary or 
     economic nature, or to which a monetary value may be attributed‘. Such personal financial interest however 
     excludes interests held in unit trusts or collective investment schemes in terms of the Collective Investment 
     Schemes Act 45 of 2002.  
204
 If this were to happen, it would be contrary to the spirit of the fiduciary nature of the position of a director.  
     As stated by Mason J in the Australian case of Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1994) 
     156 CLR 41 at 103, ‗the fiduciary‘s duty may be more accurately expressed by saying that he is under an 
      obligation not to promote his interest by making or pursuing a gain in circumstances in which there is a 
      conflict or real substantial possibility of a conflict between his personal interests and those of the persons 
      whom he is bound to protect‘.  
205
 The term ‗related person‘ is defined in s2 (1) of the Act and includes natural persons romantically related, 
      such as married couples or even co-habitants. It further includes people separated by no more than two 
      degrees of natural or adopted consanguinity or affinity, & natural persons in such a position in relation to a 
       juristic person, as to enable those persons to exercise direct or indirect control of the juristic person 
       concerned. A juristic person is related to another if either of them directly or indirectly controls the other, or 
       the business of the other.   
206
 This may also be possibly done after the board meeting where circumstances justify this. See s75(5) (a)-(g) 
      of the Act for e.g.       
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making regarding a matter in respect of which he is conflicted,
207
 and should not even 
execute any document on behalf of the company in relation to that matter.
208
 If the company 
allows such a director to execute such a document, the company should have carefully 
considered the consequences of such indulgence or allowance. The purpose of s76(4)(a)(ii) is 
to prevent conflicts of interest which can disable the independent ability of a director and the 
entire board to make decisions which are in the best interest of the company.  
It has often been held in the common law that officers and directors are not permitted 
to use their position of trust and confidence to further their private or related persons‘ 
interests. The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the company demands 
that self-interest should not compromise or taint execution of duty.
209
  Directors are expected 
to be influenced only by what is in the best interests of the corporation when making business 
decisions. They should have the independence to decide in the best interests of their company 
rather than in any other person‘s or group of persons‘ interests.
210
  
Under the South African common law,
211
 a director‘s duty to avoid a conflict of 
interest is seen to be at the heart of fiduciary duties of directors.
212
 A director who owes his 
company a duty to perform in its favour should never place himself in a situation where his 
interests conflict with his duty.
213
 Conflicts that are known to potentially disable independent 
decision-making include direct pecuniary interests of the director, family interests, interests 
of business associates
 214




A subspecies of conflict of interest cases of relevance to the BJR in South Africa 
involve cases where directors lack independence when making business decisions.
216
 In the 
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 In other words, the director should recuse himself from the relevant board deliberations. See s75(5)(e). 
208
 See s75(5)(g). 
209
 See the US case of Guth v Loft, Inc., 5 A. 2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
210
 A director‘s duty in South Africa is to exercise an independent judgment and to take decisions in the best 
     interests of the company. See Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen & Another (supra) 




 Even though, Keech v Sanford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61 is related to trust law, it has influenced South African  
     legal principles with regard to conflict of interest involving a fiduciary. Also see Imageview Management Ltd  
     v Jack [2009] BCLC 725 at 739 (CA). 
213
 See Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 at 178-179. 
214
 See Branson (2011) SAcLJ 698.  
215
 For a perfect example in South Africa, see Da Silva v CH Chemicals (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 620 (SCA).  
216
 The tricky and possibly difficult cases involve nominee directors. Nominee directors represent the interests of 
      the persons who nominated them to sit on the board of directors. In law, however, even such directors are 
      nonetheless expected to promote the best interests of the company to the exclusion of interests of even those 
      they represent. In S v Shaban 1965 (4) 646 (W) 651 the court strongly discouraged nominee directors from 
      acting like ‗puppets‘ of those who nominated them, cautioning that South African law is not prepared to 
      countenance such conduct from fiduciaries.   
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USA these cases are referred to as ‗dominated director‘ cases.
217
 A plaintiff in a matter where 
a defendant director faces conflict of interest allegations may allege that some or all directors 
are dominated by a shareholder with a controlling interest or are under the sway of a 
domineering CEO. In the US case of Shlensky v Wrigley,
218
 the plaintiff Shlensky decided to 
challenge Philip Wrigley‘s refusal to install lights in Chicago‘s Wrigley Field baseball 
stadium. He opted against taking the entire board of Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. 
to court.  Shlensky‘s motivation to take on only Wrigley, the majority shareholder and 
president of the company
219
 was that the other directors were so dominated by Wrigley that 
they improperly acquiesced in his business decisions.
220
 Such influence on decision-makers 
disables independent decision-making. This becomes a conflict of interest because directors 
will make decisions which tend to favour a ‗related person‘ and not for the purpose of 
advancing interests of the corporation. This falls under the purview of the BJR requirements 
under s76 (4) (a) (ii).  
In the context of s76(4)(a)(ii) the Act covers conflicts of interests and requires a 
director not to be influenced by material personal and/or familial financial interests. 
Alternatively, a director should comply with disclosure of financial interests as required in 
terms of s75. If a director does not comply with requirements of s76 (4) (a) (ii) (aa) or s75, 
he/she will lose protection of the BJR. 
 
(iii) A ‘decision’ must have been made 
  Under the South African version of the BJR the requirement is that in order for the 
BJR to apply to protect directors in case of say duty of care claims, a decision or judgment 
must have been made by the board. Alternatively, a director should have ‗supported the 
decision of the committee or the board‘ with regard to a decision in question. The import of 
the suggestion that the director should have supported the decision of the board is not very 
clear. It could capture within its ambit a situation where a director who was not present at the 
meeting, may throw his weight behind a decision of the board, expressing his support, 
perhaps in writing.  
Regarding the ‗decision‘, s76 (4) (a) (iii) does not specify that it should be a ‗business 
judgment‘
221
, but simply a ‗decision‘. Can a business decision be said to be  envisaged by the 
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 Branson (2011) SAcLJ 700. 
218
 237 N.E. 2d 776 supra at 777-778. 
219
 This company owned the Chicago Bulls. 
220
 See Bainbridge (2004) Vand. L. Rev 96. 
221
 The Australian BJR version is clearer in this regard as it makes specific reference to a ‗business judgment‘ in 
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subsection nonetheless? Du Plessis makes the point that s76 (4) (a) provides a wider statutory 
protection to ‗decisions‘ of directors which ‗extend beyond business judgments associated 
with directors‘ duty of care, [skill] and diligence‘.
222
 I agree with that view. Indeed, s76 (4) 
(a) provides broader protection to directors‘ ‗decisions‘ than only business judgments. 
Nonetheless, business judgments/decisions are envisaged in the subsection.   
Is a decision not to make a decision, a decision by default under the Act? Some 
authors believe that a decision to refrain from deciding is a decision for purposes of the 
rule.
223
 It is however not crystal clear whether s76 (4) (a) (iii) can be read to imply that a 
decision not to make a decision is a decision.
224
 What is clear though is the fact that cases of 
inaction of the board where action is required or even a decision not to make a decision 
where this is unreasonable, will amount to an abdication of duty by directors. As a form of 
negligence or dereliction of duty, this falls squarely within the purview of breach of the duty 
of care.
225
 The BJR is thus inapplicable in such instances.
226
 The rule does not protect 




Part of the purpose of the BJR under South African law as is the case elsewhere, is the 
promotion of the quality and integrity of decision-making by company boards. This is of 
course in addition to such goals as allowing directors the freedom to manage companies in a 
manner that enhances productivity within companies. The Act expresses this goal as 
promotion of entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency, given the significant role of 
enterprises within the social and economic life of the nation.
228
 The corollary to the 
importance of integrity of decision-making by a board is the need for the decision to be an 
independent decision or judgment. This means that rubber-stamping a powerful or 
domineering figure‘s wish as was alleged in Shlensky v Wrigley discussed above, does not 
render the decision an independent decision. Under the South African common law, there are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
     s180 (2) (a) of the Corporations Act 2001. 
222
 See du Plessis (Part 2) (2011) 32 The Company Lawyer 381. The words in italics and brackets are my own 
     additions for purposes of emphasis only. 
223
 See Branson (2011) SAcLJ 697. 
224
 This is to be differentiated from Australian law which clearly defines a ‗business judgment‘ in s180 (3) as 
      any ‗decision to take or not to take action‘ in respect to a matter relevant to the company‘s business  
      operations. See Cassidy (2009) Stell L.R 403. 
225
 Which is a violation of the statutory duty in s76 (3) (c). 
226
 In the US case of Miller v Schreyer 683 NYS 2d 51 at 54 (App Div, 1999), it was remarked that ‗where the 
     wrong alleged is inaction of the board rather than a conscious decision…the business judgment rule is 
     inapplicable‘.  
227
 In this regard s76 (4) (a) (iii) is in agreement with US case law. See Cf Brane v Roth 590 NE 2d 587 at 592. 
(Ind. App, 1992). 
228
 See s7 (b) (i) & (iii). 
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a number of types of directors known to be active within companies who may fall foul of the 
requirement that they should exercise independent judgment during the decision-making 
process of the board. Nominee directors
229
 and puppet directors in practice find themselves 
following the instructions of their controllers during board meetings. This could result in 
either conflicts of interests as discussed in (ii) above, or could affect the quality of the 
decision-made by directors, if the majority of the directors could not exercise an independent 
judgment. In S v Shaban the court remarked that failure to exercise independent discretion in 
decision-making for the benefit of the company will be punished by courts as fraud in South 
Africa.
230
 The reason being that it will infect the ‗decision‘ of the board.  
 
(iv) Rational basis for believing that the decision was in the best interest of the company 
Closely connected to the BJR requirement that a business decision must have been 
made, is the requirement that there should be a rational basis for the decision, and for 
believing that that decision was made in the best interests of the company. The Act appears to 
treat this as a species of the requirement that a decision must have been made. This Study 
follows an international pattern of separating the two requirements. Both the USA
231
 and the 
Australian
232
 versions of the BJR deal with the two aspects separately.  The South African 
version of the BJR is reminiscent of the ALI version which requires that for a director to be 
protected, a court must find that the director rationally believed that the business judgment is 
in the best interests of the corporations‘.
233
 In other words, the business decision or simply 
‗decision‘ must have been actuated by a rational or legitimate business purpose. The BJR will 




 The ‗rationality‘ requirement under s76(4) (a) (iii) can have implications for the 
standard of review applicable. The subsection requires that a director should have a ‗rational 
basis‘ which is distinguishable from a ‗reasonable basis‘ to believe that the decision taken 
serves the best interests of the company. It is inconceivable that the legislature could have 
loosely employed a rationality requirement in s76 (4) (a) (iii)
235
 when it might have intended 
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 A nominee director can be defined as a director who was nominated by a shareholder or an entity which has 
to sit on the board of directors. 
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 S v Shaban 1965 (4) SA 646 (W) 652-653. 
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 See the American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure § 401 (c) (3). 
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235
 Through the use of the phrase ‗rational basis‘. 
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to employ the phrase ‗reasonable basis‘.  In s76 (4) (a) (i) and (ii), the legislature carefully 
employed the ‗reasonableness‘ requirement before intentionally shifting to the rationality 
requirement in s76 (4) (a) (iii). While the difference between ‗rationality‘ and 
‗reasonableness‘ may prima facie seem more apparent than real,
236
 it matters in corporate 
law. By ‗rational basis‘ is conveyed the sense of being simply logical, with the result that one 
may even make an unreasonable judgment, objectively speaking, but one which is not wholly 
illogical.
237
 Thus rationality is said to be rather a permissive test
238
 and may even be more 
accommodating of decision-makers‘ idiosyncrasies than the concept of reasonableness is 
prepared to. To be reasonable means to be objective, judicious and to be prepared to see the 
bigger picture or to consider other view-points.
239
 Reasonableness provides a more exacting 
(an objective) standard which demands a sharpened and tightened scrutiny than rationality.
240
      
There is room to argue that  s76(4) (a) (iii)‘s requirement that there be a ‗rational 
basis‘
241
 for believing that a decision is in the best interests of the company, imposes a lower 
standard as compared to subsections 76(4) (a) (i) and (ii). For example, s76(4) (a) (i) requires 
that a director should take reasonably diligent steps to become informed. S 76(4) (a) (ii), in 
addition to the director avoiding conflict of interest regarding personal financial interests, 
requires that the director must have had no ‗reasonable basis‘ to know that a related person 
had a personal interest in the subject matter of the decision. Thus the first two subsections 
employ reasonableness as a standard of review, while s76 (4) (a) (iii) employs the lower 
rationality standard.  
What was the rationale for framing the standard of review with regards to the 
fiduciary duty to which it applies, namely the duty to act in the best interests of the 
corporation,
242
 in the manner it was framed? In a recent judgment in Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v 
Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others Rogers J confirms that the correct view of s76 (4) 
(a) (iii) is that the duty imposed by s 76(3)(b) to act in the best interests of the company is not 
an objective one.
243
 Thus, the duty cannot in a sense entitle a court, if a board decision is 
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 As differentiated from a reasonable basis. 
242
 See s76 (3) (b) of the Act. 
243
 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others (supra) at 74. 
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challenged, to determine what is objectively speaking in the best interests of the company.
244
 
The rationale appears to have been intended to  serve two purposes. It was, firstly, to couch 
s76 (3) (b) in subjective terms to ensure that it remains the company board which has to 
decide what is in the best interests of the company, and not the judges or the court room.
245
 
The result being that even if with the benefit of hindsight, judges do not agree with the 
wisdom of directors‘ judgment after the fact, they are not entitled to substitute the board‘s 
judgment for their preferred choices.
246
  This is only the case if the director had a rational 
basis for believing that the decision was made in the best interest of the company. The 
standard in this regard
247
 is not reasonableness but rationality. In other words, the belief that 
the decision is in the best interests of the company need only be rational, not necessarily 
reasonable. To prove that the decision was in the best interests of the company,
248
 the 
defendant director need only to demonstrate that his/her belief is justified by a sensible 
reasoning process. It is important to note that the concept of rationality does not necessarily 
exclude elements of ‗reasonableness‘.
249
 However, a director‘s sensible reasoning process 
may be accepted as meeting the requirements of s76 (4) (a) (iii) even if it is not, objectively 
speaking, a convincing one.
250
 The second reason for the employment of the rationality 
requirement in s76 (4) (a) will demonstrate that the rationality criterion to be adopted by 
South African courts will have an objective flavour.
251
 This however does not imply that the 
courts will objectively determine what is in the best interests of the company.
252
 That would 
be second-guessing the business judgments of directors and our law will not countenance 




 This flows from the fact that the Act now formally recognises directors as the legitimate organ to provide 
      strategic leadership to a company, and thus to make executive or day to day decisions affecting a company.  
      See s66(1) of the Act. 
246
 This is one instance where the BJR recognises that judges are not business experts, and the decision as to 
     what is in the best interests is better left to directors who have the requisite mandate or expertise to make 
     such decisions (see the US cases of Cuker v. Mikalauskas (supra) at 1046 & Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.  
     (supra) at 684). Hence the rationale of the traditional BJR to avoid second-guessing the business judgments  
     of directors. In a South African case Howard v Herrigel (supra) at 676, Goldstone JA accepted that a court 
     will always be careful to take into account the fact that after the event ‗the knowledge of hindsight can be 
     misleading and give rise to unfair criticism‘ of the directors‘ decision by the court.   
247
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248
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      para 76. 
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 This is a decision that only directors can make, but of course they [the directors] 
should give a reasonable explanation of how they arrived at that decision. 
The second rationale for the rationality requirement in s76 (4) (a) (iii) is to reveal the 
nexus between the ‗decision‘ by directors and the purpose for which a directorial power 
exercised was given.
254
  The relevant inquiry has been held to be whether the decision or the 
means employed was rationally connected to the purpose for which the power was given.
255
 
As argued earlier in this part, the decision must have been actuated by a rational or legitimate 
business purpose. This brings s76 (3) (a) squarely into the purview of s76 (4) (a). Rogers J 
demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between the ‗duty to act in good faith and for a 
proper purpose‘ and the rationality requirement under s76 (4) (a).  In the words of the court in 
Visser Sitrus, there exists ‗a close relationship between the requirement that the power should 
be exercised for a proper purpose and the requirement that the directors should act in what 
they consider to be the best interests of the company‘.
256
 Interestingly in Visser Sitrus the 
court employed s76 (3) (a) as if the ‗duty to act with good faith and for a proper purpose‘ was 
a natural part of s76 (4) (a) and the BJR. This further goes to justify why this Study proposes 
to include s76 (3) (a) to be part of the BJR formulation subsumed under s76 (4) (a). My point 
is that the requirement of good faith and proper purpose should be part of the requirements of 
the BJR as is the case in the US and Australia as already outlined elsewhere in this Study in 
3.3.2 and 3.4.2.  
In a nutshell, the standard of review in s76(4) (a) is therefore not a uniform objective 
standard of review. It is partly objective,
257
 and partly subjective
258
 as demonstrated above. 
 An ancillary question which may need consideration is whether the standard of 
review in s76(4)(a) is more objective than it is subjective and with what consequences for 
corporate governance in South Africa. At this stage (and based on the above analysis), it 
appears that the BJR provisions have what can be termed a dual objective/subjective standard 
of review. Subsections 76(4)(a)(i) and (ii) emphasise considerations of reasonableness, which 
leads to an objective standard, while s76(4)(a)(iii) imposes rationality as a standard. As 
demonstrated above, the rationality requirement in s76(4)(a)(iii) imposes a less exacting 
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standard as compared to a standard of reasonableness in subsections 76(4)(a)(i) and (ii). It 
should, nonetheless, be noted that the subjective elements in s76(4)(a) do not have the effect 
of undermining the objective elements of the BJR in the subsection.
259
 If anything, the 
subjective elements have great potential to be interpreted to enhance the entire standard of 
review in s76(4)(a). The requirement that a rational basis must exist for believing that the 
decision is in the best interest of the company will have a positive impact on the standard of 
review as demonstrated above. A rational belief may be interpreted to be one that no 
reasonable person in the position of the director can conclude or hold
260
  
Where a court is called upon to apply a standard of review in a given case it will 
combine objective and subjective elements to espouse an exacting standard of review like 
Rogers J did recently in Visser Sitrus. For example, the process of being informed must not 
only be preceded by ―reasonably diligent steps‖.
261
 The director should have no reasonable 
basis to know that a related person had a personal financial interest in the matter.
262
 In 
addition there should be a ―rational basis‖ to believe that the decision taken is in the best 
interests of the company.
263
 
5.4.3 A summary critique of the BJR provisions in s76 (4) (a)  
While s 76(4) (a) undoubtedly shows great potential to enhance corporate governance 
in South Africa through an interpretation which is in line with the spirit, purpose and objects 
of the Act, some worrying gaps, inconsistencies and lack of clarity need to be resolved first. 
Where the criticisms which can be levelled against the BJR provisions under the Act have 
been alluded to in the above illustration, they will only be briefly explained below. 
The first criticism against the BJR provisions under the Act is that the rule is wrongly 
classified as a standard of conduct instead of being captured as a standard of review. This 
wrong classification of the BJR does not necessarily stem from provisions of s 76(4) (a) as 
demonstrated earlier in this Chapter.  S 76 is under the heading ‗Standards of conduct‘, and as 
already demonstrated in this Chapter, that title aptly captures the standards under s76(3), but 
incorrectly classifies standards under s76(4)(a).
264
  Those are standards of review and must be 
                                                                
259
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distinguished from standards of conduct under s76 (3) as already explained in parts 5.2.1 and 
5.4.1 of this Chapter. As will be proposed in Chapter 7, the title needs to be amended to read 
‗Standards of conduct and review‘.   
Secondly, the absence of a ‗good faith‘ requirement is a noticeable and inexplicable
265
 
omission in the formulation of the BJR in s76 (4) (a).  One glaring difference between the 
USA and South African versions of the BJR is the emphasis on the requirements of good 
faith elements in the USA rule formulation.
266
 S 76(4)(a) on the other hand tacitly excludes 
the requirement to fulfil the statutory duty of acting in ―good faith and for a proper purpose 
‖.
267
 S 76(4)(a) only makes reference to the duty of care
268
 and duty to act in the best interests 
of the company.
269
 By excluding ―good faith‖ elements, s 76(4) (a) also differs from 
Australia‘s Corporations Act  s180(2) which explicitly makes reference to ―making judgment 
in good faith and for a proper purpose‖. 
 The intention of the legislature in excluding good faith elements as a requirement of 
the BJR is somewhat surprising, when one considers the fact that reasonableness and 
rationality are intrinsic requirements of the South African version of the BJR. The lack of 
rationality or reasonableness in decision-making may be indicative of bad faith,
270
 which 
makes the requirement of good faith and acting for a proper purpose an important element of 
the rule formulation. Thus the omission of s 76(3)(a) from the formulation of the BJR under s 
76(4) (a) is unfortunate, in the absence of a justifiable rationale for excluding such a 
requirement. Good faith is a cornerstone of the presumption of no liability in favour of the 
director. Good faith and the general duty of loyalty to the company are like Siamese twins. It 
can serve as an effective test to determine the absence or presence of most of the 
requirements listed under s76(4)(a) (i)- (iii). Having good faith as a requirement will not only 
be useful to judges who have to determine whether the BJR is applicable. It can be useful to 
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attorneys when advising their client companies on whether they satisfied a BJR test or not 
since it is easier to develop a checklist of the presence of the BJR requirements using good 
faith. Therefore any future amendment of the Act should, in the absence of a rationale for 
exclusion, consider adding the requirements of ―good faith and acting for a proper 
purpose‖
271
 under the formulation of the BJR in s76(4) (a).  
The scope of application of the BJR under s76(4) (a) remains unclear. The scope is 
undefined and so wide that as has been argued by others, it ―applies to the exercise by 
directors of any power or the performance by them of any of their functions‖.
272
 Despite the 
wide wording of the type of decisions that will be covered by the BJR, its application is 
limited to breaches of clearly circumscribed duties. Breaches of s 22, for example or the 
provisions where solvency and liquidity test is relevant
273
, it appears, will not be covered by 
the BJR. The mere fact that s 22 deals with reckless conduct and that recklessness is 
determined with reference to negligence would not invoke the BJR. In this sense the law in 
South Africa is the same as in Australia. As in the US the BJR will apply in favour of 
directors where actions are brought against them on the basis of breaches of s 76(3)(b) and 
(c), even if this occurs in the context mergers.
274
.  
In Australia, the rule is said not to have been successfully applied to insolvent 
trading.
275
 It is however probably premature to come to a cursory finding that the same 
challenge will be experienced in South Africa. Only time will tell if there will be any future 
challenges with the application of the rule in any way. In the USA the rule has been very 
useful in take-over and merger cases.
276
 South Africa has had its fair challenges in this area, 
and of the law will prove useful in insolvent trading cases. The Act has provisions relating to 
solvency and liquidity test under the Act.
277
 It also has provisions which specifically prohibit 
insolvent trading.
278
 It is predicted that the BJR will be useful in this regard. It is vital at this 
stage to repeat the caution sounded in 5.4 above regarding s76 (4) (a). As observed therein, 
s76 (4) (a) provides a wider protection to ‗decisions‘ made by directors/officers in the 
exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions. The protection offered 
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extends beyond the traditional business judgments associated with directors‘ common law 
and statutory duty of care. This explains why the scope of application of s76 (4) (a) is wide.  
 
5.4.4 The BJR provisions- Highlighting the positives  
Despite the gaps and challenges identified above, the South African version of the 
BJR has some commendable features. For example, the BJR as a standard of liability or 
review goes a long way in promoting the objectives of the Act. The purposes of the Act 
which include the promotion of entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency
279
 as well as the 
need to encourage high standards of corporate governance
280
 find expression and meaning 
through the BJR provisions.  The BJR provisions in s76 (4) (a) seek to achieve this by 
promoting the integrity of decision-making through ensuring that directors are accountable 
for the exercise of their statutory and common law powers. The BJR also encourages 
informed risk taking, without unnecessarily discouraging the spirit of enterprise, and without 
stifling innovation, entrepreneurial activities and growth of local companies.
281
   
The BJR in South Africa can be interpreted and applied to serve as a fulcrum to solve 
the long-standing tension in corporate law between shareholders‘ interests of profit 
maximisation and directors‘ freedom to manage companies. Interestingly this forms part of 
the purposes of the Act. In this regard the Act aims to ‗balance the rights and obligations of 
shareholders and directors within companies‘.
282
 How do the BJR provisions in s76(4)(a) 
propose to achieve this? Importantly, subsections 76(4)(a)(i)-(iii) provide for requirements 
which must be met by directors if their business decision is to be protected against liability 
claims for breaching standards contained in subsections 76(3)(b) and (c). Directors are held 
accountable for breach of their affirmative duties under the Act.
283
  
Section 76(4)(a) can be read to be more stringent than the USA BJR version. For 
example, in the USA, a director and his/her decisions are protected from legal attack if inter 
alia, the director and his/her colleagues, in making a business decision, ‗exercised some (not 
necessarily reasonable) care in informing themselves about the matter decided‖.
284
  The 
South African BJR adopts a tightened approach, and requires that a director, whose conduct 
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is under review, should have ―taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed about the 
matter‖
285
 in order for the protection of the rule to apply. 
5.5 South African BJR version in practice–a guide to application and administration    
  The BJR provisions will be applied by directors, attorneys or legal advisors when 
advising their clients on corporate governance or in a case before the court. Courts will also 
apply s76 (4)(a) provisions to resolve disputes brought before them. The BJR provisions 
under the fairly new Act remain untested at this stage. It thus becomes imperative for this 
Study to predict how the application of the rule will pan out in practice and to ultimately 
propose a judicial policy towards interpretation of the BJR by courts. This part briefly 
considers points which are critical to the application and administration of the BJR in South 
Africa.  The first point pertains to the need to understand the BJR legal framework in South 
Africa. The second issue concerns locus standi. The third issue is about who bears the burden 
of proof when directors‘ business decisions are challenged before the courts. The fourth issue 
deals with the approach to be adopted by the courts – an inquiry into the approach which is 
decidedly in line with the BJR formulation in s76 (4) (a).  In Chapters 6 and 7, this Study 
points towards the development of a judicial policy for interpretation and application of BJR 
by South African courts.  
5.5.1 Provisions relevant to application of BJR – the legal framework   
This work has already alluded to provisions which will be applied in tandem with the 
BJR provisions in s76(4)(a). This key subsection itself makes reference to obviously relevant 
provisions pertaining to the standards of conduct which it implicates. Thus a proper 
understanding of the standards of conduct such as the duty to act in the best interests of the 
company in s76(3)(b) and the duty of care, skill and diligence in s76(3)(c) is vital. The Act 
also makes specific reference to s75 as an alternative to the requirement that the director had 
no material personal financial interest in the subject matter of the decision.
286
 S75 deals with 
the requirement that a director makes appropriate and timely disclosures regarding personal 
financial interests or interests of related persons which he/she is aware of. Of relevance to the 
BJR, such disclosures become necessary if the personal or familial financial interests will 
have a bearing or potentially will have a bearing on the matter to be decided at a board 
meeting.
287
 The manner of disclosure, the extent, the timing of the disclosure and the fact that 
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the interested director must not take part in business relevant to the subject matter of the 
meeting are all governed by s75.
288
   
 Section 66(1), as constantly alluded to throughout this Study, is a critical part of the 
provisions relevant to the BJR application in South Africa.
289
   This section posits the board 
of directors as the legitimate organ to run the affairs of the company and to make strategic 
decisions affecting the business of the company. Decision-making is often a risky exercise, 
and the reality is that even carefully made business choices may result in unintended 
outcomes.
290
 It is a known fact that judicial review of decisions made by directors, where the 
bad results are already known by the trier of the fact, may result in hindsight bias.
291
 Such a 
situation can be prejudicial to a well-meaning director who acted in good faith. The rationale 
of the rule is thus to protect company directors and officers from the risks inherent in 
hindsight reviews of their business decisions. S 66(1) is reminiscent of the policy rationale 
for one of the USA BJR formulations, namely the Delaware formulation.
292
 To the extent that 
the BJR in Delaware exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial 
powers granted to Delaware directors,
293
 it is similar to the purpose of the BJR under the Act. 
Thus s66 (1) recognises directors, and not the court, as experts in deciding on the best course 
of action when directing the business and affairs of a corporation. Hence the use of the 
subjective elements of rationality in relation to the director‘s belief that the decision made 
was in the best interests of the company.
294
  
The decision regarding what is in the best interests of the company is the directors‘ to 
make, and is not necessarily reserved for the court of law.
295
 As long as some of the 
requirements of the BJR are objectively met,
296
 the requirement that the decision is in the best 
interests of the company is to be protected if made on a rational basis. This is so in order to 
protect and promote the full and free exercise of managerial powers by directors. In light of 
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the above expose, an attorney, a director or even a court of law needs to understand the full 
implications of s66(1) and its relationship with s76(4)(a) before applying the BJR provisions.   






 of the BJR and 
standards of care, skill and diligence are more relevant to Chapter 6 of this study, and a more 
detailed discussion is reserved for that chapter.   
5.5.2 BJR in practice in SA: form, burden of proof & an approach in line with s76 
(4) (a) 
South African courts will have to establish which approach towards the application of 
the BJR in a case-situation is in line with s76(4)(a) of the Act. This implicates a good number 
of preliminary issues which need to be established first. In this regard it matters to establish 
first, the form to be followed by the BJR proceedings. Another important consideration in this 
connection is the question regarding who has locus standi (legal standing) to challenge 
directors‘ business decisions before the courts. This matter is more relevant to the question of 
enforcement mechanisms relating to the BJR and the duty of care, skill and diligence and is 
reserved for Chapter 6. Thirdly the question regarding who bears the onus/burden of proof in 
such circumstances also needs to be settled. 
The BJR is applied whenever a question is raised regarding the exercise of powers or 
performance of the functions of a director.
300
 Section 76(4) (a) commences by stating that a 
director would have satisfied his/her duties to act in the best interests of the company and the 
duty of care, skill and diligence, if that particular director satisfies the BJR requirements 
listed in s 76(4)(a)(i)-(iii). The phrasing of s76(4)(a) is critical to interpretation and 
application. Thus, whenever it is alleged that the statutory duties in subsections 76(3) (b) and 
(c) have been violated, preliminary inquiries in line with the BJR provisions must be made. 
Doctrinally the primary focal point (in s76(4)(a)) in judicially analysing director conduct has 
to be on standards of conduct in form of relevant directors‘ statutory duties. South African 
courts, when analysing director performance should avoid the error of according analytical 
pre-eminence to the rule. In the USA, this doctrinal error has unfortunately led to a 
diminished emphasis on directors‘ duties such as the duty of care, which is critical to 
corporate governance.
301
 In any event, in terms of s76(4)(a) the grounds for a court to impose 
                                                                
297
 See ss5, 7, and 158 of the Act for e.g. 
298
 See s77 of the Act. 
299
 See Chapter 7 of the Act, especially s 156. 
300
 See ss76(3)(b) & (c).  
301
 See Johnson (2013) Del. J. Corp. L 424-427. 
184 
 
liability on a director or for overturning a board‘s decision is proof by a plaintiff of a 
director‘s violation of a duty in either s76(3)(b) or (c) or both.     
The question regarding who bears the burden of proof in the application of the BJR in 
South Africa is an important one. It should be answered by paying careful attention to the 
language used in s76(4)(a). That subsection provides that a director ‗will have satisfied the 
obligations of subsection 76 (3) (b) and (c)‘ if the director has fulfilled the requirements of 
the BJR in 76(4) (a) (i)-(iii) as highlighted above. Thus the BJR becomes a statutory defence 
to be raised by directors who are facing litigation where allegations of breach of s76 (3) (b) 
and (c) duties are made against them. S76 (4) (a), unlike the Delaware BJR formulation, is 
not exactly framed as a presumption.
302
 The South African version of the BJR should rather 
be seen as a defence available to a director facing claims of negligence and breach of duty to 
act in the company‘s best interests. If the BJR is to be construed as a defence available to the 
director, then it follows logically that the director should bear the onus to prove the existence 
of one or all of the requirements of the BJR under the Act.
303
 Once the director has satisfied 
the existence of the BJR requirements, then the rule attaches to protect the director against 
allegations of violating s76 (3) (b) and (c). Once the BJR requirements have been satisfied, 
the director escapes into an ‗impregnable safe harbour‘
304
 and is protected against a full-
blown trial pertaining to claims of breaching the said director‘s duties. In this approach, once 
the accused director meets the burden of proof, the matter is closed and it will not proceed to 
full trial.  
The South African BJR provision, s76 (4) (a) shares similarities with Australia‘s s180 
(2) and the ALI Draft,
305
 both of which are safe harbour provisions. The nature of safe 
harbour provisions or statutory defences to liability claims is that they impose on directors the 
onus of establishing the presence of the rule‘s elements.
306
 In a recent Australian case, ASIC v 
Rich, Austin J ruled that directors should bear the onus to establish the preconditions in order 
to access the s180 (2) defence against duty of care claims.
307
 The court gave important 
reasons for clarifying the position regarding who bears the onus of proof in this regard. Of 
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relevance to South Africa are two reasons. The first one is that since the preconditions
308
are 
matters within the knowledge or reach of the director as a business manager, it was 
appropriate or even fair to require directors/officers to provide evidence of compliance with 
requirements.
309
  This onus of proof has positive implications for corporate governance. For 
example, this will build a culture where managers or directors will need to maintain accurate 
records to support the adequacy of the processes followed to arrive at particular business 
decisions. In the long run, this culture, it is hoped, will enhance the integrity of corporate 
decision-making processes. The second reason put forward by Austin J is that imposing the 




If the BJR under s76(4)(a) had been framed as or if ever it is to be interpreted to 
amount to a presumption of good faith in favour of the director, then the burden of proof 
would fall on the one who is challenging a board‘s decision.  Thus, a plaintiff challenging a 
board decision, for example, has the burden at the outset to rebut the rule‘s presumption. To 
rebut the rule, a plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence that directors, in reaching 
their challenged decision, breached subsections 76(3)(b) and (c). Evidence would have to be 
adduced that the decision made was not an informed decision,
311
 that there was a presence of 
disabling conflict of interests
312
 and that the decision was not in the best interests of the 
company.
313
 Under this approach, if a shareholder plaintiff fails to meet this evidentiary 
burden, the BJR applies to protect directors including corporate officers, and the decision 
they made. If the rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the defendant directors who should 




There is a risk or disadvantage associated with the ‗presumption‘ approach especially 
in the USA. Presumptions can be upset, with the implication that directors will have to go 
through the ordeal of a full-trial in an attempt to vindicate their decision.
315
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 That is, that the decision does not satisfy the requirements of s76(3)(c) of the Act. 
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 I have already made an observation in this part that s76 (4) (a) is not framed as a 
presumption in favour of a director. The subsection could be termed ‗safe-harbour‘ 
provisions in the mould of the ALI Draft or the statutory defence of s180 (2) of the Australian 
Corporations Act. Thus at the outset of the hearing, say into liability claims against a director 
for breach of s76 (3) (b) or (c), the defendant director may bear the onus to establish 
preconditions in s76 (4) (a) (i) –(iii) in order to access protection of his/her decision 
permissible under s76 (4) (a).   
5.6 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was stated as being to analyse the BJR provisions in 
s76(4)(a) of the Act in light of international experiences and the purposes of law reform and 
the Act.
316
 Three interconnected aspects had to be established, namely, the scope and content 
of the South African version of the BJR, and secondly, its implications on the relationship 
between a fiduciary duty and the duty of care. The corollary to this was an inquiry into 
whether the co-existence of a fiduciary duty and duty of care under the BJR could lead to a 
conflation of the duties
317
 with the concomitant consequence of diluting the effectiveness of 
standards of conduct.  Thirdly, this chapter sought to establish whether the BJR provisions 
have potential to enhance corporate governance by providing a mechanism to balance 
interests of shareholders and the directors‘ freedom to manage companies as required by 
s66(1).  
 With regards to the scope and content of the BJR under s76(4)(a), this work has 
clarified what the South African BJR version is and what it is not. The BJR requirements
318
 
compare favourably with formulations from international best practice jurisdictions. It has 
been established that the BJR in s76(4)(a) is a standard of review and not necessarily a 
standard of conduct.
319
 As a standard of review, the BJR provides a test to be applied when 
reviewing a director‘s conduct. It is applied in order to determine whether to impose personal 
liability or  not to a director who faces claims of breaching duties in s76(3)(b) and (c). 
Therefore, as argued in this work, the BJR is wrongly classified as a standard of conduct, and 
the title of s76 should thus be amended to read ‗Standards of conduct and review‘.  With 
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regards to scope, it has been established that there appears not to be any limitation as to the 
scope of application of the BJR under s76(4)(a).
320
  
 Part 5.4.3 identified several gaps in the BJR formulation in s76(4)(a) and that pointed 
towards possible amendments and an appropriate judicial policy to interpretation which is 
properly aligned to the purposes of the Act.. For example, the omission of the ‗good faith‘ 
requirements from the BJR formulation in s76(4)(a) and the fact that the scope of the BJR has 
not been made crystal clear require reconsideration by the legislature. 
  Despite the challenges highlighted above, South Africa has a BJR formulation which 
incorporates international best practice standards. The BJR in s76 (4) (a) has great potential 
to enhance corporate governance in several ways as highlighted in 5.4.4 above. There is an 
effective BJR legal framework in place aligned to the purposes of the Act which can be 
interpreted to encourage informed risk-taking without unnecessarily stifling innovation and 
enterprise efficiency.  
The BJR provisions in s76 (4) (a) are a fulcrum for balancing the usually competing 
interests of shareholders‘ profit maximisation drive and directors‘ need for freedom to 
manage. This is achieved through ensuring that the board of directors‘ position as the 
legitimate organ to direct the affairs of the company is statutorily secured in terms of s66 (1). 
Directors‘ freedom to manage companies is as of necessity counterbalanced by the need for 
them to be accountable for the exercise of the powers accorded to them in terms of law. It is 
also important that the Act also gives shareholders the right to challenge directors‘ business 
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 With the concomitant implication that BJR could potentially apply to all aspects of decision-making 
involving company directors and officers. 
321
 See derivative actions permitted by s165 (2). 
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CHAPTER 6: LIABILITY, INTERPRETATION & ENFORCEMENT OF 
                  STANDARDS UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 2008 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Study has hitherto analysed standards of care, skill and diligence in Chapter 4 
and juxtaposed the same with the standards of review (that is the BJR) as analysed in Chapter 
5. For these standards of conduct and review to be effective, they should be capable of 
application and enforcement. There is little point in formulating appropriate standards if such 
standards cannot be used as a means to improve directorial competence or if they cannot be 
made effective in order to enhance corporate governance generally.
1
 There are preconditions 
and/or correlatives for effective enforcement of standards.  Apart from the need for clarity of 
standards,
2
 enforcement demands knowledge of consequences of breach of the standards of 
behaviour,
3
 hence the basis of liability forms part of this Chapter. Enforcement also demands, 
as a pre-condition, a clear and effective legal framework for interpreting the empowering 
provisions of relevant legislation and related common law principles. There is also a need to 
identify enforcement mechanisms in the form of potential enforcers or those persons 
accorded locus standi
4
 by the Act to enforce standards.   
To this end, this chapter will focus on three correlatives, namely enforcement 
mechanisms for standards of conduct, the interpretation legal framework and the basis of 
liability for breach of standards.   
Where company directors fail to meet the standards of care, skill and diligence, they 
will be liable for breaching their duties in terms of common law as now subsumed by the 
Act.
5
  Directors, when exercising their powers and when fulfilling their functions in terms of 
common law and the Act,
6
 are expected to meet the requisite standards of conduct.
7
 This 
Chapter will partly analyse the legal basis for liability in South Africa for breach of 
directorial standards of care, skill and diligence, including added instances of liability under 
the Act.  
The standards in subsections 76(3)(c) and 76(4)(a) require legal interpretation for ease 
of application. Various law users and especially courts of law will have to give meaning and 
                                                                
1
 To this end I agree with a similar view expressed Finch. See Finch (1992) M.L.R 179. 
2
 Clarifying standards of conduct and standards of review were the twin goals of Chapters 4 and 5.  
3
 Finch (1992) M.L.R 180. 
4
 Legal standing. 
5
 See s77 (2) (b) (i) of the Act. 
6
 See s76 (3) of the Act. 
7
 See ss76 (3) (c) & 76 (4) (a) of the Act.    
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clarity to the relevant provisions when dealing with legal challenges. The standards of 
conduct and review are yet to be tested. As such there is very little case law to analyse in 
order to establish if courts‘ interpretation of subsections 76 (3) (b) – (c) and 76(4)(a) is in line 
with the purposes of the Act. There is now one case, namely, the Visser case which has 
already been referred to in this Chapter 5.
8
 This Study has undertaken to predict how courts 
are likely to interpret the standards in line with the interpretation matrix provided for under 
the Act and in tandem with rules of interpretation of statutes under South African law. A 
judicial policy towards interpretation will be suggested, and this will naturally form part of 
the recommendations of this Study.
9
 
  With regard to enforcement mechanisms, this Chapter attempts to identify possible 
enforcers of the standards established in Chapters 4 and 5. Focus will also be on locus standi 
as provided for in the Act, and how effective enforcement can enhance corporate governance 
in South Africa.    
 It is important to note that while this chapter may adopt more of a narrative approach; 
it lays a foundation for a proposal or a prediction of the future judicial approach or policy 
towards interpretation of standards of conduct and review under the Act.   
6.2 Liability of directors and other company officers under the Act 
The liability of directors and prescribed officers is discussed with the understanding 
that this work focuses on standards of care, skill and diligence and the BJR. As demonstrated 
in Chapter 5, the BJR also entails in its scope a fiduciary duty component.
10
 To that extent, 
where the BJR is ruled to be inapplicable by the court following a challenge of the board‘s 
decision, which challenge is predicated upon breach of a fiduciary duty, liability for 
breaching a fiduciary duty is thus implicated. Therefore, while the main focus will be on 
liability for breach of standards of care, skill and diligence, reference will also be made to the 
basis of liability for breach of a fiduciary duty.  
It is also vital to point to the legal provisions relevant to matters of liability under the 
Act, and implications of the language employed in the different provisions.  It is clear from 
the reading of the Act that instances of directors‘ personal liability have been broadened 
beyond common law. The consequences or implications of such a wider ambit is that 
                                                                
8
 See 5.4.2 above. 
9
 See Chapter 7 below. 
10
 See s76 (4) (a) (ii) & (iii) which entail such fiduciary duties as conflict of interests and duty to act in the best 
interests of the company respectively. 
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directors will find themselves potentially liable not only to the company, but to shareholders 
and any other person who is now permitted by law to enforce a legitimate right.
11
  
The main provision on director liability is s77, which generally provides a basis of 
liability of directors and prescribed officers. The ambit of who can be liable for breach of 
directors‘ duties under this section has been widened. Liability now attaches to members of 
the audit committee, alternate directors, any member of a committee of the board, regardless 
whether such  persons are members of the board.
12
  
In terms of s218 (2), any person who contravenes any provision of the Act is liable to 
‗any person‘ who has suffered an injury or loss as a result of such contravention. The ambit 
of s218 (2) is so wide that it can be applied to any person who contravenes the Act. Attention 
should be drawn to the use of the phrase ‗any person‘.
13
 Enforcement of a right following an 
injury to an interest is, by implication, not only reserved for the company as a separate legal 
entity and its shareholders. ‗Any person‘ who has suffered loss as a result of contravention of 
any provision of the Act can sue for damages as permitted by s218 (2). This provision is to be 
juxtaposed with s20 (6), which is a right only reserved for and to be enforced by 
shareholders, and is relevant to either a breach of a duty of care or a fiduciary duty.
14
  
6.2.1 Bases of liability for breach of the duty of care, skill and diligence 
(i) Common law basis as subsumed by the Act 
At common law, a director‘s liability for breach of the duty of care, skill and diligence 
is based on delict. The most applicable type of delict in this regard is the Actio Legis Aquilae. 
In terms of this delict, damages are claimed for the wrongful and culpable (intentional or 
negligent) causing of patrimonial loss. Proof of the following elements is required; conduct; 
wrongfulness, fault, loss suffered and causation.
15
 This position was confirmed in fairly 
recent cases. In Du Plessis NO v Phelps, for example, Friedman J confirmed the English law 
                                                                
11
 See ss218(2) and 165(2) of the Act which will be referred to below.  
12
 See the expanded definition of ‗director‘ given for purposes of liability of directors in s 77 (1) (a) – (b) of the 
Act. 
13
 S 218 (2) provides that ‗any person who contravenes any provision of this Act is liable to any other person for 
loss or damage suffered by that person as a result of the contravention‘. 
14
 S 20 (6) reads as follows: 
‗Each shareholder of a company has a claim for damages against any person who intentionally fraudulently or 
due to gross negligence causes the company to do anything inconsistent with – 
(a) this Act; or 
(b) a limitation, restriction or qualification contemplated in this section, unless that action has been ratified 
by the shareholders in terms of subsection (2).‘ 
15
 See J Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Law of Delict 6 ed (2010) 4. Also see N Bouwman ‗An Appraisal 
of the Modification of the Director‘s Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence‘ (2009) 21 SA Merc L.J 510.  
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derivative principle regarding liability for breach of duty of care as based on delict.
16
 Where 
there is a contract between a director and the company, liability is based on breach of 
contract.
17
 The company can recover damages flowing from either the intentional or 
negligent conduct of the director.
18
 
The common law position has now been subsumed under s77 (2) (b) of the Act. This 
subsection provides that a director may be held liable in accordance with the principles of the 
common law relating to delict for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a 
consequence of any breach by the director of the duty of care, skill and diligence.
19
 It has to 
be noted that in terms of the common law bases of liability of directors under s77(2) (a) and 
(b), the company is the primary enforcer of affected interests. The director may also be held 
liable for breach of any other provisions of the Act such as  s218(2) and s20(6) as discussed 
above, or any provision of the Memorandum of Incorporation (hereafter MOI).
20
 As such, it 
is not only the company that has legal standing to seek redress for injury to any of its 
interests. The common law right of any person to bring proceedings on behalf of the company 
has been abolished. However, a statutory derivative action now provides for expanded legal 
standing to compel the company to commence and continue legal proceedings or take related 
steps in order to protect the company's interests. Moreover, stakeholders have also been given 
wide-ranging personal remedies in terms of provisions such as s 218(2) and s 20(6).
21
. This 
has been made possible by s165 which provides for expanded legal standing to allow 
stakeholders or interested persons to compel the company to commence, continue legal 




(ii) Other statutory bases of liability for breach of standards of care under the Act 
Subsection 77 (3) provides an expansive list of instances when a company may 
recover losses, damages or costs arising from a director‘s failure to meet the required 
standard of conduct when exercising his/her powers and performing functions set out in the 
law.
23
 This is in addition to the common law basis of liability for breaching directors‘ 
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 (1995) (4) SA 165 (C) at 170. 
17
 See HS Cilliers, ML Benade, JJ Henning, JJ du Plessis, PA Delport, L de Koker & JT Pretorius Corporate 
Law 3 ed (2000) at 148. 
18
 Bouwman (2009) SA Merc L.J 510. 
19
 See s77 (b) (i) of the Act. 
20
 See s77 (b) (ii)- (iii) of the Act. 
21
 See Rabinowitz v Van Graan and Others (2012/26217) [2013] ZAGPJHC 151; 2013 (5) SA 315 (GSJ) (26  
    April 2013) for application of s218 (2) of the Act.   
22
 See s165 (2)(a) – (d) of the Act.  
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 The statutory bases of director‘s personal liability for breach of statutory duties are 
in line with the scheme of the Act.  
The bases of a director‘s liability to the company for injury suffered to its interests, listed 
in s77(3)(a)- (e) in some instances combine consequences for violations of both a fiduciary 
duty and a duty of care, skill and diligence. Where this happens, it does not necessarily imply 
that the legislature deliberately intended to conflate the duties.
25
 This simply shows that there 
are situations which reveal breach of both classes of directors‘ duties.  This is evident in the 
many instances provided for under s77(3) circumstances listed from (a) to (e). These are 
instances where a company may recover loss, damages or costs as a direct or indirect 
consequence of a director‘s actions which fall short of specific standards set out in the Act.    
6.2.2   Liability for breach of a fiduciary duty 
For the reason that this Study has considered the BJR, a brief consideration of the 
basis of liability for breach of a fiduciary duty is necessary. If a defendant director fails in 
his/her defence against claims that a board decision was not in the best interests of the 
company, then the matter has to proceed to a full trial.
26
 Where it is alleged that in coming to 
a decision, a director failed to satisfy one of the requirements for raising the BJR as a 
statutory defence, namely requirement of s76 (3) (b), then the director will face liability 
claims for breach of a fiduciary duty.  
It is important to note that the Act has broadened instances of director liability
27
 in as 
much as it has broadened the fiduciary duties of directors.  
 As similarly indicated in part 6.2.1 above, the Act now confirms the common law 
basis of liability for breach of a fiduciary duty. In this regard s 77(2) (a) provides that a 
director is liable in accordance with the principles of the common law relating to breach of a 
fiduciary duty, for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company. The injury suffered 
by the company, which gives the company locus standi to enforce its rights against the 
miscreant director, must arise from breach of duties contemplated in s76 (2), s76 (3) (a)-(b)
28
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 See confirmation of this in s77 (2) (b). 
25
 See part 5.3.2 under Chapter 5 for a discussion of the debate against inclusion of the BJR. One of the reasons 
raised by critics against inclusion of BJR in the Act was fear that it would result in the blurring of the 
distinction between a fiduciary duty and the duty of care. It has since been argued in this work that these fears 
are unfounded. 
26
 See part 5.5 under Chapter 5 above. 
27
 See s77 (3) of the Act as discussed above. 
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 It appears that the company is the proper plaintiff in case of loss, damages or costs 
suffered as a result of breach of the above-stated fiduciary duties. The corollary of this is that 
the director who is guilty of breach of such duties is liable to the company only and not to 
any other person. This position is distinguishable from the situation envisaged in s218(2) as 
noted in 6.2 above. Should any stakeholder desire to seek redress in respect of corporate 
wrongs arising from breach of any of subsections 75, 76 (2) and 76(3) (a) – (b), this is only 
possible through derivative action,
30
 but not personal action. This is the legal implication of 
s77 (2) (a).
31
   
  
6.3 Interpretation of s76 standards of conduct and review – the legal framework 
The Act only became operational in May 2011. S 76 remains untested at this stage. To 
the knowledge of the writer very little case law has developed... Interpretation of provisions 
will play a key role in clarifying meaning. 
 .  In Chapters 5 and 6, this Study promised a discussion of an interpretation that is 
aligned to the purposes of the Act. The task here is to clarify the method of interpretation 
adopted in this Study. This Study points towards the judicial policy for interpreting standards 
which South African courts are likely to follow when dealing with relevant cases in future. It 
is argued in this part that interpretation of provisions of the Act must not only be aligned to 
the purposes of the Act. Interpretation should be contextual in the widest sense,  and it must 
also be in sync with the normative value-laden constitutional framework given expression 
through objectives set in s39 (2) of the Constitution of South Africa. It should also be 
harmonised with international standards. 
6.3.1 Relevant provisions for interpreting standards   
  The Act has provisions relevant to the interpretation of standards of conduct and 
review. "Section 5(1), which concerns the "General interpretation of the Act" requires that the 
Act must be interpreted with reference to its purposes. Those purposes are set out in s7. Even 
though Chapter 7 of the Act
32
 is relevant to enforcement of standards (to be discussed in 6.4 
below), a part of the chapter, that is, s158 which is entitled ‗Remedies to promote purposes of 
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 S 75 provides for the requirements of disclosure of a director‘s (or any person who can be presumed to be a 
director in terms of s75 (1) (a)) personal financial interests. S 75 provides for directors‘ standards of conduct, 
despite the fact that ss75 (3)-(4) are not couched in peremptory terms unlike ss75 (5) - (6), and also despite 
the fact that s75 is not classified under standards of directors‘ conduct in s76.  
30
 In terms of s165(2) of the Act. 
31
 See a similar view expressed in Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law at 584. 
32
 Entitled ‗Remedies and Enforcement‘. See the Company Legislation Handbook  6 ed (2014) p168, published 





 is relevant to interpretation too. It provides guidance on what courts must do or 
consider when determining matters brought before them by litigants in terms of the Act.   
 
(i) A purposive/contextual interpretation is envisaged by the Act  
  Section 5 provides for interpretation of provisions of the Act to take place ex 
visceribus actus (from the bowels of the Act) or  as part of the more encompassing legislative 
instrument in which it has been included.
34
  S 5(1) in this regard states that the Act ‗must be 
interpreted and applied in a manner that gives effect to the purposes set out in section 7‘.
35
 
This is a text-in-context approach or a purposive approach distinguishable from the time-
honoured and now outdated orthodox text-based/literal approach to statutory interpretation.
36
 
In terms of the contextual approach, a statutory provision is viewed through the lens of the 
purpose of the legislation (the entire legislative scheme), and should not be construed on its 
own.
37
 The purposes or objects of the legislation are paramount considerations in the process 
of constructing meaning of statutory provisions. Thus the provisions of the Act at the centre 
of this study, viz, subsections 76(3)(c) and 76(4)(a) should not be interpreted in isolation, but 
in the context of the entire Act, as guided by the objects of the Act.
38
  
It is also vital to note that ‗context‘ is so elastic a concept that it demands a holistic 
approach to the task of constructing meaning of a statutory provision. The dictum of 
Schreiner JA in Jaga v Donges NO and Another; Bhana Donges NO and Another is 
instructive in this regard. The court remarked that context is ‗not limited to the language of 
the rest of the statute regarded as throwing light of a dictionary kind on the part to be 
interpreted. Often of more importance is the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and 
purpose, and, within limits, its background‘. 
39
 It is for this reason that when interpreting the 
subsections under review in this Study, the courts will be required to look beyond words, 
phrases or definitions within these provisions. Regard should also be had to the following 
                                                                
33
 Ibid at 169. 
34
 The term ‗the bowels of the Act‘ is an expression used by de Ville. See JR de Ville Constitutional and 
Statutory Interpretation (2000) at142. 
35
 Discussed in part 4.2.3 of Chapter 4.   
36
 In terms of the text-based approach, the interpreter concentrates on the literal meaning of the provision to be 
interpreted. The primary rule is that if the meaning of the text is clear, such a plain meaning should be applied 
and it is equated with the intention of the legislature - as remarked by the court in Principal Immigration 
Officer v Hawabu 1936 AD 26.  In terms of the golden rule, courts can only deviate from this where there is 
ambiguity in words. For more, see C Botha Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students 5 ed (2013) 
at 91. 
37
 De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation 142. Also see Botha Statutory Interpretation 97. 
38
 As set out in s7 (a) – (l) of the Act. 
39
 1950 (4) SA 653 (A) 662. 
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important considerations: the history of the legislation;
40
 the common law prior to the 
enactment of the Act; law reform or policy objectives;
41
 defects in the law not provided for 
by the common law;
42
 new remedies provided by the legislature and motivations for such 
remedies.  
A consideration of most of these factors is necessary were a court of law to arrive at 
the ‗mischief‘ that the legislature intended to deal with when enacting a particular statute. 
Here we encounter the ‗mischief rule‘. In terms of one of the common law presumptions of 
statutory interpretation, the legislature does not intend to enact invalid or purposeless 
provisions.
43
 In order to ascertain the ‗mischief‘ intended to be cured by a piece of 
legislation, it is thus unavoidable to view a provision which requires interpretation in the light 
of its contextual environment. In this construction, not only are the purposes of the Act in s7 
critical, but also what Botha refers to as the ‗intra-textual and extra-textual factors‘
44
 which 
must be ‗accommodated in the continuing time-frame within which legislation operates‘.
45
 
This is particularly important when interpreting subsections 76(3)(c) and 76(4)(a) of the Act. 
Both subsections contain critical innovations in the Act, namely codification of the common 
law duty of care and adoption for the first time ever of a US-style BJR.  
When interpreting these provisions to establish their purpose and the mischief 
intended to be cured, the courts will have to apply a holistic approach to statutory 
interpretation.
46
 This means that the courts will as of necessity, have to consider overarching 
constitutional values, international experiences in the interest of the future development of 
corporate governance standards in South Africa.  Legislation is forward looking and not 
back-ward looking and interpretation should take this into account. 
 
(ii) A court‘s role to harmonise the Act with relevant international experiences 
Section 5 provides that ‗to the extent appropriate, a court interpreting or applying this 
Act may consider foreign company law‘.
47
. The exact scope of the phrase ‗foreign company 
                                                                
40
 That is background to the Act, which may include the debates prior to the enactment of the legislation. See 
part 5.3.2 of Chapter 5 for the relevant debate prior to the Act.  
41
 Chapter 4 of this study discusses the policy objectives for law reform in part 4.2.3 as alluded to above. 
42
 Deficiency in the common law or existing statute is usually a strong motivation for law reform. 
43
 According to de Ville, this presumption is also referred to as ‗the presumption against redundancy‘. See 
Dorbyl Vehicle Trading & Finance Co (Pty) Ltd v Klopper 1996 (2) SA 237 (N) 241, referred to in de Ville 
Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation 167.  
44
 This refers to inside the statute‘s text and factors which lie outside and beyond the text. 
45
 Botha Statutory Interpretation 98. 
46
 A purposive approach will not only be resorted to in a case where a literal approach has failed.    
47
 S 5(2) of the Act.  
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law‘ may not be crystal clear. It should nonetheless be construed to include relevant foreign 
case law. It also includes reference to the persuasive value of foreign legislation .  
The purpose of s5 (2) is to bring an international contextual dimension to 
interpretation of provisions of the Act. It stretches beyond the national context, background 
of the Act or its objects – that is, the international experiences relevant to development of 
jurisprudence in South Africa. This facilitates the comparative aspect in statutory 
interpretation. Hitherto, this Study has considered international best practices in Chapter 3. 
South African standards of conduct and review have been compared with standards in 
Australia, the UK and USA.  A point was made in Chapter 3 that given similarities between 
standards of care in South Africa and Australia, South African courts may be able to draw 
some lessons from recently decided Australian cases on duty of care and diligence, as well as 
on BJR.
48
     
Even though s5 (2) is not couched in peremptory terms,
49
 it can be interpreted to give 
effect to one of the policy objectives for law reform, and indirectly, part of the objects of the 
Act. The relevant policy objective, as discussed in Chapter 4, is the objective of 
harmonisation of South African corporate law with the best practice jurisdictions 
internationally.
50
 This policy goal can be linked to one of the purposes of the Act, namely ‗to 
continue to provide for the creation and use of companies in a manner that enhances the 




(iii) Important considerations for courts when applying standards in s76 
  
Section 158 is an important provision for statutory interpretation of standards in two 
critical ways. The first is the promotion of the spirit, purport and objects of the Act. The 
second one is courts‘ duty to develop common law beyond precedent.   
Section 158 requires that whenever a court or any other forum applies standards to 
resolve a case before it, it must do so in a manner that best promotes the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Act.
52
 This ties in well with the purposive approach provided for by the Act in 
s5 (1) as discussed above. It is noteworthy that the Act borrowed the phrase ‗the spirit, 
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 See part 3.3 of Chapter 3 in this regard. 
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 See part 4.2.3 of Chapter 4 of this study. 
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 See one of the purposes of the Act listed in s7(e). 
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 from the interpretation clause in the Constitution.
54
 This is just one of 
the numerous examples of how the legislature sought to align provisions of the Act with the 
normative framework of values under the Constitution.
55
   
The second issue is the obligation of the courts to develop common law whenever it is 
clear to the court that the law is deficient to meet arising needs or new situations in the 
commercial world.
56
 Subsection 158(a) is couched in peremptory words, and provides that: 
When determining a matter brought before it in terms of this Act, or making an 
  order contemplated in this Act –  
(a) a court must develop the common law as necessary to improve the realisation 
  and enjoyment of rights established by this Act.
57
 
It can be argued that in terms of s158 (a), the duty of the court to develop the common law of 
company law is obligatory, and not optional. It may not even be necessary to derive this 
obligation in terms of s39 (2) of the Constitution. The broad thrust of the Act also leads to the 
conclusion that a court has a mandate to develop the common law. The value judgment must 
obviously be made by the court as the situation demands. While a court will have room to 
exercise discretion, there shall arise situations when this duty to develop the common law is 
obligatory, giving the court little leeway to opt out.  
The effect or rather implications of these two subsections is that the judiciary‘s 
inherent law-making discretion during statutory interpretation of provisions of the Act is 
recognised by the Act.  The courts may tweak or adapt the language and meaning of the text 
in order to align it with the purposes of the legislation.
58
 The first option in this regard is 
provided in s158 (b) (ii). In terms of this subsection, where a statute is capable of two 
meanings, the court ‗must prefer the meaning that best promotes the objects of the Act‘.  
6.3.2 Teleological interpretation–Impact of the Constitution’s normative framework 
 A teleological interpretation implies that the Constitution of the Republic, which is 
the supreme law of the land, provides a normative value system (or the context) against 
which all law, all actions, including decision-making processes are evaluated and measured.
59
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 As employed in s158 (b) (ii). 
54
 S 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which will be discussed in 6.3.2 below. 
55
 The first such sign of alignment with the enduring principles contained in the Bill of Rights is to be seen in 
the purposes of the Act. S 7 (a) provides that the Act must ‗promote compliance with the Bill of Rights as 
provided for in the Constitution, in the application of company law‘.    
56
 See s158 (a) of the Act. 
57
 The underlining of the word ‗must‘ is my own for purposes of emphasis only.  
58
 Botha Statutory Interpretation 99. 
59
 Ibid at 108. 
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There is authority in case law for the assertion that the adjudication and interpretation of any 
statutes in South Africa must be done ‗through the prism of the Bill of Rights‘ (hereafter, 
BOR).
60
   
A combination of constitutional provisions demonstrates why the Constitution 
provides overarching values and a broader context to guide interpretation of statutes. In terms 
of s2, ‗the constitution is supreme law…law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid…‘ This 
provision is supported by sections 7, 8(1) and 8(2). S 7 provides that the BOR is the 
cornerstone of democracy in South Africa and that the state is required to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights contained therein.   In terms of s8 (1), the BOR applies to all law 
and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of the state. The BOR, 
according to s8 (2) applies to bind natural persons as well as juristic persons such as 
corporations. Finally, the Constitution provides the interpretation clause (viz, s39 (2)), 
applicable to the interpretation of all legislation in South Africa since the advent of the 
constitutional era. All these relevant constitutional values collectively posit the BOR as the 
very embodiment of the value system against which the adjudication process and 
interpretation of statutes is to be evaluated. They find expression through s39 (2). 
 
6.3.2.1 The interpretation clause s39 (2) – ‘the spirit, purport and objects’ of the 
            BOR 
The Constitution is said to have changed the ‗context‘ of all legal thought and 
decision-making in South Africa.
61
 It has done this through a very key provision which now 
guides all statutory interpretation in South Africa – the interpretation clause in s39 (2). This 
clause contains fundamental values to interpretation of legislation and provides as follows: 
When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law 
or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
Important to note is the fact that s 39(2) provides for interpretation of ‗any legislation‘. This 
means that s39(2)‘s scope of application goes beyond the BOR. The interpretation clause 
applies to all statutory interpretation in South Africa. Section 39(2) thus provides ‗the starting 
point in interpreting any legislation‘, as pointed out by Ngcobo J in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) 
Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.
62
 It is further noteworthy that the 
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 See Langa DP‘s remarks in Investigating Directorate: Serious Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
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interpretation clause is couched in peremptory terms. Every court, tribunal or forum is 
obligated to and indeed must ‗promote the spirit, purport and objects‘ of the BOR during 
adjudication, when interpreting any legislation or when developing the common law. 
Whether a provision in a statute appears clear and unambiguous or not, the s39 (2) mandate 
finds application and must be fulfilled. In terms of s239 of the Constitution, where the BOR 
imposes a mandate, such a constitutional obligation must be performed diligently, timeously 
and without fail. This mandate is directed to ‗every court, tribunal or forum‘
63
 tasked with 
‗determining a matter brought before it in terms of this Act‘.
64
 
 While the Act provides its own ‗General interpretation of Act‘ provision,
65
 this 
legislative scheme or context is not the be-all-end-all of interpretation of provisions of the 
Act. It has been persuasively argued that the ‗spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights‘
66
 must be the starting point of all statutory interpretation in South Africa.
67
 What does 
the phrase ‗spirit, purport and objects‘ of the BOR mean exactly? Fully unpacking the scope 
of the phrase is beyond the scope of this Study. Suffice it to say though for purposes of this 
part, that this phrase refers to the fundamental values embodied in the BOR, which values 
must inform every action, legal thought and decision-making in South Africa. These 





 These are values which underlie ‗an open and democratic society 
based on freedom, human dignity and equality‘.
70
 South Africa has had a chequered past 
characterised by discrimination, unfair treatment and exclusion of parts of the population 
from certain services or part of the life of the unconstitutional state of apartheid.   The 
Constitution now contains aspirations to right the wrongs of the past.
71
 As such, now every 
law, conduct and decision making which can potentially affect people‘s enjoyment of rights, 
must pass the constitutional muster.
72
    
Since the spirit, purport and objects of the BOR must be promoted during 
interpretation of every statute, the courts fullfill a critical role as envisaged by the s 39 (2). 
                                                                
63
 Phrase used in s39 (2) of the Constitution. 
64
 Meaning the Companies Act 2008. See s158 of the Act. 
65
 In the form of s5 of the Act. 
66
 See s39 (2) of the Constitution.  
67
 See Botha Statutory Interpretation 101. 
68
 See s7 (1) of the Constitution. 
69
 See s1 (b) of the Constitution. 
70
 This phrase was employed in s36 (1) of the Constitution, and was repeated in s39 (1). 
71
 In this regard, see the Preamble to the Constitution.  
72
 Impliedly, if a statute is not properly aligned to the normative value-laden framework in s39(2), such a law or 
conduct based on such a law can be declared by a court of law, a tribunal or any similar forum to be invalid 
for inconsistence with s2 of the Constitution. 
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Judges are no longer mere referees whose task during statutory interpretation is limited to a 
mere ‗mechanical reiteration of what was supposedly intended by Parliament‘ as was the case 
during the days of parliamentary sovereignty.
73
 As guardians and enforcers of the values 
underlying the Constitution, the courts have to ensure that interpretation of provisions of the 
Act fulfils the objectives of s39 (2).
74
 In other words interpretation has to begin from s39 (2) 
and must comply with the normative value-laden framework of the constitution.
75
 The Act 
acknowledges the impact of the Constitution in interpretation of its provisions. This is 
axiomatic and manifest in that the first among the twelve purposes listed in s7 provides that 
the Act must ‗promote compliance with the Bill of Rights as provided for in the Constitution, 
in the application of company law‘.
76
   
6.4 Enforcement mechanisms for standards & remedies 
Having established the standards of conduct and review, liability of directors and 
other officers for breaching such standards, and the interpretation of relevant provisions, the 
next logical step is to consider enforcement of standards. Indeed it serves little point to 
formulate appropriate standards of care and review if such standards will not be enforced 
effectively.
77
 Part of the aspirations of the Act
78
 was to ‗provide a predictable and effective 
environment for the efficient regulation of companies‘.
79
 Predictability and effectiveness 
cannot only be predicated on clarity of standards and clarity of remedies. Other factors must 
be put in place. For example, it is vital to have sufficiently empowered potential enforcers. 
Such enforcers
80
 should be aware of the availability of civil or administrative remedies and/or 
criminal offences applicable for breach of standards.   
Enforcement usually takes place through appropriate forums or an apparatus which 
promotes efficient administration and resolution of complaints. In South Africa today, 
compliance with standards of conduct prescribed for company directors and officers is either 
on a voluntary or legislated basis. Under the old Companies Act of 1973, there was reliance 
on criminal sanctions to ensure legislated compliance. The new Act has however sought to 
                                                                
73
 See Botha Statutory Interpretation 102-103. 
74
 In terms of Schedule 2‘s item 6 (1) every judge of a court in South Africa, when taking an oath of office, is 
required to swear/affirm that he/she ‗will uphold and protect the Constitution and the human rights entrenched 
in it, and will administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance with the 
Constitution and the law.‘ This is a serious undertaking by judges to be guardians and enforcers of the 
Constitution. 
75
 Ibid at 108. 
76
 See s7 (a) of the Act. 
77
 Finch (1992) The Modern Law Rev 179. 
78
 See s7(i) & (j) of the Act. 
79
 See s7(l) of the Act. 
80
 Usually those with vested interests. 
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depart from a steadfast reliance on criminal sanctions, in preference for what has been 
referred to as a ‗system of administrative enforcement‘.
81
 While the Act has sought to 
decriminalise company law, it cannot be gainsaid that it has not scrapped criminal sanctions 
in toto. The Act has retained minimum number of criminal sanctions. This is in addition to 
administrative enforcement
82
 and civil remedies made available to certain persons upon 
infringement of their rights.
83
   
 In this part, and in line with the theme of this Study, I will look into factors which can 
potentially facilitate effective enforcement of standards as provided for by the Act. To this 
end, I will firstly consider potential enforcers or enforcement agencies. In this connection, an 
interesting development in the Act is the aspect of extended locus standi and how this could 
benefit enforcement of standards. Secondly, I give an overview of dispute resolution forums 
or avenues for addressing complaints on alleged contraventions of the Act. The Act provides 




6.4.1 Extended locus standi
85
, derivative action & effect on enforcement  
The Act contains provisions which have extended legal standing in form of s157 as 
read with s165 of the Act. Extended locus standi permits a wide range of aggrieved parties or 
complainants to bring matters or disputes before courts, the Companies Commission, the 
Companies Tribunal or the Takeover Regulation Panel (the Panel). The phenomenon of 
widened legal standing before courts or similar forums may be novel to company law in 
South Africa.
86
 It is however not entirely new to South African law in general. This approach 
was chiefly introduced by the South African Constitution in 1996. With reference to the 
BOR, s38 broadened the approach to locus standi. It introduced aspects such as class 
actions,
87
 permits an association to act in the interest of its members,
88
 allows a person to act 
                                                                
81
 Companies Bill, 2007 p 15. Also see Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 825. 
82
 See the Memorandum on the objects of the Companies Bill, 2008, Companies Bill [B 61D-2008] para 1 
referred to in Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law at 825.  
83
 See ss218(2) and 20(6) of the Act which were briefly discussed in 6.2.1 above.  
84
 In a nutshell, the four means of enforcing rights provided for by the Act are the following: application to the 
High Court; filing of a complaint with the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (the CIPC or 
Companies Commission); applying to the Companies Tribunal for adjudication and alternative dispute 
resolution.      
85
 Including derivative actions. Locus standi simply refers to the right or capacity to bring an action before court. 
86
 It is new in the sense that it did not form part of the previous Companies Act of 1973. 
87
 See s38 (c) of the Constitution. 
88





 and provides for the possibility of a litigant to act on behalf of a person 
who cannot otherwise act in their own name.
90
  
Now s157 of the Act is comparable to s38 of the Constitution in that it has 
considerably widened locus standi. In this regard, the subsection provides as follows:  
…the right to make an application or bring a matter [before courts or any other forum 
      identified in the above paragraph] may be exercised by a person – 
(a) directly contemplated in the particular provision of this Act; 
(b) acting on behalf of a person contemplated in paragraph (a), who cannot act in 
their own name; 
(c) acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of affected 
persons, or an association acting in the interest of its members; or 
(d) acting in the public interest, with the leave of court.‘91    
In addition to the categories of people identified in s157 (1) who can enforce rights or 
standards before courts or other forums, s157 (2) extends locus standi to the Companies 
Commission or the Panel.  These regulatory or enforcement agencies can exercise the right to 
enforce standards or to protect rights of individuals or interests of a company before courts in 
two ways. Firstly, a Commission or Panel in its discretion, may, upon request by a 
complainant, bring a matter before a court in order to protect affected interests.
92
 Subsection 
157(2) (a) envisages within its ambit, a situation where the Commission or Panel may 
commence proceedings before the court in favour of a party who filed a complaint with the 
regulatory body. The wording of s157 (2) appears to imply that this can happen even if the 
complainant may not have specifically requested the Commission or Panel to commence 
proceedings before the court or tribunal on its behalf. This is the implication of the phrase 
‗the Commission or the Panel, acting in either case on its own motion and in its absolute 
discretion‘, used in s157 (2) (a). However it seems logical that the Act should require a 
complaint and request from a complainant before intervention, and that the Commission 
should retain a discretion not to intervene despite a request and/or complaint.  Secondly, in 
terms of s157 (2) (b), the Commission or Panel may apply for leave to intervene as a plaintiff 
in proceedings before a court or tribunal. Such intervention can be justified by an allegation 
                                                                
89
 See s38 (d). 
90
 See s38 (b). 
91
 See s157 (1) (a) – (d) of the Act. Words in brackets and italics are my own addition for purposes of emphasis. 
92
 See s157 (2) (a). 
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by the Commission or the Panel that it is necessary in order to represent any interest that 
would not otherwise be adequately represented in those proceedings.
93
  
Section 165 creates further opportunities for the enforcement of standards of conduct 
through derivative action.
94
 While s157 provides extended legal standing to apply for 
remedies, s 165 grants the right of derivative action to a category of persons who are deemed 
by the Act to be sufficiently interested in enforcing or protecting company interests.  These 
persons include: a shareholder or any person entitled to be registered as such;
95
 a director or 
prescribed officer;
96
 a registered trade union or other employee representatives;
97
 or any 
person granted leave by the court to serve a demand upon the company to commence 
proceedings to enforce the company‘s rights.
98
 In terms of s165 (2), these persons are entitled 
to serve a demand upon a company to commence or continue proceedings against or to take 
related steps to protect the legal interests of the company. For example, if there is a director 
whose action
99
 is prejudicial to the company, and yet there is no initiative from the 
executive/board to take remedial action, a sufficiently interested person may serve a demand 
on the  company to take steps to protect its threatened interests in terms of s165 (2).    
A company may not ignore such a demand served on it in terms of s165 (2) without 
just cause. The Act permits the company to apply to court within 15 days of receipt of such 
demand, for the setting aside of the demand, if it so wishes. A court may only set aside the 
demand if it is satisfied that the grounds for the demand are frivolous, vexatious or without 
merit.
100
 If the company does not make an application to the court to set aside the demand, 
the Act prescribes that the company must institute an independent investigation into the 
merits of the demand. The results of the independent investigation should be reported to the 
company board.
101
 The Act sets time-limits for the board to take decisive action after results 
of an independent investigation have been communicated to it. The company has 60 business 
days after being served with the demand to either comply with the demand or to serve a 
                                                                
93
 See s157 (2) (b). Also see the Uniform Rules of Court (High Courts of South Africa), Rule No. 12 which 
provides for ‗Interventions of persons as Plaintiffs or Defendants‘ in GN R516 and GN R518 of 8 May 2009. 
94
 In terms of the Act, a derivative action can be understood not to only mean a right to bring or prosecute legal 
proceedings on behalf of the company. The Act gives a transformed meaning in that a derivative action can 
now be understood to be a right of any person placed in the category under s165(2) (a) – (d), to serve a 
demand on a company to commence or continue legal proceedings, or take steps to protect the legal interests 
of the company.    
95
 See s165 (2) (a). 
96
 See s165 (2) (b). 
97
 See s165 (2) (c). 
98
 See s165 (2) (d). 
99
 Which action might fall short of a standard of care, skill and diligence envisaged in s76 (3) (c).   
100
 See s 165 (3). 
101
 See s165 (4) (a) (i) - (iii). 
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notice to the person who made the demand indicating its decision to refuse to comply with 
the demand.
102
 This naturally opens the door for a process which may culminate with the 
person who made a demand commencing legal proceedings on behalf of the company to 
protect its interests.  
Extended legal standing and derivative actions are two clear ways through which the 
Act seeks to enhance the enforcement of standards of directors‘ conduct. The persons listed 
in the categories under subsections 157 (1) – (2) and 165(2) can thus be viewed as enforcers 
of standards. I call these persons potential enforcers of standards because the Act permits 
them to take action to enforce their rights
103
 or to cause the company to protect its interests, 
say, against miscreant directors.
104
 Subsections 157 and 165, by increasing avenues for 
enforcement have the effect of discouraging non-compliance with standards. Secondly, this 
makes companies accountable for violating provisions of the Act.  This is certainly in the 
interests of enhancing corporate governance in South Africa.   
6.4.2 Remedies & enforcement of standards under the Act: An overview 
 The Act has restructured old regulatory agencies and created new ones in an attempt 
to promote effective enforcement of its provisions. The Companies Intellectual Property 
Registration Office (CIPRO) has now been revamped to become the Companies Commission 
or CIPC. The Act has sought to decriminalise company law. It now predominantly uses a 
‗system of administrative enforcement‘ which is driven by the CIPC,
105
 while minimal 
criminal sanctions have been retained by the Act.
106
 The Act has designed a system of 
multiple forums for resolution of disputes, ensuring that those seeking remedies or to enforce 
their legitimate interests have a wide choice of forums. There is now the Companies 
Tribunal
107
 which is an innovative new central dispute resolution forum which serves as the 
adjudication arm within the new system of administrative enforcement of the Act. Other new 
regulatory agencies include the restructured Takeover Regulation Panel (the Panel)
108
 and the 
                                                                
102
 See s165 (4) (b) (i) - (ii).   
103
 This refers to personal interests in terms of s 157. 
104
 Through the re-conceptualised derivative actions.   
105
 See Companies Bill, 2007 p15. 
106
 The offences retained by the Act broadly include - breach of confidence (s213); falsification of records, 
reckless conduct & non-compliance (s214) & hindering administration of the Act (s215).  
107
 Established in terms of s193 of the Act. 
108
 Formerly the Securities Regulation Panel. 
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Financial Reporting Standards Council (FRSC).
109
 The High Court though, remains the 
primary forum for remedies, interpretation and enforcement of the Act.
110
 
 In tandem with its main goals of ensuring compliance with and enforcement of the 
Act,
111
  the CIPC administers investigations of complaints regarding alleged contraventions.  
The CIPC can either receive complaints from individuals for non-compliance with the Act 
(including directives from the Minister to investigate allegations) or it can initiate 
investigations on its own.
112
  At the end of its investigations, if the CIPC has not decided to 
end the matter, it can do any of the following to ensure compliance and enforcement of the 
Act: 
(i) Issuing of a compliance notice to a natural or juristic person to require the person to 
take necessary steps to correct or cease a reported contravention of the Act.
113
 Issuing 
a notice signifies that the CIPC is satisfied that a prima facie case exists, but that the 
contravention cannot otherwise be addressed by the court or Tribunal. 
(ii) The CIPC may refer the matter to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) for 
prosecution if it is an alleged offence in terms of s214 (3). 
(iii) The CIPC, the Tribunal or an entity accredited in terms of s166 may apply to High 
Court for a consent order (confirming its resolution of the matter).
114
 The CIPC may 
also apply to court for commencement of proceedings on behalf of a complainant 
against contravention of the Act.  
(iv)  CIPC may refer a complaint to the Tribunal for resolution, if the matter falls within 
the Tribunal‘s jurisdictional competence. The Tribunal fulfils a dual role as an 
enforcement agency. It adjudicates on disputes referred to it,
115
 and facilitates 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) upon application by aggrieved parties for 
mediation, conciliation or arbitration.
116
  
(v) The Act provides for notice of non-referral of complaint.
117
 Where no prima facie 
case has been established following a complaint, the CIPC will give this notice to a 
                                                                
109
 The FRSC is established in terms of s 203 of the Act. It is responsible for setting financial reporting 
standards for companies and ensuring alignment with international best practices – see s204. 
110
 Companies Bill, 2007 p15. 
111
 See s186 (d)-(e). 
112
 See s187 (2) (c)-(d).  
113
 See s170(1) (g). 
114
 See s167 (1) (a) read with s 173(1) (a). 
115
 See s195 (1) (a). 
116
 See s166 (1).  
117
 In prescribed form. See Reg 140 (2) & Form CoR 140.2. 
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complainant, declining to take any further action.
118
  This does not in way affect a 




  6.5 CONCLUSION  
The importance of this chapter is that it has explored ways in which the standards of 
conduct and review established in the earlier parts of this study can be effectively enforced. 
To this end, the chapter discussed the correlatives for effective enforcement. These include 
knowledge of consequences of breach of standards – liability; the legal framework for 




 With respect to liability for breach of standards, this chapter has established that the 
Act has broadened instances of directors‘ personal liability.  S 77 has confirmed the common 
law liability for breach of the standards of care, skill and diligence as well as breach of a 
fiduciary duty. The Act has opened room for more enforcers to enforce the Act whenever 
their rights are violated. The company is no longer the only enforcer of rights violated when a 
director contravenes a provision of the Act. Shareholders
121
 and any person
122
 who has a 
legitimate interest and/or has been injured can enforce their rights against a director for 
breach of standards of conduct.
123
  This development, together with the fact that the ambit of 
who can be a director has been expanded,
124
 can potentially assist in enhancing standards of 
corporate governance in the country. 
 This Chapter has predicted the judicial policy towards interpreting provisions of the 
Act
125
 in light of the fact that there is no big body of case law based on the Act as yet.
126
 It 
has been established that the purposive/contextual approach is the most appropriate method to 
                                                                
118
 See s173. 
119
 S 218 (2) – (3) ensure that there is no unfair limitation to the remedies available to an aggrieved party. 
120
 See part 6.1 above. 
121
 In terms of s20 (6) of the Act. 
122
 See s218 (2). 
123
 See part 6.2 above. 
124
 See definition of director in s76 (1) of the Act. 
125
 Including standards of conduct and review. 
126
 See introduction to part 6.3 above. This does not suggest that there have been no cases in which 
interpretation of the provisions of the Act generally has been considered. A few cases have been decided 
where courts have considered interpretation of the Act. Examples include the recent Ex Parte: Gore NO and 
Others (18127/2012) [2013] ZAWCHC 21; [2013] 2 All SA 437 (WCC) (13 February 2013), which case 
considered the interpretation of s20 (9). See e.g. para 32. The most relevant case to part of the Study is Visser 
Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) as aforementioned in 
Chapter 5. However, when applying s76 (4) (a) in analysing directors‘ decision-making when exercising their 
right to refuse to transfer shares, the court did not clearly articulate the judicial policy towards interpretation 
of provisions of the Act.  The court probably found it unnecessary to do so. 
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employ when interpreting provisions of the Act.
127
 Section 5 provides for interpretation of the 
Act from the bowels of the Act, and in a manner that gives effect to the purposes of the Act in 
s7. The contextual interpretation provided for by the Act ensures that the approach takes into 
account context in its elastic form. The context includes the entire legislative scheme, the 
background which includes the defects at common law which necessitated law reform. The 
appropriate interpretation method imposes on the courts the obligation to develop the 
common law whenever it is found to be necessary to do so in order to improve the realisation 
of rights under the Act.
128
 Consideration of the normative value-laden constitutional 
framework given expression through objectives set in s39 (2) of the Constitution is also key. 
It is a starting point to statutory interpretation in South Africa.
129
 It was further argued and 
established in this Chapter that contextual interpretation will give the courts a role to 




 This Chapter has briefly analysed the apparatus put in place by the Act for purposes 
of enforcing provisions of the Act, and thus improve corporate governance. To this end, this 
chapter has analysed the effectiveness of the multiple forums established by the Act to 
enforce rights and standards in order to ensure compliance with the Act. These means of 
enforcing standards include the revamped CIPC and the newly established Companies 
Tribunal.
131
 As established, these are means of ensuring administrative enforcement of the 
Act. While the Act places more reliance on administrative enforcement, which it is hoped 
will be more effective, it has retained a few criminal sanctions for selected contraventions of 
the Act.
132
 It has been suggested in this work that the Act has put in place, on paper, 
potentially effective means of enforcing provisions of the Act to fulfil one of the purposes of 
the Act. This purpose is to ‗provide a predictable and effective environment for the efficient 
regulation of companies‘.
133
 To this end, the CIPC will provide administration of 
enforcement of the Act. The Tribunal will fulfil a dual role. The first one is as the 
administrative adjudication body following contraventions of the Act. The second role is to 
provide a forum for conducting ADR processes.
134
 This is progressive and innovative in that 
                                                                
127
 See part 6.3.1 (i) above. 
128
 See part 6.3.1 (iii) above. 
129
 See part 6.3.2 above 
130
 See part 6.3.1 (ii) above. 
131
 Analysed in part 6.4.2 above. 
132
 See part 6.4.3 above. 
133
 See s7 (l) of the Act. 
134
 See part 6.4.2 (a) & (b) above. 
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it ensures quicker resolution of disputes. This is a welcome development given the reality that  





CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS – SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Study set out to answer the central research question whether the new Act can be 
said to have made the standards of care, skill and diligence more accessible, clearer, 
ascertainable and more enforceable in light of the incorporation of BJR.
1
 In this concluding 
chapter, the results of this investigation, including the steps followed to reach the conclusions 
arrived at, will be crisply presented. This should naturally culminate in specific proposals for 
law reform. The importance of each chapter in contributing towards an attempt to find 
solution(s) to the key research question and sub-inquiries will be outlined in part 7.2, a part 
that provides chapter summaries. Part 7.3 presents recommendations or proposals for law 
reform. Part 7.4 provides a brief commentary on the outlook of corporate governance in 
South Africa in light of law reforms and recommendations made in this study.  
7.2 Summary of Chapters: Highlights, Challenges and Opportunities 
 7.2.1 The research focus (the legal problem) and Hypothesis 





 for the Study. It was considered significant to have this Study at a time 
when South Africa, for the first time in history, has codified the duty of care, skill and 
diligence in a statute. In addition, the Act adopted a US-style BJR despite criticisms such as 
that the concept was a foreign legal transplant that was bound to negatively impact on 
standards. As already pointed out, these two aspects
4
  relate to decision-making, which is a 
critical role that a director has to play in the life of a corporation. Chapter 1 justified this 
Study by pointing out that the duty of care, skill and diligence is vital to corporate law. The 
duty‘s importance is evident in that it applies to all decisions directors make or should make 
were they to exercise their powers for the benefit of the company and its key stakeholders.
5
  
                                                                
1
 See part 1.3 of Chapter 1.  
2
 See part 1.4.1 of Chapter 1. 
3
 See part 1.4.2 of Chapter 1.  
4
 That is, the duty of care, skill and diligence and BJR. 
5
 Especially the shareholders, considered to be the residual claimants of the assets of the corporation. See part 
1.4.1 of Chapter 1. 
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The sub-inquiries to the key question identified in Chapter 1
6
 formed building blocks 
to the development of the main focus of the thesis as will be demonstrated under this part 
below.  
Every study begins with a supposition based on limited evidence as a starting point 
for further investigation. Thus my hypothesis was that BJR under the Act was undesirable for 
the reasons that it was incompatible with South African company law. I further assumed that 
BJR would operate to limit the effective enforcement of the duty of care, skill and diligence. 
My assumption had two bases. The first one being that even though the standard according to 
which the duty of care was measured under South African common law was not crystal 
clear,
7
 the law largely perhaps employs a less objective standard of liability than is to be 
expected in a modern era.
8
 This standard is a low standard, hence the paucity of cases where 
the duty of care was successfully enforced in South Africa.
9
 The second basis of my 
assumption was that BJR, itself a foreign concept from the USA, would be incompatible with 
South African law, given the USA‘s history of conflating a fiduciary duty and the duty of 
care.
10
 Hence the assumption that BJR would operate to blur the distinction between these 
two duties. This is something alien to South African corporate law wherein such distinction is 
celebrated.
11
 My hypothesis was tested by the evidence from the research and a critical 
analysis of relevant provisions of the Act.
12
 The present Chapter will demonstrate why the 
hypothesis could not completely stand the test of a critical examination of the research 
question. 
 
7.2.2 Conceptual Framework - Directors’ Standards of Conduct and BJR 
Chapter 2 laid down a conceptual framework to the overall focus of the Study, namely 
the standards of care, skill and diligence and the BJR. Important concepts such as corporate 
governance and BJR were defined. In addition, the expansive meaning of directors was 
given,
13
 while their legal status
14
 in a transforming corporate law landscape in the country 
was examined. 
                                                                
6
 As outlined in part 1.3 of Chapter 1. 
7
 See Bekink (2008) SA Merc LJ 95. 
8
 See part 4.2.1 of Chapter 4. 
9
 Ibid.  
10
 See Gregory (2005) Akron L. Rev 181.  
11
 See Jones (2007) SA Merc LJ  327.  
12
 See part 4.2.3 of Chapter 4. 
13
 See part 2.2.2 of Chapter 2. 
14
 See part 2.4.3 of Chapter 2. 
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 Corporate governance provides the context within which to discuss the focus of this 
study. Decision-making which implicates standards of conduct and BJR is a governance 
issue. As already highlighted,
15
 integrity of the leadership role of directors in companies in 
the decision-making process is a critical principle underpinning corporate governance 
regulation in South Africa.
16
 Directors have to make business decisions, at times under 
imperfect circumstances and while confronting tensions inherent in the corporate form.
17
 Not 
least of these tensions is the pressure to balance the profit maximisation drive from 
shareholders and accountability for how the directors manage broader stakeholder interests. It 
was pointed out
18
 that BJR is increasingly being seen as a fulcrum used to balance these 
competing concerns in the corporate form.
19
 Thus BJR provides a platform for the interaction 
of a standard of conduct (the duty of care) and a standard of review in the director‘s role to 
direct the business and affairs of a corporation.
20
 
The various definitions of BJR considered in Chapter 2
21
 agree that the concept refers 
to a standard of review whereby courts of law review directors‘ conduct using a set criterion 
provided for in the empowering legislative framework.
22
 It is left to Chapter 5 to make a case 




7.2.3 International best practices on standards of care and BJR: Lessons for South 
Africa? 
   
Chapter 3, a comparative study, provided invaluable insights or lessons which could 
enrich South African jurisprudence on standards of conduct and review, including 
interpretation thereof. Lessons for law reform or for improving the enforcement of standards 
have been drawn from comparators of choice in this study. The international experiences 
were drawn from Australia, the UK and USA.  
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 See part 2.2.1 of Chapter 2. 
16
 See South African Broadcast Corporation Ltd v Mpofu (supra) at 447. 
17
 See McMillan (2013) Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev.527. 
18
 See part 2.2.3 of Chapter 2.  
19
 See Norman & Di Guglielmo (2005) U. PA. L. Rev 1399 at 1424-1425. Also see McMillan (2013) Wm. & 
Mary Bus. L. Rev 528. 
20
 See s66(1) of the Act. 
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 See part 2.2.3 of Chapter 2. 
22
 See part 2.2.3 of Chapter 2. 
23
 See parts 5.2.1 and 5.4.1. 
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Possible lessons on standards of care, skill and diligence 
As already stated in Chapter 3,
24
 South African law shares a common law inheritance 
with both Australia and the UK. As such, law reforms in these jurisdictions will continue to 
provide lessons for the possible enrichment of standards of conduct in South Africa. The 
content of the duty of care in the USA and case law principles also have the potential to 
enrich the interpretation of the duty under s76 (3) (c) of the Act. Lessons from international 
best practices will now be briefly presented below. 
 
(i) Codification of the duty of care – lessons on clarity of the standards adopted   
 
South Africa has followed the examples of the UK and Australia of expressing in a 
statute directors‘ common law duties, as is the case in s76(3)(c).
25
 The difference is that while 
standards of the statutory duty of care under the UK‘s Companies Act 2006 and Australia‘s 
Corporations Act 2001 are clear, the similar standards under the Act are not as clear. As 
already established,
26
 due to the manner in which s76 (3) (c) was formulated, it is not easy to 
decipher what the exact standards are that have been introduced by the statutory duty of care. 
Can it be said that the standards are dual objective/subjective as is the case with UK law? 
Clearly, the standards are not purely objective as is the case with Australia‘s s180 (1). Hence 
the conflicting views in literature about the exact standards introduced into South African law 
by s76 (3) (c) as stated in Chapter 3.  
It is not easy to say whether a reasonable person standard/test applies in s76(3)(c) or 
not. While subsection 76(3)(c)(i) appears to introduce objective elements of care, subsection 
76(3)(c)(ii) undermines the objectivity of the skill test by asserting that the director need only 
meet the standard of a person having ‗the skill and experience of that director‘.
27
 This has the 
danger of reading even the objective elements of care down to the common law subjective 
standard. In contrast, law reform in the UK clearly identified the issue of the clarity of 
standards of care, skill and diligence demanded of directors as one of the  aspects of law 
requiring reform.
28
 It was decided by the Law Commission that the dual objective/subjective 
standards developed at common law and through s214 (4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 were 
                                                                
24




 See parts 3.2.3 and 3.3.5.  
27
 See part 3.3.2. 
28





 That fact is clearly reflected in s174 of the Companies Act 2006. 
Limb 2 in s174 as argued in Chapter 3, does not have the effect of undermining the objective 
standards in limb 1.
30
 A point was made in Chapter 3 that South Africa can learn from the 
UK in terms of providing clarity in the formulation of standards of care in s76(3)(c). As it 
stands and as already argued and established in Chapter 4, given the ambiguous drafting of 
s76 (3) (c), the current standards may be read to be subjective/objective. This appears to be 
contrary to what appears to have been the legislative intent as can be deciphered from the 
forerunner to s76 (3) (c), which was drafted alongside the UK‘s s174 of the Companies Act 
2006. Since the UK standards are objective/subjective, and Cl 91 (1) (a) was drafted 
alongside the UK statute, then the legislative intent must have been to introduce dual 
objective/subjective as opposed to subjective/objective standards. To bring s76 (3) (c) in line 
with what appears to be the true legislative intent, it is to be proposed under 7.3 below to 
amend s76 (3) (c) accordingly to give effect to the legislative intent. 
 
(ii) Clarity of the relationship between the statutory and common law duty of care 
 
A consequence of partial codification of common law duties is the need for a clear 
judicial approach on handling the relationship between the two duties during interpretation. 
The question which confronts the judiciary often is whether the statutory duty has superior 
status to the common law duty. Courts of law should not be unfairly left to deal with this 
dilemma on their own without proper guidance from the legislature. Afterall it is the primary 
duty of the legislature to make laws, while the courts have a duty to interpret  the law when 
applying it to a given situation. It was pointed out in Chapter 3 that the Act lacks a provision 
to clarify the exact relationship between the statutory duty of care and the equivalent common 
law duty.
31
  This is in stark contrast to international trends. Elsewhere where these two duties 
co-exist in the legal system, there is a clear provision to guide the judiciary on how it is to 
treat the two duties.
32
 S 77 (2) makes it quite clear that the relevant common law principles to 
both the fiduciary duty and the duty of care retain utility in terms of assigning liability to 
parties in case of breach of the duties.
33
 I am thus convinced that the common law principles 
will apply concurrently with the statutory duty. The role of the common law principles is to 






 See part 3.2.3. 
32
 See parts 3.2.2 and 3.3.2 of Chapter 3 for an analysis of how UK and Australian law has provided guidance on 
how the judiciary is to interpret or treat the interaction of these duties in a legal system. 
33
 See s77 (2) (a) – (b) of the Act. 
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serve as an aid to the interpretation of the statutory duty. Interestingly, with respect to the 
validity of company actions in s20 (7), the drafters of the Act demonstrated awareness of the 
need to provide clarity regarding the relationship between a statutory provision and the 
relevant common law principle.
34
 A relevant amendment is necessary for purposes of clarity. 
In Australia,  s185 of the Australian Corporations Act clearly provides that the 
partially codified common law duties
35
 apply together with the common law and not in 
derogation to or impliedly also not subordinate to equivalent common law rules . Thus the 
duty of care in s180 (1) for example is an independent statutory duty and has equal status to 
the common law or any equivalent duty. In the UK, s170 (3) similarly seeks to clarify the 
relationship between the statutory and common law duties of care. It states that even though 
all the codified directors‘ statutory duties are based on relevant common law rules or 
equitable principles;  they ‗have effect in place of those rules and principles‘. Thus under UK 
law, in case of any conflict between the common and statutory law rules, regard must be had 
to the natural language of the statute as the port of first call.
36
 This deference to statutory law 
has been held to be important in order to preserve the code‘s status as the principal law and 
not allow it to be undermined.
37
 
South Africa needs a subsection in the mould of s185 or s170 (3) to clarify the 
relationship between the statutory duty of care and relevant common law rules. Such a 
subsection should clarify whether statutory directors‘ standards in s76 (3) operate in 
substitution of, in addition to or whether they will override the common law. The question 
whether the common law still applies and what role it plays post partial codification of basic 
directors‘ duties is very important for interpretation of s76 (3) (c). This question is also 
important for the application of s76 (4) (a) which encapsulates the BJR. Will the BJR which 
clearly applies to statutory duties of care and to act in the best interests of the company also 
apply to the equivalent duties at common law?  A relevant proposal to close the gap in law 
will be made in this regard under part 7.3 below.   
 
(iii) Better understanding of the content of the statutory duty of care – lessons from USA and 
Australia 
                                                                
34
 S 20 (8) brings about this clarity of the relationship between the statutory provision in subsection (7) and the 
common law. It achieves this by providing that ‗subsection (7) must be construed concurrently with, and not in 
substitution for , any relevant common law principle relating to the presumed validity of the actions of a 
company in the exercise of its powers‘.     
35
 See ss180-184 of the Corporations Act 2001. 
36
 D Ahern ‗Directors‘ duties, Dry Ink and the Accessibility Agenda‘(2012) 128 L.Q.R 114 at 131. 
37
 See Bank of England v Vagliano Bros [1891] A.C. at 107. 
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  There are lessons to be drawn from US law and Australian case law on a proper 
understanding of the content of the statutory duty in s76(3)(c). Proper understanding of the 
content of the duty has a bearing on liability of a director who faces claims for breaching his 
duty of care, skill and diligence towards a company.  
In American law, the duty of care in s4.01 of the ALI Principles of Corporate 
Governance has been interpreted in line with case law principles to illustrate the leadership 
thrust of the duty.  It has been demonstrated in US case law that the standard of conduct is 
about a director‘s managerial responsibilities towards the company. Such responsibilities 
include the duty to care for the business of the company. This includes but is not limited to 
taking reasonable steps in playing a monitoring role to executive management using the 
monitoring procedures put in place by the company. Thus directors are expected to provide 
such care as an ordinary prudent man would be reasonably expected to give in a similar 
situation. All directors are responsible for managing the business and affairs of the 
corporation.
38
 As such, no director should abdicate their responsibility to provide oversight.
39
   
The sub-duty to act with diligence can be interpreted in US law to impose a 
continuing obligation on directors to keep themselves informed of the affairs of the company. 
In both US law
40
 and Australian law,
41
 this has been held to be an obligation to keep abreast 
of developments such as the financial performance of the company at material times.  
The sub-duty of skill under South African law can be equated to the content of the 
American sub-duty to be informed. This sub-duty entails an obligation of a director to place 
herself in a position to make an informed decision by being literate through acquiring the 
basic competence to discharge normal responsibilities of a director. As the work of a director 
involves reading financial reports and approving financial statements relating to a company‘s 
financial performance, this includes a basic ability to read and understand such documents.
42
 
Thus even in a developing country like South Africa, a member of the BRICS,
43
 there is a 
                                                                
38
 See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, (supra) at 823-824. 
39
 See Eisenberg (1990) Uni of Pitt L. Rev 945. 
40
 See Rankin v Cooper (supra) at 1013. 
41
 See the Adler case (supra) at 253 referred to in part 3.3.1 of Chapter 3.  
42
 See Francis v. United Jersey Bank (supra) at 821-822 where Pollock J remarked that as a general rule a 
director (in America) should acquire at least a rudimentary understanding of the corporation. In the Australian 
Centro case the court similarly held that there is a positive duty on directors to have a basic financial literacy 
to enable them to read and understand financial statements. 
43
 BRICS is an acronym of five emerging economies in the world. It stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa.  The common characteristics include the fact that these are large, fast-growing developing or 
newly industrialised economies or countries.    See ‗BRICS - Objectives, Summits, Need and Disparities‘ 
available at http://www.careerride.com/view.aspx?id=19744 accessed on 26 July 2015.  
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demand for high corporate governance practices as a prerequisite for investment promotion.
44
 
It can no longer be business as usual. South Africa has since recognised the need to provide 
for a predictable and effective regulatory environment. This is vital to enable the country to 
be globally competitive and attract the much-needed investment inflows into the country. The 
sub-duty of skill should be interpreted to include a positive duty on all directors of big 
corporations in South Africa to acquire basic competences to place themselves in a position 
to effectively guide and monitor company affairs.  
This way of looking at the content of the duty of care, skill and diligence in American  
and Australian case law will certainly influence positively the interpretation of the statutory 
duty in s76(3)(c) by South African courts. The Act has a mechanism which allows courts of 
law to look to foreign case law during interpretation of provisions of the Act,
45
 as will be 
highlighted in part 7.2.6 below.   
(iv) Delegation and reliance on others for performance – lessons from foreign case law 
 
 It is vital to point out that South Africa has confirmed in the Act the common law 
position regarding delegation and reliance.
46
 Australian courts have recently confirmed a 
modern approach to reliance and delegation. The maxim delegatus non potest delegare – 
meaning that a fiduciary may not delegate his job or duty, but only some powers/authority to 
company servants necessary for performing it, has been confirmed in various Australian 
cases. The firm approach is that directors cannot substitute reliance upon the advice of 
management in place of their own attention and examination of a strategic matter that falls 
within the board‘s responsibility.
47
 South African case law also seems to agree that a director 
remains accountable for the exercise of delegated authority.
48
 The Act also confirms this, 








                                                                
44
 See s 7 (b)(iii) & (c). 
45
 See part 6.3.1 in Chapter 6. 
46
 See part 4.5 for a discussion of delegation and reliance under the Act. 
47
 See the Centro case (supra) at 175. Also see part 3.3.1 of Chapter 3 for a discussion of other cases which 
confirm the position in the Centro case.  
48
 See Barlows Manufacturing (supra) at 611 referred to in part 4.5.1 under Chapter 4. 
49
 S 72 (3) provides that ‗the creation of a committee, delegation of any power to a committee, or action taken 
by a committee, does not alone satisfy or constitute compliance by a director with the required duty of a director 
to the company, as set out in section 76‘.   
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Lessons from the BJR international experiences 
As highlighted in this study,
50
 the BJR provision is a new innovation in South African 
statutory law. No case law has developed to gauge how the provisions of s76(4)(a) will be 
applied and to see the results of the BJR‘s interaction with standards of care, skill and 
diligence. Therefore international experiences regarding the scope, rationale for and 
application of the BJR will prove instructive to the development of jurisprudence in South 
Africa. Australian experiences with the adoption of BJR and the case law principles evolving 
from application of the rule provide a useful guide to South African courts. The USA is the 
place of origin of BJR and has a rich source of case law principles to learn from.   
In a snapshot, the following are lessons South Africa can derive from international 
experiences with application of BJR: 
 
(i) The requirements or content of BJR (good faith, care and loyalty)  
 
International trends point towards the content or triad of the BJR as concerning the 
closely related elements of good faith, care and loyalty towards the company. In the 
Australian BJR version, a director‘s duty to act in ‗good faith for a proper purpose‘ is a key 
part of the requirements of the rule formulation.
51
 Similarly, the traditional American BJR 
formulations reveal the central role that good faith plays in the rule.
52
  Good faith is 
conspicuously absent in the BJR formulation under 76(4) (a). In fact, a proper reading of s76 
(4) (a) reveals a deliberate intention by drafters to specifically exclude good faith from the 
BJR formulation. This exclusion of good faith under the Act is inexplicable, especially given 
the absence of rationale to justify the exclusion. Good faith is considered an umbrella 
requirement. It has also been aptly described as a ‗surrogate of sorts‘ for the test to be applied 
when determining the presence or absence of key BJR elements such as conflict of interests 
or ill-motives for the business decision.
53
 Absence of good faith in the conduct of a director 
has been held by English cases to be indicative of the possibility of a director not having 
acted in the best interests of the company. Thus it is very unfortunate that s76 (4) (a) excludes 
good faith in the formulation of BJR. With the benefit of these international experiences and 
                                                                
50
 See part 5.1 of Chapter 5. 
51
 See s180 (2) (a) of the Corporations Act 2001 discussed in part 3.3.2 of Chapter 3 as part of the Australian 
statutory BJR formulation. 
52
 See part 3.4.2 of Chapter 3 for a discussion of the ‗USA traditional formulations of BJR‘. In the ALI 
formulation, it is assumed that a director must make a business judgment in good faith. Under the Delaware 
formulation of the rule, BJR is formulated as a presumption of good faith in favour of directors. Further see 
Aronson v Lewis (supra) at 812.     
53
 Branson (2011) SAcLJ  702-704. 
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trends it will be proposed that good faith be added to the rule formulation to form part of the 
requirements for the BJR.  
If the rationale for exclusion of good faith is for fear that the ‗proper purpose‘ part of 
the duty in 76(3)(a) may affect the applicability of BJR to insolvent trading  as happened in 
Australia,
54
 there is a way of avoiding that anomaly. One way of doing this would be to 
decouple the elements of the duty in s76 (3) (a) and thus present the two duties as separate, 
just as the duties are at common law. Then the good faith element can become part of the 
BJR formulation without fears of the consequence of including the proper purpose element. 
However, as demonstrated in a recent judgment in Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop 
Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others even the ‗proper purpose‘ part of s76 (3) (a) may prove to be very 
useful in the review of directors‘ decision-making process.
55
 Rodgers J ruled that there exists 
a close relationship between the requirement that the power
56
 should be exercised for a proper 
purpose and the requirement that the directors should act in what they consider to be the best 
interests of the company‘.
57
    
 
 
(ii) Characterisation of BJR as a standard of review 
 
As already established in this work, when allegations of breach of  duty are made, 
BJR provides the test a court is to apply when it reviews a director‘s conduct.  Thus the duty 
of care for example, is the standard of conduct, while BJR provides a standard of review. 




 empowering legal 
frameworks.  
 
(iii) Specifying that a ‗business judgment‘ or ‗business decision‘ was made, necessary?  
 
Australian and US formulations use the descriptive term ‗business judgment‘
60
 while 
s76 (4) (a) intimates the same thing without clearly specifying it. In Australia, a ‗business 
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 See Farrar (2011) SAcLJ 761. 
55
 Visser Sitrus (supra) at paras 80 – 85. . 
56
 See the power to be exercised by directors referred to in the opening statement to s76 (4) (a). 
57
 Visser Sitrus (supra) at para 80. 
58
 See part 3.3.2 of Chapter 3. 
59
 See part 3.4.2 of Chapter 3. 
60
 See s180 (2) of the Corporations Act 2001 and the ALI formulation of the rule in the US respectively. 
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judgment‘ is also clearly defined.
61
 Does South Africa  need to specify that the decision 
referred to especially in s76 (4) (a) (iii) is a ‗business decision‘?. As already established in 
this work, s76 (4) (a) differs from the Australian and US laws in the scope of protection 
offered to ‗decisions‘ of directors in the exercise of their powers and performance of their 
functions.   S 76 (4) (a) can be read to provide wider protection to the ‗decisions‘ of the 
director beyond the traditional limitations of BJR – which focuses on protection of business 
judgments.
62
 I thus conclude in this respect, that it was unnecessary and indeed out of 
character of what appears like a legislative design, for the legislature to have specified that 
the decision is a business judgment. A business judgment is subsumed in the wider 
application of s76 (4) (a) nonetheless.  
 
7.2.4 A critical analysis of standards of care, skill and diligence under the Act 
Chapters 4 and 5 are critical in answering the central question whether the Act has 
made standards of care, skill and diligence clearer, more accessible and enforceable than 
before in the light of the adoption of BJR. Chapter 4 tackled the question regarding the 
standards of conduct. Chapter 5 considered the impact of BJR on application and 
enforceability of the standards of care, skill and diligence in the context of decision-making. 
Chapter 4 was analysed in light of law reform objectives
63
 in tandem with the purposes of the 
Act. It was established that the Act set out to achieve various purposes. The most relevant are 
the need to promote transparency, high standards of corporate governance
64
 and the need to 




Chapter 4 established that the relevant goals of law reform referred to above were 
partly achieved by the Act. For example, the fact that South Africa now has a statutory duty 
of care, skill and diligence should be hailed, and this is in line with the purpose of promoting 
transparency of relevant standards.  Transparency through a code also means improvement of 
accessibility of the law to users such as company directors, prescribed officers, inter alia. The 
adoption of the statutory defences of delegation and reliance is also a positive development in 
the law as argued in Chapter 4.
66
 Apart from it being desirable in a modern economy to 
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 See s180 (3) of the Corporations Act 50 2001. 
62
 See part 5.4.2 (iii) of Chapter 5.  
63
 See the DTI Policy document 2004. 
64
 See s7 (b) (iii) of the Act. 
65
 See s 7 (l). 
66
 Part 4.5. 
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promote enterprise efficiency, the presence of these defences strengthens the argument that 
corporate governance standards need to be tightened up and promotes enterprise efficiency. 
Therefore in a nutshell, there is little doubting that the Act has achieved the goal of 
accessibility and transparency in the law.
67
 The Act has provided an excellent starting point 
for modernisation of standards of care. There appears to be a legislative intent to put in place 
a predictable and effective environment for the regulation of companies.    
However, a critical analysis of s 76(3)(c) as part of s76 revealed worrying ambiguities 
in the formulation of the standards of care, skill and diligence. The question of the status of or 
the relationship between the statutory duty and common law has already been dealt with 
under 7.2.3 above.
68
 The main concern revealed in Chapter 4, pertains to lack of clarity of the 
standards established by s76(3)(c).
69
 It is not clear what test is applicable due to the manner 
the standards were formulated. If the test cannot be easily ascertained, this affects 
enforcement of the duty. It is not very clear whether the Act has improved from the 
dominantly subjective elements at common law. The purpose discernible from the law reform 
objectives and purposes of the Act was to ensure better standards. Yet s76(3)(c) does not 
make it clear if the legislature has simply confirmed the subjective standards at common law, 
or has achieved an upgrade from the common law.  There is therefore a case to be made for 
clearer standards of care, skill and diligence in line with the purposes of the Act. 
 
7.2.5 BJR under the Act – a standard of review 
 Chapter 5‘s contribution to answering the central question of this study is two-fold. 
Firstly, the chapter analysed s76 (4) (a) to establish the scope, content and rationale for BJR 
under the Act. Secondly, the chapter investigated whether BJR could have the effect of 
limiting the enforcement of the duty of care, skill and diligence. Chapter 5 highlighted some 
positives
70
 as well as criticisms which could be levelled against s76 (4) (a).
71
   
 Adoption of BJR is one of the many innovations of the Act, and there are many 
positives to be drawn from s76 (4) (a).
72
 The South African version of BJR can be said to be 
comparable to international best practice standards. It has incorporated aspects from the US 
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 See part 4.6 of Chapter 4. 
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 Also see an examination of the matter in part 4.4.1 of Chapter 4. 
69
 See part 4.4.3. 
70
 See part 5.4.3 of Chapter 5. 
71
 See part 5.4.4. 
72
 See part  
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and Australian versions of the BJR.
73
 A closer look at the purposes of the Act and provisions 
of s76(4)(a)  reveal a recognition in South Africa of  international thinking about business 
and its leadership. Companies are increasingly being seen as a means of growing national 
economies, as well as a means of achieving economic and social benefits.
74
 Directors in their 
leadership role are encouraged to promote enterprise efficiency.
75
 The Act acknowledges that 
directors have to make business decisions, at times under imperfect circumstances and while 
confronting tensions inherent in the corporate form.
76
 As such the Act sought to encourage 
informed risk-taking and to avoid the excessive limiting of entrepreneurial flair. The Act 
counterbalanced this by putting in place measures to encourage responsible management of 
companies.
77
 BJR represents the best of these measures under the Act to ‗balance the rights 
and obligations of shareholders and directors within companies‘.
78
 Directors‘ right or 
freedom to govern the company
79
 is constrained by the need for them to be accountable for 
the exercise of the powers accorded them under the Act.  
One way in which shareholders can make directors accountable is through institution 
of liability claims in case of alleged violation of a director‘s duty towards the company.
80
 
Thus BJR provides a standard of review or a test to be applied when a director‘s conduct is 
reviewed by a court.
81
  The standard of review established by s76 (4) (a) is an objective one 
as argued under Chapter 5.
82
 There is nothing that suggests that the purpose of the BJR is to 
dilute the effectiveness of the duty of care under the Act. As already stated, BJR provides a 
standard by which the duty of care, skill and diligence (standard of conduct) can be reviewed. 
 While there are positives regarding the adoption of BJR under the Act, some 
criticisms can be levelled against s76 (4) (a). Most of these criticisms against the BJR 
provisions under the Act have already been aptly captured under 7.2.3 above.
83
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 See s7 (b) (i) of the Act. 
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7.2.6 Legal framework for liability, interpretation and enforcement of standards 
 
The question that Chapter 6 attempted to answer is whether the Act has put in place 
sufficient mechanisms to ensure effective application and enforcement of standards. The 
chapter has analysed and established the three correlatives for effective enforcement of 
standards. These include knowledge of consequences of breach of standards – liability issues, 
a potentially effective framework for interpretation of standards and multiple dispute 
resolution fora.  This chapter observed that the Act has put in place a legal framework to 
ensure effective enforcement of standards. The chapter analysed the Act and re-affirmed what 
is the appropriate method for interpreting the standards of care, skill, diligence and BJR.
84
 
7.3 Recommendations and proposals for law reform.    
Gaps in law and ambiguities in the standards of care, skill and diligence under s76 (3) 
(c) and standards of review under s76 (4) (a) have been highlighted in this Chapter
85
 as also 
noted throughout this Study. Recommendations and/or proposals to improve the law will now 
be made below. The approach is to make separate proposals for amendment of standards of 
care, skill and diligence under s76 (3) (c), as well as amendments to s76(4)(a) and to also 
make general recommendations. 
 
7.3.1 Proposals for improving standards of care, skill and diligence 
 
A proposal to clarify the status of s76 (3) (c) vis-à-vis common law 
 
It is proposed that a subsection be inserted in s76 (3) to clarify the relationship between s76 
(3) (c) and the common law as follows: 
 
‘The provisions of this section have effect in addition to, and not in derogation of any duties 
of the director of a company under the common law or any other law’ 
Or 
‗The provisions of this section must be construed concurrently with, and not in substitution of 
any relevant common law principles and in line with provisions of s77 (2).’ 
 
                                                                
84
 See part 6.3 of Chapter 6. 
85
 See parts 7.2.3, 7.2.4 & 7.2.5 above. 
223 
 
Amendment of subsection of s76(3)(c) to ensure that the duty imposes a reasonable 
person test or at least dual objective/subjective standards, and should read as follows: 
 
…with the degree of care, skill and diligence 
(i) which may be expected from a reasonably diligent director carrying out similar functions 
in relation to the company; and 
(ii) taking cognisance of the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has  
 
7.3.2 Proposals for improving standards of review or BJR provisions in s76(4)(a)  
 
Amendment of parts of s76 (4) (a) to include the ‘good faith and for a proper purpose’ 
elements and thus ensuring that s76 (3) (a) becomes part of the BJR formulation and to 
ensure that the common law also forms part of the BJR formulation,
86
 as follows: 
…a particular director of a company – 
(a) will have satisfied the obligations of subsection (3)  (and delete (b) and (c) ) and 
the comparable obligations at common law  if – 
(i) the director has taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed about the 
     subject matter of the decision   
… 
(iii) the director made a decision including a business judgment in good faith and for 
a proper purpose… 
 
7.3.3 General Recommendations 
 
As a consequence of the proposed amendments to subsections 76(3)(c) and 76(4)(a) 
made in parts 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 above, the following proposals are made to give proper effect to 
the suggested improvements in the law: 
 
Proposed amendment to the title of s76 to reflect the proper characterisation of the BJR 
subsection (s76 (4) (a) ) as a standard of review, to avoid it being confused with a standard 
of conduct as is the case currently.
87
 The amendment will read as follows: 
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‗Standards of conduct and review‘ 
 
7.3.4 Recommendations on interpretation of and approach to standards 
 
It needs to be re-emphasised here that given the fact that the Companies Act 2008, 
which became effective only in May 2011 is still fairly new, no body of case law has evolved 
regarding the interpretation of s76(3)(c) and s76(4) (a). The best thing that can be done, as we 
prepare for the first case to ‗break the ice‘, is to propose the best approach that is aligned to 




Suggested judicial policy/approach towards interpretation of standards 
This approach is premised on the following five pillars: 
 
I. Need for proper understanding of the relationship between standards of conduct and 
review 
As demonstrated throughout this study,
89
 the Act presents directors‘ duty of care, skill 
and diligence as a standard of conduct, while BJR is a standard of review. Thus BJR is a test 
used to review a director‘s standard of conduct whenever a director faces liability claims for 
breaching his duty of care, skill and diligence as well as the fiduciary duty to act in the best 
interests of the company. This work has already proposed the inclusion of s76 (3) (a) of the 
Act as part of the BJR formulation under s76 (4) (a)..  
 
II Contextual approach to interpretation of s76 (3) (c) and s76 (4) (a) 
 
As established in Chapter 6, a proper examination of s5 and s158 shows that the most 
appropriate approach towards interpretation of provisions of the Act is the purposive or 
contextual approach.  This approach ensures that the judiciary, the Commission or the 
Tribunal should interpret standards of care, skill and diligence and standards of review in a 
manner that best promotes the spirit, purposes and objects of the Act.
90
 It is very clear that the 
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Act demands an interpretation of its provisions in a manner that promotes high standards of 
corporate governance.
91
 Thus, in line with proposals made in 7.3.1 above, the Act cannot be 
interpreted to have imposed the standards of care, skill and diligence which are as low as s76 
(3) (c) in its current form suggests. It is also clear that the Act intended to promote enterprise 
efficiency while at the same time ensuring responsible management of companies, as well as 
balancing the rights and obligations of directors and shareholders. Hence the standards 
represented by s76 (3) and s76 (4) (a) should be interpreted by courts of law to be geared 
towards promotion of informed risk-taking by directors. In other words, there should be a 
balance between enterprise efficiency promotion and responsible management. 
 
III Teleological interpretation and courts’ duty to develop common law 
Consideration of the normative value-laden constitutional framework given 
expression through objectives set in s39 (2) of the Constitution is key and a starting point to 
statutory interpretation in South Africa as demonstrated in this study.
92
 The appropriate 
interpretation method imposes on the courts the obligation to develop the common law 
whenever it is found to be necessary to do so in order to improve the realisation of rights 
under the Act.
93
  This is in line with the spirit, purport and objects of the Act as reflected in 
s158 (a) of the Act, read with the objectives of s39 (2) of the Constitution. 
 
IV Courts’ role to harmonise national corporate governance standards with international 
standards 
 It is further suggested and predicted here that South African courts are encouraged or 
mandated by the Act to contribute towards the harmonisation of provisions of the Act with 
relevant international experiences or evolving international standards.
94
   
 
V. Use of codes of corporate governance – especially King III as an aid for interpretation  
  Given the fact that the codes of corporate governance developed by the King 
Committee in South Africa have made a contribution to law reform, there is no reason why 
these reports should not be relied upon by the judiciary as an aid to statutory interpretation. 
The partial codification of directors‘ duties and the adoption of the BJR in a statute (in this 
case under the present Act) received support from King 1 and King II as demonstrated in this 
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 King III does not contain any recommendations unlike its predecessors. King III was 
developed specifically to be supportive of principles contained in the Act and to usher 
evolving international corporate standards or trends into South African corporate governance. 
Thus the report provides a link between those matters that were recommendations in the 
previous King reports but are now matters of the law under the Act.
96
 Hence King III could 
boldly suggest that the criteria of good governance, governance codes and guidelines will be 
relevant to determine what is regarded as an appropriate standard of conduct for directors.
97
  
In two very recent cases, South African courts demonstrated that corporate governance codes 
have potential to play a very meaningful role as interpretation aids during adjudication of 
matters.
98
 Therefore King III in particular will have to form part of the judicial policy towards 
interpretation of provisions of the Act.   
7.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS: The Future of Corporate Governance in South Africa 
 This Study has demonstrated that subsections 76(3) (c) and 76(4) (a) can be analysed 
and interpreted to reveal strengths as well as shortcomings. Despite the weaknesses for which 
proposals for law reforms have been made, there is no doubting that the overall legal 
framework under the Act provides potentiality for promoting high standards of corporate 
governance. For example, as demonstrated above and throughout this Study, the purposes of 
the Act can be a basis for making a case for tightening up standards where they are weak. 
Standards of conduct and review can and indeed should be interpreted in a manner that gives 
effect to the spirit, purposes and objects of the Act. A contextual interpretation of standards 
under the Act for example, should reveal that s76(3)(c) and s76(4)(a) complement each other 
as demonstrated. It is perhaps too early to make judgment as to whether the application of the 
BJR will detract from the effectiveness of the statutory or common law duty of care or not. 
Evidence from the Visser Sitrus case appears to indicate that directors‘ decisions are likely to 
enjoy a safe harbour where elements of s76 (4) (a) are satisfied.
99
 Visser Sitrus is just one of 
many decisions to come, and different courts may adopt a different attitude. Indications are 
that courts may follow a policy of deference to business judgments of directors where 
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requirements of s76 (4) (a) are satisfied, even if they may lead to a limitation of the rights of 
affected parties as was the result in Visser Sitrus.  The Act itself mandates courts and any 
forum interpreting and applying provisions to prefer an interpretation which best promotes 
values underpinning the Act.
100
 As aforementioned, the Act permits courts to enrich 
jurisprudence by infusing local standards with evolving international standards when 
interpreting and applying the Act.
101
  
The further potential of the Act is to be seen in the multiple forums for resolving 
disputes established by the Act. As stated previously, there is no point in establishing good 
standards, if those standards will not be effectively enforced. The Act has strengthened the 
liability regime for breach of standards. Another important factor to consider is the extended 
locus standi in s157 of the Act.  
All the factors stated above point towards the potentiality of increasing chances of 
incremental development of standards through future case law and effective application of 
standards. Courts of law have a critical role to play in further shaping the standards of 
corporate governance in the country.  Given the potential that exists under the Act, and the 
proposals made in this study, South Africa has reason to believe that corporate governance 












                                                                
100
 See s158 of the Act. 
101






Arsalidou Demetra The Impact of Modern Influences on the Traditional Duties of Care, Skill 
and Diligence of Company Directors Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/Boston 
2001 
Cassim FHI et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed. (Juta Claremont, 2012) 
Cilliers HS and Benade ML (ed) et al Corporate Law 3 ed. (Butterworth‘s, Durban, 2000) 
Davies PL Davies and Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law 7 ed (London Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2003) 
Davis D et al Companies and Other Business Structures in South Africa 2
nd
 ed (Oxford 
University Press, Southern Africa Pty Ltd, Cape Town, 2011) 
Dignam A Hicks & Goo’s Cases & Materials on Company Law 7ed (Oxford University 
Press, 2011). 
du Plessis JJ, Hargovan, Bagaric M, Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 2
nd
 
ed (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
Girvin S, Frisby S, Hudson A Charlesworth’s Company Law 18
th
 ed (Sweet and Maxwell, 
2010) 
Kellaway E Principles of Legal Interpretation of Statutes, Contracts & Wills (Butterworth 
Publishers Pty Ltd, South Africa, 2006)  
Lipton P and Herzberg A Understanding Company Law 6
th
 ed (Sydney: LBC Information 
Services, 1995) 
Mitchel PLR Insider Dealing and Directors’ Duties 2
nd
 ed (Butterworths, London, 1989) 
Mongalo TH (ed) Modern Company Law for a Competitive South African Economy (Juta 
Cape Town 2010) 
Neethling J, Potgieter JM & Visser PJ Law of Delict 6ed (Lexis Nexis, 2010)  
229 
 
Parkinson JE Corporate Power and Corporate Responsibility- Issues in the Theory of 
Company Law (Clarendon Press, 1995) 
Pretorius JT and Delport PA South African Company Law Through the Cases-A Source Book 
6
th
 ed (Juta & Co. Ltd, 1999) 
Pretorius JT, Delport PA, Havenga M and Vermaas M Hahlo’s South African Company 
Law Through The Cases 5th ed  (Juta Cape Town 1991). 
 
Tricker B Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices 2ed (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 




Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler (2002) ACSR 72 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey and Others [2011] FCA 717, 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey and Others (No.2) [2011] FCA 
1003 (Federal Court of Australia, Middleton J, 27 June 2011, 31 August 2011). 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd [2011] 
FCAFC 19 (Full Federal Court). 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Macdonald [NO 11] (2009) 256 ALR  
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Maxwell (2006) 59 ACSR 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2010) 75 ACSR 1.  
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Vines (2004) 48 ACSR 322.   
AWA v Daniels (1992) 7 ACSR  
Byrne v Baker [1964] VR 443. 
230 
 
Daniels (formerly practising as Deloitte Haskins & Sells) v Anderson (1995) 16 ACSR 607 
(NSW); (1995) 37 NSWLR 438. 
Gamble v Hoffman (1997) 24 ACSR 369  
Harlowes Nominees Pty Ltd v Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Co (1968) 121 CLR 
Mulkana Corp NL (in Liq) v Bank of New South Wales (1983) 8 ACLR 278 SC (NSW). 
The Bell Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (No.9) [2008] WASC 239 (28 October 
2008) [4362]. 
Re Property Force Consultancy Pty Ltd 1995 13 ACLC 
Vines v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2007) 62 ACSR 1, 149 
White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207. 
United Kingdom 
Bank of England v Vagliano Bros [1891] A.C. 
Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1. 
Corporate Affairs Commission v Drysdale (1978) 141 CLR. 
Dorchester Finance Co v Stebbing [1989] B.C.L.C 498. 
Dovey v Cory 1901 AC 477. 
Earl of Halsbury LC in Dovey v Cory 1901 AC 477. 
Ferguson v Wilson L.R 2 Ch.77. 
Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189. 
Gregson v HAE Trustees Ltd [2008] EWHC 1006 (Ch); [2009] 1 All E.R (Comm) 
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145 
Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum & Others [1974] 1 All ER 1126 (PC) 
Imageview Management Ltd v Jack [2009] BCLC 725 at 739 (CA). 
231 
 
In re Elgindatahad Ltd [1991] BCLC 959 Ch.  
In Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 (CA) 
Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi [2004] EWCA Civ. 1244.  
Keech v Sanford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61. 
Lagunas Nitrate Co v Lagunas Syndicate [1899] 2 Ch 392. 
Niagra Ltd (in Liquidation) v Langerman & others 1913 WLD 188. 
Norman v Theodore Goddard [1991] BCLC 1028 
Overend, Gurney & Co v Gibb (1872) LR HL 480.  
Principal Immigration Officer v Hawabu 1936 AD 26.  
Re Barings plc (No 5)  
Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 425 (ChD). 
Re Cardiff Savings Bank: Marquis of Bute’s Case [1892] 2 Ch 100 
Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] 
Re Denham & Co (1884) LR 25 Ch D 752. 
Re D’Jan of London Ltd [1993] BCC 646 
Re Elgindata Ltd 1991 BCLC 959. 
Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd [1994] BCC 161. 
Re Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co (1882) 23 Ch. D.I.PP. 
Re Mea Corporation Ltd [2007] BCC 288 
Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL). 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Tjolle [1998] BCC 282. 
Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd [1972] 2 KB 9 (CA). 
232 
 
Sub Nom Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker and others (No 5) [1999] 1 
BCLR 433 (Ch D) 
Turquand v Marshall (1896) LR 4 Ch App 379.  
 
United States America 
Aronson v Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) 
Brehm v Eisner 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000).  
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del.1993).   
Cf Brane v Roth 590 NE 2d 587 at 592. (Ind App , 1992). 
Godbold v Branch Bank Mobile 11 Ala. 191 (1847) 
Guth v Loft, Inc., 5 A. 2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).  
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v Stanley 770 F. Supp 1281 N.D.Ind. (1991). 
Francis v United Jersey Bank 432 A. 2d 814 821-823 (1981) 
Joy v North, 692 F. 2d 880, 885-886 (2d Cir. 1982) 
McMillan v Beran 755 A.2d 910, 916-917 (Del. 2000).  
Miller v Schreyer 683 NYS 2d 51 at 54 (App Div, 1999). 
Omincare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003). 
Rankin v Cooper 149 F. 1010 (1907) at 1013 
Shlensky v Wrigley case 237 N.E. 2d 776 (III. App. Ct 1968). 
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.1971).  
Smith v Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 873 (1981) 





Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim 2008 (2) SA 303 (C). 
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (4) SA 
490 (CC). 
Ben-Tovim v Ben-Tovim and Others 2001 (3) SA 1074 (CPD). 
Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA).   
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
2001 4 SA 938 (CC). 
Caxton Ltd v Reeva Forman (Pty) Ltd 1990 (3) SA 547 (A). 
Cohen v Segal 1970 (3) 702 (W). 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Friedman NO 1993 (1) SA 353 (A) 370. 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v MacNeillie’s Estate 1961 (3) SA 833. 
Corporate Affairs Commission v Drysdale (1978) 141 CLR 236. 
Dadoo v Krugersdoorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530. 
Da Silva & Others v CH Chemicals (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 620 (SCA). 
Dhlomo v Natal Newspapers (Pty) Ltd (1) SA 945 (A). 
Dorbyl Vehicle Trading & Finance Co (Pty) Ltd v Klopper 1996 (2) SA 237 (N) 24. 
Du Plessis NO v Phelps (1995) (4) SA 165 (C). 
Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZACC 30. 
Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 (A). 
Fisheries Development Corporations of SA Ltd v Jorgensen & another; Fisheries 
Development Corporations of SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd & others 1980 (4) SA (W). 
Heneway Freight Services (Pty) Ltd v Klaus Grogor [2006] SCA 116 (RSA) 
234 
 
Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588 (W) 618.  
Howard v Herrigel NNO (1991) (2) SA 660 (A). 
Investigating Directorate: Serious Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re 
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC). 
Jaga v Donges NO and Another; Bhana Donges NO and Another 1950 (4) SA 653 (A) 662.  
Land and Agricultural Development Bank of SA v Parker [2004] 4 All SA 261 (SCA). 
Levin v Felt and Tweeds 1951 (2) SA 401 (A) 414. 
Lordon v Dusky Dawn Investments (in liquidation) (Pearmain Intervening) 1988 (4) SA 519 
(SECLD) 521 B-D.  
Lupacchini NO v Minister of Safety and Security [2011] 2 All SA 138 (SCA). 
Maasdorp v Haddow 1959 (3) SA 861 (C) 866. 
Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd 2006 5 SA 333 (W). 
Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA). 
Niagra Ltd (in liquidation) v Langerman & Others 1913 WLD 188. 
Philotex (Pty) Ltd & Others v Snyman & Others (1998) (2) SA 138 (SCA) 
PPWAWU National Provident Fund v Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers’ Union 2008 (2) SA 351 (W). 
Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168. 
S v De Jager 1965 (2) SA 616 (A). 
S v Hepker 1973 (1) SA 472 (W) 484. 
S v Shaban 1965 (4) SA 646 (W) 652. 
South African Broadcast Corporation Ltd v Mpofu [2009] 4 All SA 446. 





Esser Irene-Marie Recognition of Various Stakeholder Interests in Company Management 
(unpublished PhD thesis, UNISA, 2008).  
Moyo NJ South African Principles of Corporate Governance: Legal and Regulatory 
Restraints on Powers and Remuneration of Executive Directors Published LLM Thesis 
(UNISA 2010). 
 
Journal Articles  
Ahern D, ―Directors‘ duties, Dry Ink and the Accessibility Agenda‖ (2012) Law Quarterly 
Review Vol.128. 
Bainbridge S ‗The Business Judgment Rule as an abstention Doctrine‘ (2004) 57 Vand. L. 
Rev. 83 at 84. 
Barnard J, ―Corporate Boards and the New Environmentalism‖ (2006-2007) 31 William & 
Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 291-316. 
Bekink M, ‗An Historical Overview of the Director‘s Duty of Care and Skill: From the 
Nineteenth Century to the Companies Bill of 2007 (2008) South African Law Journal. 
Blair Margaret M. & Stout Lynn A. ‗A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law (1999) 85 
Virginia Law Review 288. 
Botha D & Jooste R, ‗A critique of the Recommendations in the King Report regarding a 
Director‘s Duty of Care and Skill‘ South African Law Journal Vol. 114 65-76 
Bouwman N, ‗Modification of the Director‘s duty of care and skill‘ (2009) 21 SA Mercantile 
Law Journal 509-534. 
Branson D, ‗A Business Judgment Rule for Incorporating Jurisdictions in Asia?‘ (2011) 23 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 687-713  
Branson D, ‗The Rule that isn‘t a Rule- The Business Judgment Rule‘ (2002) 36 Valparaiso 
University Law Review 631-654. 
Bruner CM, ‗Is the Director‘s Duty of Care a ‗Fiduciary‘ Duty? Does it Matter?‘ (2013) 48 
Wake Forest Law Review 1027-1054. 
236 
 
Cassidy J, ‗Models for Reform: The Directors‘ Duty of Care in a Modern Commercial 
World‘ (2009)3 Stellenbosch Law Review 373-406. 
Cassidy J ‗An Evaluation of Section 234(2) of the Corporations Law and the Directors‘ Duty 
of Care, Skill and Diligence‘ (1995) Australian Business LR 184. 
Comino V ‗Effective Regulation by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission: 
The Civil Penalty Problem‘ (2009) 33 Melbourne Univ. Law R. 803-832. 
DeBow Michael E. & Lee Dwight R., ‗Shareholders, Nonshareholders and Corporate Law: 
Communitarianism and Resource Allocation‘, (1993) 18 Delaware Journal Corporate Law 
397. 
du Plessis JJ  ‗A comparative analysis of directors‘ duty of care, skill and South Africa and 
Australia‘ (2010) 1 Acta Juridica 263-289. 
Eisenberg MA, ‗The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in 
Corporate Law‘ (1993) 62 Fordham L. Rev.  444-445. 
Eisenberg MA, ‗The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers‘ (1990) 51 Uni of Pitt 
L. Rev 945 
Esser I & Coetzee J ―Codification of Directors‘ Duties‖ (2004) Juta’s Business Law 12. 
Esser IM & Delport P ‗The Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence: The King Report and the 2008 
Companies Act‘  (2011) 74 THRHR 449-455. 
Farrar J, ‗Directors‘ duties of care: Issues of Classification, Insolvency and Business 
Judgment and the Dangers of Legal Transplants‘ (2011) 23 Singapore Academy of Law 
Journal 745-761. 
Finch V ‗Company Directors: Who Care About Skill and Care?‘ (1992) 55 The Modern Law 
Review 179-214. 
Freeman R.E. ‗The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions‘ (1994) 4 
Business Ethics Quarterly 409. 
Gill A ‗Corporate Governance as Social Responsibility: A Research Agenda‘ (2008) 26:2 
Berk. J. Int. Law 452. 
237 
 
Gregory William A, ‗The Fiduciary Duty of Care: A Perversion of Words‘ (2005) 38 Akron 
L.Rev 181-183 
Hamermesh LA & Gilchrist S III ‗Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A 
Reply to Professor Johnson‘ (2005) 60 The Business Lawyer 865-876. 
Hargovan A, ‗Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Macdonald [NO 11]: 
Corporate Governance Lessons From James Hardie‘ (2009) 33 Melbourne Univ. Law R. 
Havenga M, ‗The Business Judgment Rule-Should we Follow the Australian Example?‘ 
(2000) South African Mercantile Law Journal.   
Hazen Thomas Lee ‗The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral 
Values‘ (1991) 69 North Carolina Law Review 278. 
Heracleous Loizos and Lan Luh Luh ‗Agency Theory, Institutional Sensitivity, and Inductive 
Reasoning: Towards a Legal Perspective‘ (2012) 49 Journal of Management Studies 223-
239.  
Jensen Michael ‗Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective 
Function‘ (2001) 14:3 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 297.  
Johnson L, ‗Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate 
Purpose‘ (2013) 38 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 406-451. 
Jolls C, ‗A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economic (1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev 1471 at 1523-
1527 
Jones E, ―Directors‘ Duties: Negligence and the Business Judgment Rule‖ (2007) 19 South 
African Mercantile Law Journal 326-336. 
Joash Amupitan ‗Status of a Company Director- An Agent, Trustee or Employee‘ (2000) 4 
JPPL 60-70 
Keay  Andrew ―Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: Ana Analysis of the United 
Kingdom‘s ‗Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach‘ ‖ (2007) 29:577 Sydney Law Review 
590. 
Manne HG ‗Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics‘ (1967)53 VA. L. Rev 259. 
238 
 
McLennan JS, ―Duties of Care and Skill of Company Directors and Their Liability for 
negligence‖ (1996) 8 South African Mercantile Law Journal 94-102. 
McMillan L ‗The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine‘ (2013) 4 Wm. & Mary 
Bus. L. Rev. 521. 
Michael Bradley et al ‗The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary 
Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads (1999) 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 
Mildred Bekink ‗An Historical Overview of the Director‘s Duty of Care and Skill: From the 
Nineteenth Century to the Companies Bill of 2007‘(2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 95 at 97.   
Millon David ‗Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law (1993) 50 
Washington and Lee Law Review 1378.  
Millon David, ‗Theories of the Corporation‘, (1990) Duke Law Journal at 205-232. 
Norman E & Di Guglielmo CT ‗What happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance 
from 1992- 2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments‘ (2005) 153 U. PA. L. Rev 
1399. 
Reisberg A, ―Corporate Law in the UK after Recent Reforms: The Good, the Bad and the 
Ugly‖ (2010) 63 Current Legal Problems 315-374.    
Santow K, ―Codification of Directors‘ Duties (1999) 73 ALJ 336 
Sneirson, Judd F ‗Doing Well By Doing Good: Leveraging Due Care for Better, More 
Socially Responsible Corporate Decision-making‘ (2007) 3 Corporate Governance Law 
Review. 
Tunc, A ‗The Judge and the Businessman‘ 1986 (102) Law Quarterly Review 560. 
Velasco Julian ‗The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder‘ (2006) 40:407 University of 
California Davis Law Review 412. 




Weng C ―Assessing the Applicability of the Business Judgment Rule and the ―Defensive‖ 
Business Judgment Rule in the Chinese Judiciary: A Perspective on Takeover Dispute 
Adjudication‖ (2010) 34 Fordham International Law Journal 124-146. 
Reports 
American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: 
Restatement and Recommendations, 1982 (United States of America).  
The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (The Institute of Directors in 
Southern Africa), King I, 1994. 
The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (The Institute of Directors in 
Southern Africa), King II, 2002 
The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (The Institute of Directors in 
Southern Africa), King III, 2009. 
Report of the Committee on The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (the Cadbury 
Report), (published on 1 December 1992, Gee and Co. Ltd).  
Legislation, Policy Papers & other Regulatory Instruments 
Auditing Profession Act 26 of 2005 (South Africa). 
Close Corporation Act 69 of 1984 (South Africa). 
Companies Act, Cap.46 of 2006 (United Kingdom) 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 (South Africa). 
Companies Act 71 of 2008, GN 421 2009 in GG 32121, April 2009 (South Africa).  
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, (South Africa). 
Corporations Act 2001 (Australia). 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (South Africa). 
German Stock Corporations Act 2005 (Germany) 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (South Africa). 
240 
 
Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 
South African Company Law for the 21
st
 Century: Guidelines for Corporate Reform, 2004, 
GN 1183 in GG 2004-06-23 (South Africa). 




‗A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility‘ available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0681:FIN:EN:PDF accessed on 4 
March 2013. 
Cooper SM, Corporate Governance in Developing Countries: Shortcomings, Challenges and 
Impact on Credit, a paper presented at the Modern Law for Global Commerce Congress of 
UNCITRAL, Vienna 9-12 July 2007, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Cooper_S_rev.pdf 
Edelman James ‗Directors and Fiduciary Duties: The Story of Nocton v Lord Ashburn‘ (May 
23, 2012) available at 
http://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/_files/Directors_and_Fiduciary_Duties_20120523.pdf , 
accessed on 19 August 2013      
JSE Listings Requirements available at http://www.jse.co.za/listing_requirements.jsp , 
accessed on 20 February 2013. 
Keay Andrew ‗Moving Towards Stakeholderism? Constituency Statutes, Enlightened 
Shareholder Value, and all that: Much ado about little?‘ electronic copy available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1530990 at 5-6, accessed on 19 July 2013. 
Kershaw, David, ‗The Rule in Foss v Harbottle is Dead; Long Live the Rule in Foss v 
Harbottle‘ (January 30, 2013). LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 5/2013. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209061 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2209061 accessed 
on 02 September 2013.   
Linda Mswaka ‗Corporate governance under the South African Companies Act: A critique‘, 
available at   http://ssrn.com/abstract=2184678 accessed on 19 February 2013. 
241 
 
Lindsay KH, ―Codification of directors‘ duties- Between the devil and the deep blue sea‖, 
available at http://www.hrfuture.net/governance/codification-of-directors-
duties.php?Itemid=153 
McCarthy, C.2009. The global financial and economic crisis and its impact on Sub-Saharan 
economies.  tralac Trade Brief 1. Available at http://www.tralac.org/wp-
content/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/TB012009GlobalCrisis20090401Fin.pdf 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004 document, available at 
www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf, accessed on 16 
February 2013. 
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Carbon Tax Option, December 2010- A South 
African Discussion paper, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/Discussion%20Paper%20Carbon%20Taxes
%2081210.pdf  
1Time files for liquidation, available at http://www.iol.co.za/business/companies/1time-has-
filed-for-liquidation-1.1416938#.UNQD52edJRw 
‗What is responsible investment?‘ available at http://www.unpri.org/about-ri/introducing-
responsible-investment/ accessed on 4 March 2013. 
Zwinge T, Have Directors Duties Of Care And Skill Become More Stringent? What Has 
Driven This Development? Is This Development Beneficial- An analysis of the Duty of Care 
in the UK in Comparison to German Duty of Care, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1591590  
 
 
 
 
